21. Buying air warfare destroyers: a strategic decision
- Author:
- Hugh White
- Publication Date:
- 06-2005
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Lowy Institute for International Policy
- Abstract:
- The Air Warfare Destroyer [AWD] project is Australia's biggest proposed defence acquisition in decades. Cabinet has already chosen a company to build the ships. But before minsters go further and sign contracts, they should stop and ask two big questions which have not so far been properly considered. First, would AWDs do enough for Australia's defence to justify their cost, and what would we need to sacrifice to afford them? Second, are we buying them the right way? There are good reasons to think that the answer to both questions is no. The AWD's main purpose is to provide air defence for ADF amphibious operations in medium- to high-level conflicts. But such operations would not be a high priority for Australia. The forces we could deploy are small, and the risks they would face, even with AWDs, are daunting. And if it was necessary, amphibious operations could be better protected for air attack by proactive counter-air campaigns or fighter escorts. For coalition operations, AWDs would only add another option to a wide range of highly capable contributions we can already make, including submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, AEW and fighters. And AWDs would be marginal to any future development of ballistic missile defences for Australia. So AWDs would provide few important new military options. But their high price imposes big opportunity costs in the already-squeezed defence investment program. Unless Defence funding rises sharply, we can afford them only by cutting other major capabilities. The most likely trade-off is the JSF project; cutting that would have serious strategic costs. So ministers should not commit to buying the AWDs before they have reviewed the Defence Capability Plan as a whole to see the full implications for the ADF's overall capability. If ministers nonetheless decide to buy AWDs, they should look very carefully at how the project is being developed and managed. As they did with Navy's troubled Collins submarines and Seasprite helicopters, Defence is setting unique Australian requirements that will unnecessarily add to the cost and risk of the project. And they are experimenting with a new acquisition strategy that provides less competition and leaves more of the risk of the project in Defence's hands. A simpler and more competitive acquisition strategy would provide better value for money. The simplest and cheapest of all would be to buy overseas. There is no compelling strategic reason to buy AWDs, and even less to build them in Australia.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and Government
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Australia/Pacific