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1. Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
James Revill
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Biotechnology E-commerce: A Disruptive Challenge to Biological Arms Control

Author:
Raymond A. Zilinskas and Philippe Mauger
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Current approaches to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons rely heavily on the operation of export controls for equipment used in the production or dissemination of biological agents. Concerned that the emergence and growth of biotechnology e-commerce has significantly disrupted the effectiveness of such export controls, the British Commonwealth and Foreign Office funded a study in June 2014 for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) titled “The Internet as a Source for Dual-Use Technologies of Biological Weapons Concern: Policy Implications and Governance Options,” to research the biological arms-control problems presented by biotechnology dual-use products and technologies sold via the Internet (e-commerce), and to determine how these problems could be addressed.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Biological Weapons, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Alternatives to High-Risk Radiological Sources

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, Egle Murauskaite, and Tom Coppen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
There is growing global awareness of the need to secure radiological sources in order to prevent terrorists from using such materials in a radiological weapon, such as a “dirty bomb.” A new CNS report calls for a move towards permanently reducing this threat by substituting non-isotopic alternatives for these sources in civil uses. As an initial step, the authors propose a move towards gradual phase-out of cesium chloride use in pre-transfusion blood irradiation on a global scale – a domain where non-isotopic alternatives are considered to be the most viable in the short-term. They urge United States to launch an international initiative involving the phase out of cesium-chloride and other high-risk radiological sources as a “gift basket” for the upcoming 2014 Nuclear Security Summit. Cesium chloride is one of the most commonly used radiological materials, despite being an IAEA Category 1 “extremely dangerous” source. Because cesium chloride is easily dispersible, water soluble, and relatively easy to handle, it is particularly suitable for terrorist purposes. The blood irradiators that use it as a source are located in many large hospitals and blood banks (inherently publicly accessible spaces), and the source is usually transported through regular civilian infrastructure at the beginning and the end of its lifecycle, giving more cause for concern. Cesium chloride based irradiators are used to treat blood and blood products prior to transfusion in order to prevent a rare but fatal Graft Versus Host Disease (GVHD). A growing number of non-isotopic alternatives are becoming available for that purpose, but there is a serious lack of awareness about the range of options and how they compare to current practices, both among the medical professionals and national regulators.
Topic:
Health, Biological Weapons, Radiological Weapons, and Medicine
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Ugly Truths: Saddam Hussein and Other Insiders on Iraq’s Covert Bioweapons

Author:
Amy Smithson
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Although the inspections of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which operated from April 1991 to October 1998, unmasked Iraq’s biological weapons program and revealed a considerable amount of detail about its planning, organization, and execution, various factors about the program remain unclear. These gaps in information persisted through the activities and reporting of both the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspections Commission, which existed from December 1999 until the outbreak of the second Gulf War in March 2003, and the Iraq Survey Group, which reported on the remnants of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities after the 2003 Gulf War.1 To deepen understanding about Iraq’s biological weapons program, a team of analysts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) identified a number of research questions that, if answered, would provide a more comprehensive account of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programs. The twenty research questions ran the gamut of relevant topics. Specifically with regard to the bioweapons program, the research questions sought to clarify the reasons behind Iraq’s choice of biowarfare agents and delivery systems, the timeline and technical specifics for certain activities, possible interaction with governments and biowarfare experts outside of Iraq, the management of the program, and the details of how Iraq disposed of its biological munitions and bulk biowarfare agent. In an effort to answer some or all of these questions, CNS’s staff turned to the records of the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) database. In mid-July 2011, the time in which CNS’s staff reviewed the CRRC records for information pertinent to Iraq’s biological weapons program, it should be noted that a relatively small fraction of the documents in the possession of the CRRC had been translated into English and made available in the CRRC database. Accordingly, the review of the database did not turn up a tremendous number of documents providing insights about Iraq’s biological weapons program. Nonetheless, the review uncovered several documents that shed light largely on the political management of Iraq’s bioweapons program and how Iraq’s leaders tried to cope with UNSCOM’s inspections. This report, which begins with a brief review of the search methodology, otherwise presents the research findings in rough but not exact chronological order. To help the reader quickly grasp the relevance of the research findings in a history that is complicated and sometimes full of technical detail, the research findings are interlaced with background derived largely from Germ Gambits: The Bioweapons Dilemma, Iraq and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 2011). Germ Gambits, which tells the tale of UNSCOM’s bioweapons inspections in Iraq, is based primarily on interviews with UNSCOM inspectors, buttressed by UNSCOM documents and secondary materials. Therefore, any citation to Germ Gambits is based on numerous authoritative sources. Because this report provides the unadulterated Iraqi view on certain topics, in a certain sense it is like seeing the other side of the coin that Germ Gambits presents. CNS Senior fellow Amy E. Smithson, PhD, wrote Germ Gambits and was the principal researcher reviewing the biological weapons-related documents in the CRRC database.
Topic:
United Nations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, Conflict, and Biological Weapons
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America