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21. When Russia Goes to War: Motives, Means and Indicators

Author:
Konrad Muzyka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since Vladimir Putin declared the fall of the Soviet Union to be the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century, prompting concerns that Moscow would seek to rebuild its influence by conquering territories on its borders, Russia has deployed combat troops into Georgia, Ukraine and Syria, and inserted private military companies into the Central African Republic, Libya, Mozambique, South Sudan and Venezuela. But there is little consensus among analysts about the meaning of Russia’s military behaviour, or how far it might go in pursuing its interests. Is it trying to rebuild a version of the former Soviet Union? Does it have the will and capability to go to war? Under what circumstances might it be ready to commit combat troops? And how do these questions relate to its immediate neighbourhood, in particular to the Baltic region? This analysis examines Russia’s fundamental motives for going to war in the ‘near abroad’, describes how Russia might wage war in the Baltic states, and identifies some of the indicators that might suggest it is preparing to do so.
Topic:
War, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Syria, and Baltic States

22. Contemporary Deterrence – Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO decided, in July 2016, to establish an enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. A battalion-size battlegroup (BG) was deployed in early 2017 to each of these nations. This report looks at various aspects of the eFP some eighteen months after the start of its deployment and offers recommendations to NATO Allies, particularly host and contributing nations, for strengthening the eFP.
Topic:
International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Post-Crimea Shift in EU-Russia Relations: From Fostering Interdependence to Managing Vulnerabilities

Author:
Kristi Raik and András Rácz
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The relationship between the EU and Russia is characterised by a considerable degree of interdependence. In the 1990s and 2000s, the EU’s approach to Russia was based on the expectation that economic ties and interaction in various fields would contribute to regional stability and security and possibly even the democratisation of Russia. However, looking at the relationship today, one has to admit that the expected positive effects of interdependence have not materialised. Since 2014, the conflict over Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions have pushed the Europeans to reassess their approach and put more emphasis on reducing the vulnerabilities created by mutual ties, notably (but not only) in the field of energy. Russia, for its part, has been keen to reduce its dependence on Europe, for instance in the financial sector and in respect of food imports. As a result, the preconditions for developing the EU-Russia relationship in accordance with the logic of positive interdependence have weakened further.
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Ukraine

24. To the Seas Again Maritime Defence and Deterrence in the Baltic Region

Author:
Henrich Lange
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report concerns the maritime aspects of defence and deterrence in the Baltic Sea region. Access to the Baltic Sea is of vital economic interest to its littoral states, including Russia. Large numbers of vessels convey substantial trade volumes, including energy products, through its waters each day, while a significant number of critical infrastructure links lie below its surface. The operating environment is complex. The Baltic Sea is confined and shallow. Its winding shape includes several bottlenecks, and its numerous islands confine major shipping to certain channels. Its unusual hydrology, frequent adverse weather conditions and ice, and the presence of large quantities of discarded ordnance complicate naval operations. The short distance of the sea from airfields and the potential operating locations of land-based military capability, including electronic warfare and cyber assets, further complicates the employment of naval force. This environment demands a particular set of professional skills and knowledge.
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Baltic Sea

25. Going Past Monopoly: Developing a Balanced Baltic Sea Regional Gas Market

Author:
Emmet Tuohy
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the last half-decade, the three Baltic states have made dramatic progress towards diversifying their energy supplies, especially of natural gas. This progress—brought about thanks to remarkable political will as well as improved regional cooperation—has resulted in considerable economic benefit while decreasing the three countries’ vulnerability to outside pressure. Yet, much remains to be done in order to complete the three countries’ internal markets.
Topic:
International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Baltic Sea

26. Stepping on the Gas: Future-Proofing Estonia’s Energy Market and Security

Author:
Andrei V. Belyi
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Baltic region is making a significant progress in developing functioning regional natural gas market, expanding and integrating the related infrastructure, and ensuring the security of supply. However, there are multiple factors—at the national, regional, European and even global levels—that prevent this from becoming an ideal market capable of delivering greater security at a reasonable cost. Liquidity of the market is low due to falling consumption; state aid and state participation in the energy enterprises discourage private investments and distort market conditions, while geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia add further complications. The report considers the trends in the overall natural gas sector—such as greater portion of trade being conducted in gas trading hubs; more reliance on spot pricing rather than long-term contracts; LNG glut in the global markets, introduction of “virtual pipelines” and flexible infrastructure, pressure to reduce CO2 emissions as well as the US entry into the global LNG market as a major player—and analyses their implications to Estonia. It puts forward a number of recommendations on how to create and sustain the conditions necessary for efficient natural gas market in the region as well as for improved energy security of Estonia.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Economy, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

