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1. Iran Nuclear Deal Procurement Channel Update: Is it being bypassed?

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The procurement channel set up under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, appears to be considering fewer proposals than expected and is altogether unused by a traditionally illicit conduit to Iran’s nuclear, missile, and non-nuclear programs, namely China. The procurement channel was designed to regulate Iran’s imports of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use goods for nuclear or non-nuclear use. Given that Iran’s non-nuclear industries have often imported nuclear dual-use goods, this finding raises the question of whether the procurement channel, and its associated Procurement Working Group (PWG), is simply not being used, but illicit, nuclear dual-use supplies are still going to Iran. Although no evidence has emerged of banned sales going from the United States, Europe, or Japan, which have often been targets of Iranian illicit procurement networks, there is concern that banned sales could be going from parts of Asia. In particular, Chinese entities may be continuing to make sales of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran without using the channel. The United States and its allies should augment efforts to detect and intercept the flow of any strategic goods from China to Iran and from other potentially illicit supplier countries to Iran. China needs to reach out to suppliers or distributors of dual-use goods operating on its territory and ensure that they are informed about China’s export control laws and PWG requirements governing the sale of nuclear dual-use goods to Iran’s industries, whether they be nuclear or non-nuclear.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

2. What is new in the Iran Nuclear Archive?

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Nuclear Archive seized by Israel in Iran contains much new information not previously available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or Western governments about Iran’s past work on nuclear weapons under the so-called AMAD project. I have reviewed much of the information gathered by the IAEA about Iran’s past nuclear weapons programs and it is compelling, but this information has many gaps and is unable to allow for conclusions about the current program and its intentions. The archive fills in many of these holes, and overall, according to the Israelis, it presents a relatively complete and alarming picture of Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, and in far more detailed than previously available.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

3. Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Apart from Saudi Arabia, which our Institute views as currently the largest proliferation risk in the Middle East, three key neighbors of Iran also warrant intensive study as to their nuclear capabilities and plans, safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and future proliferation risks. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt are seen by the Institute as states in the Middle East most poised to seek advanced nuclear capabilities in response to a resurgent nuclear Iran, or as the limitations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conclude or otherwise end. Egypt has the most experience of the three in working with nuclear materials and facilities under efforts dating back decades. Turkey may pose the greatest risk as far as surprise proliferation given the state of political affairs in that country and growing impulse of President Erdogan to consolidate power. The UAE, which was the first Middle Eastern country to adopt a so-called “gold standard” of renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, will be a country to watch for reversing course on its pledge. Each of these countries has varying security concerns with regard to Iran, and each has nuanced domestic goals that could propel proliferation attempts. A common recommendation for all three countries is that the United States and its allies should seek strong defensive relationships with those countries potentially affected by the end of JCPOA limits; others include the United States should work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region and use national intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to detect and work to reverse proliferation if it emerges. A summary of findings on each country follows, with a technical look at their emerging nuclear capabilities and plans, the security context with regard to Iran, status of their safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and recommendations for preventing the spread of advanced nuclear capabilities in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

4. Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Using data compiled from a new index by our Institute, the Peddling Peril Index, which we will soon release, three quarters of the countries that voted in July 2017 in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lack adequate export control legislation. These countries lack a firm basis to control the export or retransfer of nuclear and nuclear-related commodities that are critical to the production and possession of nuclear weapons. If the UN Ban Treaty proponent countries truly seek a world without nuclear weapons, they should take the lead in ensuring that all countries, including their own, have effective strategic trade control systems able to prevent the spread of dangerous commodities and facilities that are critical to the production, maintenance, and improvement of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Cobalt 60 Sources in Mosul: Recovery and Lessons for the Future

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Case Study
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Two years ago, in the summer of 2015, the Institute decided to investigate whether Daesh controlled dangerous radioactive material in Iraq or Syria. The result of a few months of study by Sarah Burkhard, a young scientist, and other staff surprised us all. Their investigations found that there were apparently two sources of radioactive cobalt in Mosul that posed a risk of being used in a radiological dispersal device. We could not know if Daesh was aware of these sources and their potential, or had already taken possession of them. We produced a confidential research study that we used to alert the United States and other friendly governments of the situation as we knew it, most of which were also monitoring the situation. At the same time, we decided not to publish any of our results. As we learned more, we updated our study, which remains a confidential report due to its sensitivity. We are very relieved that these two, older albeit still dangerous, cobalt 60 sources were not found and used by Daesh. They were recovered intact recently. We want to thank in particular Joby Warrick at The Washington Post, who we had alerted early on for assistance in researching the fate of these sources. He understood the importance of digging into this story while delaying its publication until the radioactive sources were in safe hands. He and his colleagues at The Washington Post recently added greatly to this important story.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Mosul

6. A Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: Finding a Definition More Fitting of Today’s Reality

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The Trump administration has announced that it has created a new North Korea policy that is aimed at exerting maximal pressure on Pyongyang but also achieving negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. However, denuclearization negotiations do not appear imminent. The Trump administration has stated that now is the time for focusing on creating greater pressure on North Korea, and North Korea has signaled little interest in negotiations and much more interest in developing and keeping its nuclear weapons, comprised of both the warheads and missiles. But it is not too early to discuss what negotiations should look like. Many have stated that the denuclearization process should start with the creation of a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program, as was done in previous North Korean negotiations. A freeze, albeit limited, was also the starting point for the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal. But what should this freeze look like in new North Korean negotiations, given all its nuclear advances in the last several years?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

7. Heavy Water Loophole in the Iran Deal

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Although President-elect Donald Trump’s position on the Iran nuclear deal remains unclear, he and his allies in the Congress are expected to at least better enforce and strengthen the Iran deal. They should start by focusing on the deal’s heavy water loophole, whereby Iran can store offshore in Oman heavy water it owns and controls in excess of the nuclear deal’s limits, awaiting its eventual sale. To date, if the stocks in Iran and Oman are counted together (a reasonable view since Iran owns and controls both stocks), Iran has far exceeded the nuclear deal’s stated limit of maintaining a stock of only 130 metric tons of heavy water. Yet, this loophole was sanctioned by the executive body of the Iran deal, the Joint Commission. Despite such generous treatment, Iran has even so twice violated the narrow limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water it can hold inside Iran since the deal started in January 2016. Iran should no longer be facilitated in its overproduction of nuclear-related heavy water. Oman would do the world a favor by halting its willingness to accept Iranian heavy water and send any back to Iran for downblending. The return of the heavy water and its blending down would dramatically signal to Iran that violations of the Iran deal are no longer going to be tolerated, or worse, facilitated. Moreover, any further overproduction should be seen by the United States as a violation of the deal. It should work to end the Oman loophole and mitigate damage caused by a U.S. purchase of Iranian heavy water.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. Future Directions in the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Like many secret nuclear weapons programs, the DPRK goes to great lengths to hide its capabilities to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons. Despite these actions, a picture can be drawn of North Korea’s current and projected plutonium and weapons-grade uranium (WGU) stocks. Knowing these plutonium and WGU stocks can, in turn, allow an estimate of the DPRK’s current number of nuclear weapons and a range of projections of the number North Korea could build in the next several years. Although great uncertainty surrounds these projections, as well as the quality of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, these projections form a reasonable picture of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons futures, absent actions to significantly limit its nuclear programs. After summarizing estimates of stocks of separated plutonium and weapons-grade uranium as of the end of 2014, this report develops three projections of future nuclear arsenals through 2020: low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear futures. In developing these projections, which are intended to bound North Korea’s nuclear futures, a number of constraints are considered, including the number and size of nuclear production facilities, future underground testing, the extent and success of nuclear weaponization efforts, costs, and access to necessary goods and classified and proprietary technologies abroad.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

9. Civil HEU Watch Tracking: Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium: National and Global Stocks, as of End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, making it one of the most dangerous materials in existence. As a result, governments take extraordinary measures to secure HEU against theft or diversion and to reduce the inventories of HEU in the world. To that end, it is important to track how much civil HEU exists and where it is. However, national civil HEU stocks are difficult to estimate, with transparency policies varying by country and few countries providing official declarations of their stocks. As a result, this report contains the few official civil HEU declarations and estimates civil HEU stocks in countries that do not provide public declarations. This study relies on open source information to derive these estimates. It is an update of a report published in 2005.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. India’s Stocks of Civil and Military Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium, End 2014

Author:
David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
India has one of the largest nuclear power programs among developing nations. Utilizing plutonium produced in these power reactors and discharged in irradiated or spent fuel, India has developed a relatively large civil plutonium separation program and an associated fast breeder reactor program that is using that separated plutonium. India has a sizeable nuclear weapons effort. The weapons use separated plutonium produced primarily in a set of small, dedicated reactors and a smaller amount produced in nuclear power reactors. It has a growing gas centrifuge program able to produce significant amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) mostly for naval reactor fuel and perhaps for nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons. India is not transparent about its fissile material stocks. This report estimates India’s stocks of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Uranium, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
South Asia and India