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1. Dictators and Leadership: Lessons from Stalin and Mao

Author:
Graeme Gill
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The accepted wisdom about dictators is that they rule their political systems in an essentially arbitrary and willful manner. Their leadership colleagues are said to live in constant fear of the dictator, always vulnerable to his will and always looking to defend themselves against him. The leadership is shown as a Hobbesian “war of all against all” as the leader rules with no real restraint. This paper challenges that view. It will explain why such a view of leadership politics in authoritarian systems is inadequate, and will illustrate this by looking at two of the most egregious dictators of the twentieth century, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong.
Topic:
Communism, Democratization, Politics, Governance, Institutions, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

2. Who Protects Whom? Politicians, Police and the Regulation of Drug Trafficking in Argentina

Author:
Hernan Flom
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
In many developing countries with weak formal institutions, sectors within the state protect organized criminal activities, allowing illicit markets to thrive. This article posits that how state actors regulate drug trafficking affects the levels of violence associated with such criminal activity. I argue that political competition influences coordination within the police and leads to different types of regulatory regimes. On the one hand, coordinated forces implement protection rackets that contain violence. On the other, uncoordinated police carry out particularistic negotiations with drug traffickers that exacerbate criminal violence. I illustrate this argument with a subnational comparison of two Argentine provinces, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, during a period in which both witnessed a surge in drug trafficking but only one (Santa Fe) suffered a dramatic increase in criminal violence. These cases show how corrupt states can obtain relative order in highly fragmented drug markets, and how the police shape the evolution of drug dealing in metropolitan areas.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Democracy, Social Justice, Violence, Public Policy, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Argentina and South America

3. Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programs Improve Collective Action? Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination and Social Norms

Author:
Sandra Polanía-Reyes
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
This study tests an unintended benefit of a conditional cash transfer program in Colombia: the ability to overcome coordination failures. Participants interact with fellow beneficiaries, which gives rise to a coordination device. Beneficiaries participate in a minimum effort coordination game. Those enrolled in the program for over a year are exerting the highest level of effort. The improvement in coordination is not due to potential confounds such as willingness to cooperate or connectivity. A structural choice model illustrates that when beliefs about other’s behavior are sufficiently high the Pareto- dominant equilibrium holds. The findings support nascent initiatives to influence beliefs through policy interventions.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Political Economy, Poverty, Communications, Governance, Inequality, Economic growth, Public Policy, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, and Latin America

4. Comparative Continuismo: Presidential Term Limit Contravention Across Developing Democracies

Author:
Kristin McKie
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
Since presidential term limits were (re)adopted into many constitutions during the third wave of democratization, 207 presidents across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia have reached the end of their terms in office. Of these, 30% have attempted to contravene term limits whereas 70% have stepped down in compliance with tenure rules. Furthermore, of the presidents who have attempted to alter tenure restrictions, some have succeeded in fully abolishing term limits, others have only managed a one-term extension, while a minority have failed in their bids to secure any additional terms in office. What explains these divergent trajectories? On the basis of a series of statistical analyses, I argue that trends in electoral competition over time are the best predictor of the range of term limit contravention outcomes across the board, with the least competitive elections permitting full term limit abolition and the most competitive elections saving off attempts at altering executive tenure rules. Furthermore, results show that failed contravention attempts are true borderline cases, rather than instances gross miscalculations of success by the president and her party, in that they feature less competitive elections than non-attempt cases but more competitive elections than successful contravention cases. These findings suggest a linkage between political uncertainty and constitutional stability more generally.
Topic:
Democratization, Democracy, Institutions, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, Asia, and Latin America