27. Estonian-French Defence Cooperation – Where Estonian Pragmatism Meets French Vision

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu and Emile LeBrun
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
ICDS Research Fellow Kalev Stoicescu and Non-Resident Fellow Maxime Lebrun made a thorough analysis of the defence cooperation and partnership between Estonia and France. They concluded that this successful relationship, which evolved in a short time literally starting from mutual neglect, is based both on pragmatism and political vision. It also serves as a very good example of fruitful cooperation between rather different European partners in terms of size, military capabilities, history and culture, geography etc. France contributes to NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, a vital deterrence measure for the Baltic states and Poland, and Estonia participates actively in French, EU and UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. In this context, France promotes the European Intervention Initiative (in which Estonia participates) and the concept of European Strategic Autonomy (Estonia, as well as other Allies, are not yet convinced of its aims and utility). The analysis offers a comprehensive overview on the matter for those who are interested in the defence policy of Estonia and France, and the development of the defence dimension of the European Union.
Topic:
Defense Policy and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Estonia

28. Russians in Europe: Nobody’s Tool – The Examples of Finland, Germany and Estonia

Author:
Anna Tiido
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This analysis calls for European governments to pay greater attention to the resilience of their societies, starting with the integration of minorities. It is also important to continue work to increase awareness of Russian influence. The paper analyses the issue of Russian speakers in the EU based on the example of Finland, Germany and Estonia. Although the Kremlin’s “Russian World” policy sees all the people connected to Russia as a homogeneous group, the minority groups analysed are quite diverse. The media preferences and habits of Russian-speakers are connected to language, naturally, and these communities are one of the targets of Russia’s actions. At the same time, Russia also targets non-Russian audiences. It promotes propaganda that is tailor-made for specific countries, based on existing conditions. The grievances of Russian-speakers are one such tool, but they constitute one of many available—and not the main one.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Integration, Social Cohesion, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Germany, and Estonia

29. European Strategic Autonomy: Operationalising a Buzzword

Author:
Pauli Järvenpää
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) is currently the subject of some debate and controversy. While this issue has been on the table since at least the 1990s, it was reinvigorated by the publication of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, itself a response to fundamental developments in European security. In this report, we consider the security and defence aspects of ESA, an area of particular difficulties and one in which in which Europe is presently weak. Even in this very practical area, the ESA concept is ill-defined and the term itself has become a buzzword. To move towards implementation, we discuss ESA in security and defence as the capacity to act in four dimensions: political, institutional, capabilities and industrial. Political autonomy, concerns questions such as to whom the ‘E’ in ESA refers, who is able to lead the development of ESA, and what is the level of ambition for this endeavour. Institutional autonomy refers to the availability of the governance structures required to prepare and administer these priorities, while capabilities autonomy refers to the availability of the military, civilian, financial, operational, and other capabilities to credibly implement priorities and decisions. Industrial autonomy refers to the availability of the industrial and technological base necessary to develop and deliver the required capabilities. In our report, we discuss how ESA might be attained in each of these dimensions and make policy recommendations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Autonomy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

30. The Digital Counter-Revolution: Why the Kremlin Pursues a Sovereign Internet?

Author:
Antonin Plattner
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s attempts to control and regulate the flow of online information and communication within its territory reached a new stage on 1 November 2019 after its so-called “internet sovereignty” law came into force. Designed to increase state control over what Russia’s citizens can access and do online, the law has already sparked numerous protests across Russia. Although it remains to be seen how effective the law is likely to be, it is already clear that it fits perfectly well with the regime’s survival considerations and, more importantly, with the broader geopolitical strategy of the Kremlin towards the West. This paper analyses the reasons behind the failure of Moscow’s successive strategies to enforce the central state’s absolute sovereignty online. These reasons may include: The amount of data online, the web’s decentralised routing technology and the prospective satellite-based internet which together undermine Moscow’s strategies of control through physical infrastructures. The relative reluctance of international platforms to execute the authorities’ requests for censorship which limits the global success of Moscow’s strategy of control through ownership. The determination and inventiveness of the domestic digital resistance which prevents the total success of Moscow’s legal and social coercion strategies. Secondly, this paper proposes an original insight concerning Russia’s cyberstrategy. It argues that the Kremlin’s aspiration for neo-Westphalian “internet sovereignty” ultimately depends on a radical change of the internet governance format. Moscow’s call to replace the current multi-stakeholder model with a multilateral system should be understood as an absolute prerequisite for its control over domestic communications and information. From that perspective, this paper identifies Russia-based campaigns of cyber disruption as Moscow’s attempt to actively demonstrate the merit of “internet sovereignty”, by sowing international distrust in the principle of a free and international internet, as defended by the current multi-stakeholder model of governance.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, Internet, Protests, Counterrevolution, and digital culture
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia