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Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Publishing Institution Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University

11. Islam And Politics in Present-Day Russia

Author:
Alexei Malashenko
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Despite the interest for Islam in Russia, for the Islamic factor in the country's domestic and foreign policy, and despite the growing number of publications on the subject, the Russian Muslim community remains largely a thing in itself, an enigma. In other words, there are more questions than answers here.
Topic:
Government and Religion
Political Geography:
Russia

12. International Dimensions of Corruption: The Russian Case

Author:
Louise Shelley
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The globalization of the fruits of Russian organized crime and corruption have affected Russia's international image and undermined state capacity. The departure of illicitly gained billions quickly diminished the capacity of even a once formidable power. It deprived Russia of the resources it needs to rebuild the state infrastructure, service its debts and pay the salaries and pensions of its citizens. The failure of a former superpower to meet the basic needs of its citizens has served as a powerful lesson to the international community. This occurred, in part, because those who controlled the state's capital could move money abroad in enormous amounts and great rapidity.
Topic:
Government and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia

13. Putin's Russia: A Confusing Notion of Corruption

Author:
Virginie Coulloudon
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
One of the main difficulties in examining corruption both under the Soviet regime and in post-Soviet Russia lies in its definition. Ever since Yurii Andropov launched systematic anticorruption campaigns in the late 1970s and raised the level of awareness of this social disease, all Soviet and Russian leaders have emphasized the necessity of eradicating corruption without really clarifying what particular phenomenon they had in mind. When analyzing Russian corruption, one is surprised to see how many forms it takes: from rule evasion and bribe taking to rent-seeking, abuses of power, embezzlement, bureaucratic extortion, and insider dealing. Adding to this already complex picture, the causes of such infringements of the law and endemic corruption are perceived differently in different contexts – whether under the Soviet regime or in post-Soviet Russia, or if such actions were motivated by the necessity to survive in an economically and politically hostile environment or merely by a thirst for personal gain.
Topic:
Government
Political Geography:
Russia

14. The Future of Russia: The Nuclear Factor

Author:
Oleg Bukharin
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Two factors were of critical significance in shaping the international peace and security agenda after the Cold War: the emergence of nuclear security and proliferation dangers in the wake of the Soviet collapse, and the unprecedented level of cooperation between Russia and other countries to address these problems. As a result of cooperative international and Russia's domestic efforts, important progress has been made in recent years in reducing nuclear arsenals, protecting Russia's nuclear materials, and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise from Russia. Much work, however, remains to be done.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia

15. Biological Weapons Threats from the Former Soviet Union

Author:
Sonia Ben Ouagrham
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Since September 11th, the American anthrax-laced letters and the war in Afghanistan have revived the interest of government officials, researchers and the general public to the state and security of former biological weapon (BW) facilities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). In the popular press, reports of the general economic crisis and the political unrest that characterize FSU countries tend to emphasize the proliferation threat from these countries. Very little is said, however, about the nuances of this threat, its nature and degree of probability. Some reports tend to overestimate the number of employees at former BW facilities, thus inflating the risks of brain drain. While at the same time, other major sources of proliferation, such as the diversion of pathogens or the illicit transfer of specialized equipment are usually ignored. The present paper aims to characterize more precisely the threat stemming from former BW facilities in the FSU by determining what type of resources are available at former BW facilities and to what extent they are accessible to states of concern or terrorist groups. Although the existing open source information enables us to determine more clearly the categories of personnel, the type of equipment and material that pose the greatest proliferation threat, it does not measure properly the extent of the threat, i.e. an inventory of past and present facilities, expertise, equipment and material. Nevertheless, we can conclude that specialized knowledge, equipment and dangerous pathogens are available at former BW facilities in the FSU and can become accessible to state or non-state actors wishing to start or develop covert BW programs. This is particularly true in Central Asia, where economic and security factors, associated with the geographic characteristics of this region all converge to form a chain of proliferation: seekers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their related technologies, potential suppliers and deliverers.
Topic:
Sovereignty and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, America, and Central Asia