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1. Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in India-South Korea Ties

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Both India’s and South Korea’s strategic choices are deeply influenced by the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific construct, particularly amid a mounting U.S.-China rivalry. With India’s “Look/Act East” policy and South Korea’s “New Southern Policy” offering a perfect stage for deepened mutual cooperation, both nations need to further their relations to build Asia’s future while advancing their respective national interests. With both countries following stringent foreign policies as a result of the actions of their immediate neighbors, they present a geopolitically strategic complementarity for their relationship to prosper and emerge as one of the most important relationships in the region. Seoul’s hesitation to overtly embrace the “Indo-Pacific” concept is not really a barrier; rather a geo-political overture to discard the balance of power politics and pursue an autonomous foreign policy. India’s preference for the “Indo-Pacific” is equally based on strategic autonomy, imbibing universal values and an inclusive regional order. Both countries emphasize a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific and have immense potential to establish security and connectivity partnerships as the keystone of their bilateral ties. With India and South Korea understanding the economic importance versus security ramifications of China, and with Japan’s reemergence as a key regional, if not global actor, both countries need to bring serious strategic intent to their relationship. Making use of the ASEAN platform and bilateral dialogues, South Korea and India have the potential to become one of the strongest Indo-Pacific partners of the 21st century
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, South Korea, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. Finding an Advocate: The Role of the Private Sector in Korea-Japan Relations

Author:
Jiwon Nam and Kristin Vekasi
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Tensions between South Korea and Japan are frustratingly persistent. Despite the shared interests of both countries, such as economic development in Southeast Asia, and keeping a robust alliance with the United States, South Korea and Japan maintain a bellicose relationship because of unresolved historical misunderstandings and territorial disputes. Inconsistent diplomatic policies and lack of strong leaders have made it difficult to prevent unnecessary hostility between South Korea and Japan. Fear of losing support has prevented politicians from pursuing friendly policies towards each other. Businesspeople, too, have been reluctant to pursue friendly policies towards each other, because of preconceived risks of being targeted for backlash. An examination of economic data shows these risks are minimal, and political tensions do not affect business or consumer behavior. Current efforts from both Korean and Japanese business organizations to improve cooperation include student exchange programs, recruitment processes, and public diplomacy. We urge the business community to advocate more to improve bilateral relations. Economic relations alone are insufficient to handle the task of improving a difficult relationship; there is also a need for leadership. In South Korea-Japan relations, the business community should step in and provide that role.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Business, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

3. Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean Language Policy Discourse on North Korea

Author:
Jeffrey Robertson
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
During 2017-18, international attention turned to the Korean Peninsula as the threat of conflict reached new heights. This led to an explosion in the growth of “North Korea watchers”— the community of scholars, analysts, government officers, NGO advocates, and journalists who commit a portion of their lives to following events in North Korea. Divides emerged in overlapping regional, professional, institutional (political), and linguistic differences that saw individuals take conflicting positions on key issues. This paper investigates just one of these divides—how language and culture impact policy discourse on North Korea. The study explores language as a source of division in the North Korea watching community. It uses Einar Wigen’s argument that international relations should be conceptualized as inter-lingual relations, which suggests that despite the narrowing of political vocabularies, residues of politico-cultural differences remain in how concepts are contextualized into discourse, even between close partners. The study assesses compatibility between English and Korean language conceptualizations of North Korea, through an assessment of core inputs into policy discourse. The study then discusses the implications for U.S.-South Korea relations, and ongoing efforts to strengthen Korean Peninsula security.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, Korea, and United States of America

4. Converting Maximum Pressure to Maximum Leverage: The Role of Sanctions Relief in Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign has led to the imposition of a nearly comprehensive international sanctions regime targeting North Korea and its nuclear weapons program. With negotiations underway, the question of whether to provide North Korea with partial sanctions relief in exchange for limited concessions on its nuclear program has been a major point of dispute between Washington and Pyongyang. This paper looks at sanctions as a form of coercive bargaining and examines the logic and challenges behind a strategy of incrementally exchanging relief from pressure for compliance with the sanctioner’s demands. It argues that taking an “all-or-nothing” approach to sanctions relief risks missing an opportunity to reduce the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program and squandering hard-won negotiating leverage, and outlines a framework for how a step-by-step approach might proceed.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

5. Renewable Energy in Trade Wars: Solar Power in South Korea’s Energy Mix and the Impact of Protectionism

Author:
June Park
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impacts of global competition in solar panel production and the conflict of domestic interests among solar-related industries in the U.S. on South Korea’s solar-focused renewable energy policy. Examining the Moon Jaein administration’s energy policy amid the impact of the U.S. safeguard on South Korean solar panels, the paper argues a) the U.S. safeguard is a hindrance to South Korea’s path forward on solar panel production, and b) Moon’s sole focus on sustainability and his ambitious solar energy target will result in further adoption of lower-cost Chinese solar panels, foregoing the opportunity to upgrade South Korean panels. As South Korean firms announce their decisions to relocate to the U.S. to avoid U.S. safeguard tariffs, the paper recommends the destinations of South Korean solar panel exports be diversified and the goals of South Korean energy policy be centered on balancing cost, stability, and sustainability. The paper does not necessarily recommend a full-fledged drive on expanding solar energy use in South Korea; rather, it calls for the strategic reevaluation of energy policy upon which a clear and sound strategy for solar energy should be formulated.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Trade Wars, Renewable Energy, and Solar Power
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, Korea, and United States of America

6. Re-Energizing Economic Integration between South Asia and East Asia

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This chapter focuses on economic integration (linkages) between South Asia and East Asia.2 The topic is important for three reasons. First, South Asia-East Asia (SA-EA) trade is a component of South-South trade and could be a useful buffer should North-South trade soften, or populism lead the North to view trade as a “zero-sum” game, as is presently the case in the United States and several countries in Europe. The withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in January 2017 and President Trump’s reiteration of his “America First” trade policy at the 2017 APEC meetings in favor of bilateralism and “fair trade” has generated interest in alternate trade policy options in the EA region.
Topic:
Economy, Regional Integration, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, East Asia, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

7. Japan in the Driver’s Seat? Reshaping the Regional Trade Order without the United States

Author:
T. J. Pempel
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
On January 28, 2018 representatives from eleven countries, following the strong leadership of Japan, agreed to a modified version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This new pact —renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP), or TPP-11—was formally signed in Chile on March 8. The treaty will take effect once ratified by at least six member countries. Japan is planning to push the treaty through the Diet within 2018 and anticipating that it will come into force sometime in 2019. The agreement represented a major recovery by the eleven countries following initial expectations that TPP was dead after the election of Donald Trump. Trump, as an early follow through on his xenophobic and unilateral campaign promises, signed an executive order pulling the United States out of the TPP within one hundred hours of his inauguration. With that stroke of his pen, Trump wiped out 10 years of work on the so-called “Pacific” route to regional trade integration, anchored on the U.S. market. It also defied multiple analyses demonstrating the strong economic benefits that TPP would provide for the United States. Turmoil immediately prevailed among the remaining eleven signatories. Japanese prime minister Abe, for example, only weeks after Trump’s election announced, “TPP is meaningless without the U.S.” Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong argued, “if the TPP does not go ahead, it would be a great loss for the rest of the member economies.” The National Interest was typical in its skepticism about both the survival of TPP and the long-term implications for the Asia-Pacific. In an article entitled “TPP is Dead; Now What?” it observed: “The United States’ withdrawal not only throws away the potential for a trade agreement but may cause countries that expended significant political capital for the TPP to retreat from free trade for the foreseeable future.” That China will be the primary beneficiary of Trump’s withdrawal was a widespread conclusion.5 In fact, as the signing of the CPTPP indicated, all eleven countries were prepared to recommit themselves to the deal and to continue to advance the goals of a liberal trading order in the region.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Economy, Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

8. The Chinese Perception of the U.S.-China-ROK Triangle

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since being applied to U.S.-Soviet-China trilateral relations after the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the notion/theory of “strategic triangles” has been widely used to examine many trilateral relations. The model of “U.S.-China plus one” is popular among students of U.S.-China relations and, consequently, the policy community has witnessed an increasing amount of scholarship on triangles among U.S.-China-India, U.S.-China-Japan, U.S.-China-Russia, and even U.S.-China-Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, this begs the question whether a strategic triangle could be construed and constructed among the United States, China, and South Korea. Generally speaking, despite the trilateral nature of U.S.-China-ROK relations, the Chinese policy community rarely subscribes to the existence of a strategic triangle among the U.S., China, and South Korea. This is not necessarily because South Korea does not carry the same strategic weight as the two great powers, but more importantly is because China does not see South Korea as possessing the strategic autonomy to act as an independent player in the trilateral relations. Although arguably such autonomy might exist in economic and trade relations, on key political and security issues, the Chinese see South Korea as invariably constrained by the U.S.-ROK military alliance and unable to form its own independent national security policy. In writing about the post-Cold War period with an emphasis on geopolitics, Chinese authors do not often treat South Korean policy or Sino-ROK relations as autonomous. Given the great weight given to the U.S. role, it is important, therefore, to take a triangular approach in assessing these writings centered on South Korea. I do so first explaining in more detail why the “strategic triangle” framework does not apply, then examining views on how this triangle has evolved in a period of rising Chinese power relative to U.S. power and fluctuating U.S.-ROK relations as the leadership in Seoul changed hands, and finally returning to the triangular theme to grasp how this shapes China’s understanding of Seoul’s policies with emphasis on the ongoing Moon Jae-in era.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

9. The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral: Better at Deterrence than Diplomacy?

Author:
Sheila A. Smith
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Once more, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have confronted a crisis with North Korea. The pattern is now well established. First, there is a provocation—a missile test, a nuclear test, and even worse, the use of force. Next, the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia muster their forces, strengthen their trilateral policy coordination, and sanction the belligerent Pyongyang. The three nations advocate for the accompanying effort by the United Nations Security Council to condemn North Korea’s behavior. Setting aside their political differences, Seoul and Tokyo intensify their military cooperation and Washington calls for greater trilateral unity in confronting a shared security challenge. In 2017, policymakers in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo found themselves in a similar cycle but with the threat of war ever more real. The dramatic escalation of tensions between President Donald J. Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un seemed to bring the region to the brink of a second Korean conflict. But today, just as dramatically, an accelerated series of high-level summits suggests that the Korean Peninsula could be on the brink of peace. President Moon Jae-in met with Kim at Panmunjom, and both Kim and Moon stepped across the line of demarcation at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea. The two leaders have embraced a “new era of peace,” with the promise of ending the state of war on the peninsula. Trump has also said he is willing to meet Kim to discuss denuclearization. CIA director Mike Pompeo visited Pyongyang on April 1 to test out that proposition, and as secretary of state, Pompeo had the lead in setting the stage for a meeting in Singapore. The Moon-Kim meeting set up the premise of a negotiated denuclearization process. Trump and Kim will define the contours of that path forward.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Peace
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

10. Doubling Down on the U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Olympics Diplomacy Did Not Breach Trust, but TrumpMoon Confidence Is in Jeopardy

Author:
Leif-Eric Easley
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-ROK alliance faced a quickening pace of North Korean provocations in 2016-17, with Pyongyang violating UN Security Council resolutions dozens of times. Those violations included a fourth nuclear test in January 2016, fifth in September 2016, and sixth in September 2017, as well as numerous missile tests of various trajectories from different platforms. North Korea tested intermediate-range missiles overflying Japan and missiles of intercontinental range on lofted trajectories, while developing road-mobile and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. As policymakers in Seoul and Washington coordinated responses to those provocations, changes in national leadership and domestic political preferences brought into question the bilateral trust the alliance needs to deter conflict, reassure publics, and promote regional cooperation. Elections have consequences, even before votes are cast. Enduring international security alliances are based on shared national interests and a track record of diplomatic commitments and military cooperation. For allies with highly integrated defense policies, such as the United States and South Korea, it is natural for policymakers and citizens to keenly observe the national elections of the other country. Will the next government be a reliable partner, or will it fail to honor existing agreements? Will the incoming leadership improve relations, or will it downgrade cooperation? These questions were being asked before Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in were elected. The search for answers inevitably involves speculation, feeding expectations that are often overly optimistic or pessimistic. Ahead of Trump’s election, his campaign rhetoric questioned the terms and intrinsic value of the alliance to an extent not seen since Jimmy Carter’s 1976 campaign promise to withdraw U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula. President Moon came to power on the heels of conservative president Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and removal for corruption. Moon’s politics are notably more progressive than Park’s or Trump’s, including a record of pro-engagement policies toward North Korea. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un delivered his 2018 New Year’s Day address claiming that North Korea has the ability to hit any U.S. city with a nuclear-armed missile, but that Pyongyang is ready to re-engage Seoul via participation in the Winter Olympics.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Alliance, Olympics, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America