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1. Nuclear Infrastructure and Proliferation Risks of the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Egypt

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Erica Wenig, David Albright, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Apart from Saudi Arabia, which our Institute views as currently the largest proliferation risk in the Middle East, three key neighbors of Iran also warrant intensive study as to their nuclear capabilities and plans, safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and future proliferation risks. After Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt are seen by the Institute as states in the Middle East most poised to seek advanced nuclear capabilities in response to a resurgent nuclear Iran, or as the limitations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) conclude or otherwise end. Egypt has the most experience of the three in working with nuclear materials and facilities under efforts dating back decades. Turkey may pose the greatest risk as far as surprise proliferation given the state of political affairs in that country and growing impulse of President Erdogan to consolidate power. The UAE, which was the first Middle Eastern country to adopt a so-called “gold standard” of renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, will be a country to watch for reversing course on its pledge. Each of these countries has varying security concerns with regard to Iran, and each has nuanced domestic goals that could propel proliferation attempts. A common recommendation for all three countries is that the United States and its allies should seek strong defensive relationships with those countries potentially affected by the end of JCPOA limits; others include the United States should work to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in the region and use national intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to detect and work to reverse proliferation if it emerges. A summary of findings on each country follows, with a technical look at their emerging nuclear capabilities and plans, the security context with regard to Iran, status of their safeguards and obstacles to proliferation, and recommendations for preventing the spread of advanced nuclear capabilities in the region.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Infrastructure, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

2. Strengthening the Counter-Illicit Nuclear Trade Regime in the Face of New Threats: A Two-Year Review of Proliferation Threats Associated with the Middle East

Author:
David Albright, Andrea Stricker, Sarah Burkhard, and Erica Wenig
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The United States’ and associated global export control regime is losing ground due to several global events and trends underway in the United States and the Middle East. The developments at home and abroad are reducing controls and oversight over the flow of commodities vital to the development of nuclear weapons. Unless these trends are reversed, U.S. efforts to stem and stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and elsewhere will weaken. Events contributing to this greater proliferation danger include: 1) relaxed U.S. export control regulations and greater emphasis on global trade with streamlined exchange of intellectual property and commodities, including nuclear commodities; 2) on-going questions over the strong regulation of sensitive trade to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and 3) the expected actions of additional states to obtain nuclear capabilities to counterbalance Iran. This report provides findings from four studies that were part of a two-year Institute for Science and International Security review which identified threats to the United States’ and interconnected global export control regime and actions to take now to mitigate damages. The review found that U.S. policy goals should include strong efforts to restrict the flow of sensitive technologies to the Middle East where proliferation and security concerns are currently high. This includes examining its own export control reforms and repairing new or ongoing deficiencies that contribute to the spread of sensitive military or other technologies. It should work to negotiate or otherwise impose the extension of limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since the legitimization of Iran’s advanced nuclear program exacerbates proliferation concerns. It should counter illicit nuclear and missile trade in the Middle East and elsewhere, which could support nuclear weapons development. The United States should affirm its strong defensive commitment to allies such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Egypt, while working against their development or import of advanced fuel cycle capabilities. The United States should also support the implementation of strong controls and transparency measures in the Middle East to ensure that burgeoning civilian nuclear programs remain peaceful, such as commitments not to enrich or reprocess, implementation of the Additional Protocol, and provision of secure, lifetime fuel supplies for nuclear reactors. It should monitor via national intelligence capabilities any concerning research or imports by Middle East nations that could signify proliferation intentions, and use all available diplomatic or coercive means to prevent additional nuclear proliferation. Finally, the United States and its allies should work to reduce Middle East security tensions and develop threat reduction efforts more broadly.
Topic:
Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Middle East

3. After the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Advancing the Non-Proliferation Pillar

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
07-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Adoption of a consensus final document action plan at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference on May 28 was a significant achievement for the parties to the NPT. It is a particular achievement for the United States, which fought hard for consensus against great odds. Success was even more important because the last review conference in 2005 ended in acrimony and without a final document. The document demonstrates and reinforces international commitment to the global nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The parties to the NPT have agreed to implement a set of specific actions that cover a wide variety of areas in support of the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. These actions are measurable and will provide accountability at the next review conference. The unfortunate news is that the document does not substantially strengthen the nonproliferation pillar of the Treaty, the more urgent priority with regard to the three pillars in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The conference was unsuccessful in significantly advancing support for universal application of the Model Additional Protocol, dealing with noncompliant states such as Iran, addressing withdrawal while a state is noncompliant, and preventing illicit nuclear trade in the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

4. Unprecedented Projected Nuclear Growth in the Middle East: Now Is the Time to Create Effective Barriers to Proliferation

Author:
David Albright and Andrea Scheel
Publication Date:
11-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Large civil plutonium stocks are set to accumulate for the first time in the wider Middle East over the next two decades. Countries in this conflict-prone region are planning the construction of at least 12 to 13 new nuclear power reactors (Table 1). Using a simple calculation to determine the expected plutonium discharge annually from these reactors, ISIS estimates that regional civil plutonium production could total more than 13,000 kilograms, or 13 tonnes by 2020, and nearly 45 tonnes by 2030 (Table 2). Given that just 8 kg of plutonium is enough to fabricate a nuclear weapon, this figure is significant. These quantities indicate that by 2020 the region may possess enough plutonium for almost 1,700 nuclear weapons. To be usable in a nuclear weapon, this plutonium must first be separated from the irradiated fuel in reprocessing plants. Middle Eastern countries may seek to purchase civil reprocessing plants from suppliers or build them using their domestic capabilities and equipment purchased from abroad. To reduce the risk of proliferation in the Middle East and help lay the basis for a regionwide nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ), the United States must ensure that plutonium is not separated from irradiated reactor fuel, insist on adequate international inspections of these countries, including the adoption of the Additional Protocol, and develop mechanisms to remove spent fuel from the region. Absent such conditions, the incoming administration should discourage the development of nuclear power.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

5. North Korea’s Plutonium Declaration: A Starting Point for an Initial Verification Process

Author:
David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On December 27, Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper quoted U.S. and North Korean officials saying that North Korea had declared a plutonium stockpile of about 30 kilograms. The report was subsequently picked up by several wires, including AFP and UPI. Based on discussions with a knowledgeable official, this roughly 30 kilograms of plutonium apparently refers to a stock of plutonium that North Korea separated from irradiated fuel produced in the five megawatt-electric reactor at Yongbyon. The separation of the plutonium occurred at the Radiochemical Laboroatory at Yongbyon. If this quantity refers to separated plutonium (and not the total quantity of plutonium produced in the spent fuel of several reactor cores), it does fall inside the lower bound of the range of the amount of separated plutonium that ISIS has assessed North Korea could now possess.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Plutonium
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

6. Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities

Author:
David Albright and Paul Brannan
Publication Date:
10-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
The October 3, 2007 Six-Party Talks accord outlines a roadmap for the disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) core nuclear facilities. While an agreement on “Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” has been secured, the specific details of the nuclear disablement process are still being developed. The primary goals of this Working Paper are twofold. First, to establish a definition for the term “disablement” which has only recently achieved widespread usage in the disarmament and nonproliferation community. Second, to outline the types of steps that will or could be taken at key facilities in the DPRK to achieve various disablement objectives. This Working Paper was commissioned by the Korea Working Group (KWG) at the U.S. Institute of Peace. The KWG brings together the leading North Korea watchers from the government and think tank communities to discuss pressing policy issues in the political, security, social, and economic fields.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea