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1. Dual Use in the DPRK

Author:
Margaret Croy
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Several states have succeeded in extracting “yellowcake” uranium from phosphoric acid as part of the phosphate fertilizer production process. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has both the means and motivation to undertake such work, thus significantly altering existing open-source assessments of how much yellowcake uranium North Korea could produce annually, which in turn affects estimates of how many nuclear warheads DPRK can make. There is ample rationale for the DPRK to pursue this method of uranium extraction. The dual usage of existing infrastructure would both conceal the activity and make it more difficult for international audiences to positively identify and condemn. The DPRK certainly needs fertilizer, and the information on how to extract uranium from its production is readily available. Lastly, this method of yellowcake production embodies the policy of byungjin—parallel nuclear-weapon development and economic expansion—a hallmark of Kim Jong Un’s strategy. Given these factors, the rationale for the pursuit of this method is clear. The evidence is even more so. The first section of the paper explains the science behind uranium extraction from phosphoric acid produced as an intermediary in the production of fertilizer from phosphate rock. The second section highlights some of the historical cases of states using this method to obtain uranium. The third section elucidates the reasoning and rationale for using this method in the DPRK, and the fourth section examines the open-source evidence available indicating that this method of obtaining uranium—however uncommon—is in use in the DPRK today, and is likely to continue and expand in scale.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Mining, Manufacturing, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Eyes on U: Opportunities, Challenges, and Limits of Remote Sensing for Monitoring Uranium Mining and Milling

Author:
Grace Liu, Joseph Rodgers, Scott Milne, Margaret Rowland, Ben McIntosh, Mackenzie Best, Octave Lepinard, and Melissa Hanham
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The mining and milling of uranium does not generally receive the attention that the subject deserves. Yet this overlooked aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle can offer analysts important clues about a country’s fissile-material production. This, in turn, helps inform highly sensitive inquiries, such as estimates of arsenal size and potential for growth. Geospatial technology is uniquely helpful as a discovery and verification tool. The production of fissile material is often a closely held state secret; even for states that report production levels to the International Atomic Energy Agency, these numbers can be difficult to verify. Remote-sensing technology, such as satellite imagery paired with change-detection algorithms, can help pierce the veil of state secrecy and overcome physical barriers to inform analysts about this vital first step in the nuclear fuel cycle. Occasional Paper #44—the final installment in a four-part series that uses open-source remote-sensing data to identify and monitor uranium mining and milling activities—examines these new tools and technologies in detail to demonstrate how analysts use them to detect, estimate, or verify uranium production. It explores different remote-sensing techniques and their various advantages, including traditional optical imagery, multispectral and hyperspectral images, and thermal and near-infrared images. It also discusses machine-learning algorithms as another tool for analysts examining large quantities of geospatial information in a relatively short amount of time. Though these technologies hold great promise for WMD analysts, there are limitations to their use. CNS Occasional Paper #44 discusses these current and future limits, and concludes by calling for increased collaboration between the commercial satellite industry and analytical organizations and verification regimes alike, as a way f
Topic:
Natural Resources, Mining, Minerals, Uranium, and Milling
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. WMD Capabilities Enabled by Additive Manufacturing

Author:
Christopher Daase, Grant Christopher, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Miles A. Pomper, and Robert Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Additive Manufacturing (AM)—also known as 3D printing—is a rapidly emerging technology with growing relevance for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. The rapid pace of AM development makes it increasingly difficult to keep track of AM’s potential effect on proliferation pathways. So far, studies addressing the issue have mainly focused on nuclear proliferation. This has created two major problems for policy makers. First, by the time governments are able to respond to specific AM-induced proliferation risks, those risks might already have been overtaken by newer developments. Second, by focusing on nuclear proliferation pathways, governments can fail to recognize AM’s relevance to other proliferation modalities, including chemical and biological weapons and, especially, the means of WMD delivery. This report addresses these shortcomings. As an innovative pilot study, this report provides a more comprehensive approach toward explaining latest AM developments and mitigating the risk of WMD proliferation. Effectively, this report is the first beyond-the-horizon assessment of the impact of AM developments not only on potential nuclear-weapons programs, but also on other WMD modalities and their delivery systems. For this project, Negotiation Design & Strategy (NDS) assembled an expert team of well-known AM and nonproliferation specialists from Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom—three countries at the forefront of AM development. The research team’s contextual knowledge of AM facilities in Europe and the United States allowed for in-depth, on-the-ground interviews with US and European experts from the private sector, national laboratories, and research institutions. Interviews were augmented with an analytical deep dive into the latest AM developments, based on open-source technical literature, including academic papers and patents. The final report allows us to better forecast technological developments and raise awareness for the critical role that AM plays in international security. This report also demonstrates the importance of emerging technologies in the nonproliferation field and underscores the need for further research of this kind. Studies such as this are crucial to inform the broader examination of the relationship between technology and international security.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Avoiding a Nuclear Wild, Wild West in the Middle East

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
With the recent visit of Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, there is keen interest in finalizing a civil nuclear cooperative agreement. Trump officials have also said they intend to renew or strike additional civil nuclear deals with Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. How necessary and economically competitive is nuclear power in the Middle East for desalination and producing electricity compared to non-nuclear alternatives? In the Saudi case, is a Russian, Chinese, or French reactor sale likely? What are the nonproliferation implications of allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess, either now or in the future? Speaker: Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Cheney Pentagon.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

5. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. he Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium Management Approaches

Author:
John Carlson, Leonard Spector, and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #42 discusses issues relating to separated, or unirradiated, plutonium in civilian nuclear programs, that is, plutonium that has been chemically separated from spent nuclear reactor fuel by reprocessing but has not been reintroduced into a nuclear reactor after separation and subjected to further irradiation. Efforts to limit the spread of reprocessing in the civilian sector crystalized in the mid-1970s. Two developments triggered the intensified attention to this issue: (1) India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device, which used as its core plutonium produced in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear-research program, and (2) attempts on the part of several states that had not renounced nuclear weapons to obtain reprocessing plants for their civil nuclear power programs. In the intervening forty-four years, in those states that proceeded with civilian reprocessing programs, stocks of separated civilian plutonium have continued to grow in the aggregate. Taken together today, they are substantially greater than worldwide military plutonium stocks. Multiple approaches to limiting the separation of civil plutonium have been implemented, and still others have been given serious study, but stocks have increased regardless, while options for working down these stocks appear to be diminishing. Meanwhile, concern has deepened over the possible theft or diversion of this material, which could bring weapon-sufficient quantities of plutonium into the hands of violent extremists. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are valuable, but they do not fully address the risks of breakout from nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Safeguards are intended to provide timely warning of diversion, so as to provide an opportunity for intervention. However, even if diversion of plutonium is detected immediately, the plutonium could be weaponized too quickly for effective preventive measures. Nor are safeguards designed to address nuclear-material security issues. Accordingly, there is a need for institutional and technical measures to mitigate risks from separated plutonium. This report recommends steps to address the risks posed by existing reprocessing programs and stocks as well as ways to discourage potential new programs.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Nuclear Power, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Findings from the 2016 Symposium on Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies

Author:
Steven Fairchild, Caroline R. M. Kennedy, Philippe Mauger, Todd J. Savage, and Raymond A. Zilinskas
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The Symposium on the Export Control of Emerging Biotechnologies was held during October 18-20, 2016 in Monterey, California, USA. Co-hosted by the International Biosecurity and Prevention Forum (IBPF) and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, the symposium’s objectives were to identify emerging biotechnologies that are candidates for export control as well as effective mechanisms for their enforcement. A total of sixty experts from fifteen countries participated in the symposium. They represented the scientific, policy, industry, legal, and enforcement fields in roughly equal proportions. Attendees participated in one of nine working groups that were tasked with identifying emerging biotechnologies of concern and which, therefore, could be subject to realistic mechanisms for export control. In the event, participants identified seventeen emerging biotechnologies and services and debated whether each posed significant biosecurity risks. Participants then assessed options for new hard controls (export controls) and soft approaches (e.g., industry codes-of-conducts). Most participants flagged four biotechnologies and associated services as engagement priorities: ground-based aerosol generating systems; DNA synthesis and assembly equipment; high-throughput screening systems; and facility-wide production control software. Findings from the symposium have been documented in a final report that was published in April 2017 as CNS Occasional Paper #26.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks: Non-State Actors and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Deputy Director Elena K. Sokova discusses risks of nuclear weapons and materials falling into wrong hands and provides an assessment of international efforts to deny terrorists and non-state actors access to these weapons and materials in her chapter in the new UNIDIR study Understanding Nuclear Risks.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Searching for Illicit Dual Use Items in Online Marketplaces: A Semi-Automated Approach

Author:
Bryan Lee, Margaret Arno, and Daniel Salisbury
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Online business today takes place in a global marketplace. Drop shipments and containerized shipping have made the export and import of materials and finished goods easier than ever. Anyone who has ever purchased something online is already familiar with this world from the consumer perspective. However, online marketplaces are increasingly important for business-to-business commerce as well. Suppliers of many high-tech products use online platforms for both domestic and international transfers, including products that are considered dual-use. Dual-use commodities are items which are used for civilian industry but also have potential application in the development of weapons of mass destruction. As the popularity of online marketplaces increases, so does the risk that illicit trafficking networks can misuse these platforms as a means of gaining access to critical dual-use commodities. Well-known US-based platforms like eBay, Amazon, and Craigslist are thought to have reasonably effective procedures to screen for dual-use materials that might be controlled. However, even these firms have been challenged by the upsurge in use of their platforms for trade in potentially sensitive items. For non-US based platforms, reports highlighting how some sites have been used for illicit trafficking may have brought increased attention to the issue, but it remains unclear how effective screening methodologies are. Further, it is unclear if smaller sites that specialize in business-to-business transfers of industrial materials understand or implement controls on the sale of dual-use technologies. This report explores the value of semi-automated approaches to gather and analyze data from online marketplaces to further understanding of the prevalence of dual-use technologies and the potential for proliferators to use these marketplaces to illicitly procure these items. It concludes that large-scale harvesting of online marketplace information is possible using off-the-shelf open source technologies and basic programming skills. Data gathered through such harvesting methods, however, are of generally poor quality. Machine learning techniques are likely to improve data collection and closer cooperation between online marketplaces and compliance officials would be an effective method of keeping these marketplaces safe and open for business.
Topic:
Digital Economy, Trafficking, Illegal Trade, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. “Stress Testing” the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and Andrea Berger
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On June 7, 2017, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey brought together thirteen experts for a one-day workshop “stress testing” the draft convention to ban nuclear weapons. The exercise was designed to examine key provisions of the draft, identify potential problems in terms of their implementation, compatibility with other existing instruments and practices, and reactions of states not participating in the negotiations, and seek possible solutions. The organizers did not seek to forge consensus among the participants but rather generate discussion and proposals on ways to address the issues raised by the experts. Participants were also asked to set aside their views on the desirability of a convention as a whole, and instead assume that a ban, as currently drafted, was concluded and opened for ratification. As a result, the views presented in this report are not intended to serve as arguments for or against a convention banning nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus