Search

Begin New Search Publishing Institution James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

11. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in China and North Korea through Remote Sensing Imagery

Author:
Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although uranium mining and milling constitute the first step in any nuclear-weapons program, nuclear nonproliferation analysts have devoted surprisingly little attention to monitoring these processes. Understanding and monitoring uranium mines and mills can provide deeper insight into fissile-material production. This report focuses on the insights gleaned from remotely sensed images of known Chinese uranium mines and mills to understand the current status of uranium mining and milling in North Korea.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

13. Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling in India and Pakistan through Remote Sensing Imagery

Author:
Melissa Hanham, Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, and Ben McIntosh
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #41 details existing and potential uranium mines and mills in India and Pakistan as part of an ongoing project to track uranium production in Asian states that possess nuclear weapons. As non-signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, India and Pakistan face challenges procuring fissile material from foreign sources. Both countries have ongoing nuclear-weapon programs, clear and increasing demands to supply their nuclear-energy programs, and domestic production deficits. The continuing and increasing demand for uranium in India and Pakistan indicates that domestic uranium production is likely to grow significantly in the near future. This paper explores remote-sensing techniques that can allow open-source analysts to monitor and track front-end uranium production activity in these countries. India and Pakistan both have plans to expand their nuclear-energy industries, increasing both countries’ demands for uranium. However, without membership in the NPT, both countries face a multitude of challenges to importing uranium. They are not entitled to receive nuclear-related technologies from nuclear-weapon states, nor are they allowed to trade nuclear materials with any NPT states parties. This leaves only non-signatory countries as possible trading partners: Israel, North Korea, and South Sudan. Pakistan has a history of trade with North Korea through the now-defunct A.Q. Khan network. Both India and Pakistan are expanding existing uranium mines and mills and funding exploratory research into new sites for uranium-resource exploitation. Both countries still rely heavily on domestic production of uranium resources, which allows analysts to gain significant insight into their nuclear capabilities by monitoring domestic uranium-production sites. The operational output of a mine or processing plant can be gauged by weighing numerous factors, including the amounts of vehicle traffic, construction on the site, tailings and waste piles, and changes in the surrounding environment.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Surveillance, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

14. he Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium Management Approaches

Author:
John Carlson, Leonard Spector, and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #42 discusses issues relating to separated, or unirradiated, plutonium in civilian nuclear programs, that is, plutonium that has been chemically separated from spent nuclear reactor fuel by reprocessing but has not been reintroduced into a nuclear reactor after separation and subjected to further irradiation. Efforts to limit the spread of reprocessing in the civilian sector crystalized in the mid-1970s. Two developments triggered the intensified attention to this issue: (1) India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device, which used as its core plutonium produced in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear-research program, and (2) attempts on the part of several states that had not renounced nuclear weapons to obtain reprocessing plants for their civil nuclear power programs. In the intervening forty-four years, in those states that proceeded with civilian reprocessing programs, stocks of separated civilian plutonium have continued to grow in the aggregate. Taken together today, they are substantially greater than worldwide military plutonium stocks. Multiple approaches to limiting the separation of civil plutonium have been implemented, and still others have been given serious study, but stocks have increased regardless, while options for working down these stocks appear to be diminishing. Meanwhile, concern has deepened over the possible theft or diversion of this material, which could bring weapon-sufficient quantities of plutonium into the hands of violent extremists. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are valuable, but they do not fully address the risks of breakout from nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Safeguards are intended to provide timely warning of diversion, so as to provide an opportunity for intervention. However, even if diversion of plutonium is detected immediately, the plutonium could be weaponized too quickly for effective preventive measures. Nor are safeguards designed to address nuclear-material security issues. Accordingly, there is a need for institutional and technical measures to mitigate risks from separated plutonium. This report recommends steps to address the risks posed by existing reprocessing programs and stocks as well as ways to discourage potential new programs.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Nuclear Power, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. North Korea’s International Scientific Collaborations: Their Scope, Scale, and Potential Dual-Use and Military Significance

Author:
Joshua Pollack and Scott LaFoy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has described research and development as crucial to his regime’s efforts to overcome the international sanctions regime. By developing key technologies indigenously, North Korea seeks to reduce its need to import sensitive goods that might otherwise be denied to it through export controls, sanctions enforcement, or lack of funds. Direct collaboration between North Korean and foreign scientists is playing an expanding role in the regime’s pursuit of technological advancement. To assess the extent of this activity, and to identify collaborative research involving dual-use technologies and other technologies of potential military significance, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey developed a new dataset capturing publications coauthored by North Korean scientists and foreign scientists between 1958 and April 2018.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

16. Findings from the 2016 Symposium on Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies

Author:
Steven Fairchild, Caroline R. M. Kennedy, Philippe Mauger, Todd J. Savage, and Raymond A. Zilinskas
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The Symposium on the Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies was held during October 18-20, 2016 in Monterey, California, USA. Co-hosted by the International Biosecurity and Prevention Forum (IBPF) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the symposium’s objectives were to identify emerging biotechnologies that are candidates for export control as well as effective mechanisms for their enforcement. A total of sixty experts from fifteen countries participated in the symposium. They represented the scientific, policy, industry, legal, and enforcement fields in roughly equal proportions. Attendees participated in one of nine working groups that were tasked with identifying emerging biotechnologies of concern and which, therefore, could be subject to realistic mechanisms for export control. In the event, participants identified seventeen emerging biotechnologies and services and debated whether each posed significant biosecurity risks. Participants then assessed options for new hard controls (export controls) and soft approaches (e.g., industry codes-of-conducts). Most participants flagged four biotechnologies and associated services as engagement priorities: ground-based aerosol generating systems; DNA synthesis and assembly equipment; high-throughput screening systems; and facility-wide production control software. Findings from the symposium have been documented in a final report that was published in April 2017 as CNS Occasional Paper #26.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks: Non-State Actors and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Deputy Director Elena K. Sokova discusses risks of nuclear weapons and materials falling into wrong hands and provides an assessment of international efforts to deny terrorists and non-state actors access to these weapons and materials in her chapter in the new UNIDIR study Understanding Nuclear Risks.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Searching for Illicit Dual Use Items in Online Marketplaces: A Semi-Automated Approach

Author:
Bryan Lee, Margaret Arno, and Daniel Salisbury
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Online business today takes place in a global marketplace. Drop shipments and containerized shipping have made the export and import of materials and finished goods easier than ever. Anyone who has ever purchased something online is already familiar with this world from the consumer perspective. However, online marketplaces are increasingly important for business-to-business commerce as well. Suppliers of many high-tech products use online platforms for both domestic and international transfers, including products that are considered dual-use. Dual-use commodities are items which are used for civilian industry but also have potential application in the development of weapons of mass destruction. As the popularity of online marketplaces increases, so does the risk that illicit trafficking networks can misuse these platforms as a means of gaining access to critical dual-use commodities. Well-known US-based platforms like eBay, Amazon, and Craigslist are thought to have reasonably effective procedures to screen for dual-use materials that might be controlled. However, even these firms have been challenged by the upsurge in use of their platforms for trade in potentially sensitive items. For non-US based platforms, reports highlighting how some sites have been used for illicit trafficking may have brought increased attention to the issue, but it remains unclear how effective screening methodologies are. Further, it is unclear if smaller sites that specialize in business-to-business transfers of industrial materials understand or implement controls on the sale of dual-use technologies. This report explores the value of semi-automated approaches to gather and analyze data from online marketplaces to further understanding of the prevalence of dual-use technologies and the potential for proliferators to use these marketplaces to illicitly procure these items. It concludes that large-scale harvesting of online marketplace information is possible using off-the-shelf open source technologies and basic programming skills. Data gathered through such harvesting methods, however, are of generally poor quality. Machine learning techniques are likely to improve data collection and closer cooperation between online marketplaces and compliance officials would be an effective method of keeping these marketplaces safe and open for business.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Trafficking, Illegal Trade, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. “Stress Testing” the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and Andrea Berger
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On June 7, 2017, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey brought together thirteen experts for a one-day workshop “stress testing” the draft convention to ban nuclear weapons. The exercise was designed to examine key provisions of the draft, identify potential problems in terms of their implementation, compatibility with other existing instruments and practices, and reactions of states not participating in the negotiations, and seek possible solutions. The organizers did not seek to forge consensus among the participants but rather generate discussion and proposals on ways to address the issues raised by the experts. Participants were also asked to set aside their views on the desirability of a convention as a whole, and instead assume that a ban, as currently drafted, was concluded and opened for ratification. As a result, the views presented in this report are not intended to serve as arguments for or against a convention banning nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. The Verification Clearinghouse: Debunking Websites and the Potential for Public Nonproliferation Monitoring

Author:
Bryan Lee and Kyle Pilutti
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The rapid pace at which information spreads online has been a boon for information gathering but poses risks with respect to the truth of the information. This risk increases with high-stakes information, such as treaty compliance judgements, and it is one of the main reasons why publicly available information is usually excluded from verification efforts. Nevertheless, just as military and intelligence experts have developed techniques to counter deception, techniques to debunk online deception have grown in power and sophistication. Most of these techniques can be applied by a dedicated amateur and allow the user to identify manipulations of images, video, and audio. Coupled with the rise of open source analytical tools, there is now the potential to construct a “verification clearinghouse,” an online website that would allow both experts and members of the public to monitor and evaluate arms control treaties. There are a number of existing online debunking sites available to the public. The majority of them focus on smaller niche topics, such as sites dedicated to political fact checking or Internet hoaxes. In other cases, sites are maintained by enthusiastic experts who work to debunk cases that are of particular interest or importance to themselves or their fields. These sites are important building blocks for future verification clearinghouse efforts. In our analysis, we characterize the existing attempts to address online deception, identifying the factors that make them particularly advantageous, and group them into three different types as shown below.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Internet, Nonproliferation, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus