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1. Sudan/Russian Nuclear Power Cooperation Poses Proliferation Risks

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, Bridget Leahy, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Reuters reported on March 13, 2018 that Russia has agreed to sign a “roadmap” with Sudan on building nuclear power stations.1 However, Sudan has poor export controls, no adherence to nuclear power safety or nuclear terrorism conventions, and weak safeguards standards. Its neighbors also maintain poor implementation of these preventions against nuclear material and commodity theft or diversion. Russia should not build nuclear reactors in Sudan. Sudan should instead bolster its infrastructure so that it can at some point in the future underpin a well safeguarded nuclear power program backed by robust, internationally-acceptable strategic export controls. After reviewing data from the Institute’s Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2017,2 which ranks the efforts of 200 countries, territories, and entities to implement export controls and prevent trafficking in strategic commodities, Sudan and its bordering countries, such as the Central African Republic, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and South Sudan, are seen to pose a high proliferation and safety and security risk.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Sudan, and Eurasia

2. Transfer of Firearms on U.S. Control Lists Raises Proliferation, Terrorism Concerns

Author:
Andrea Stricker and David Albright
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
On September 19, 2017, Reuters reported that the Trump administration is in the final stages of deciding about the transfer of three categories of items (Categories 1-3) controlled by the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List.1 Those categories include firearms, ammunition, and artillery. These items are currently controlled by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, administered by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, but would be moved to the Commerce Control List under the Export Administration Regulations, which is administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security.2 The planned transfers would finish a proposed Obama administration reform under the Export Control Reform Initiative that was halted due to opposition from U.S. federal law enforcement agencies.3 The transfers are being hailed as an export promotion program, but the potential risks to U.S. national security are dire. There are a few key problems with the proposed transfers that the administration should be aware of, which could contribute to the proliferation of U.S. firearms worldwide to nefarious countries and to terrorists.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, Weapons, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. Most Nuclear Ban Treaty Proponents are Lagging in Implementing Sound Export Control Legislation

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach, and Andrea Stricker
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Using data compiled from a new index by our Institute, the Peddling Peril Index, which we will soon release, three quarters of the countries that voted in July 2017 in favor of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lack adequate export control legislation. These countries lack a firm basis to control the export or retransfer of nuclear and nuclear-related commodities that are critical to the production and possession of nuclear weapons. If the UN Ban Treaty proponent countries truly seek a world without nuclear weapons, they should take the lead in ensuring that all countries, including their own, have effective strategic trade control systems able to prevent the spread of dangerous commodities and facilities that are critical to the production, maintenance, and improvement of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Exports, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Future Directions in the DPRK’S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Like many secret nuclear weapons programs, the DPRK goes to great lengths to hide its capabilities to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons. Despite these actions, a picture can be drawn of North Korea’s current and projected plutonium and weapons-grade uranium (WGU) stocks. Knowing these plutonium and WGU stocks can, in turn, allow an estimate of the DPRK’s current number of nuclear weapons and a range of projections of the number North Korea could build in the next several years. Although great uncertainty surrounds these projections, as well as the quality of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, these projections form a reasonable picture of the DPRK’s possible nuclear weapons futures, absent actions to significantly limit its nuclear programs. After summarizing estimates of stocks of separated plutonium and weapons-grade uranium as of the end of 2014, this report develops three projections of future nuclear arsenals through 2020: low-end, medium, and high-end nuclear futures. In developing these projections, which are intended to bound North Korea’s nuclear futures, a number of constraints are considered, including the number and size of nuclear production facilities, future underground testing, the extent and success of nuclear weaponization efforts, costs, and access to necessary goods and classified and proprietary technologies abroad.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

5. Highly Enriched Uranium Inventories in South Africa

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
South Africa produced highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons at the Y plant at the Pelindaba nuclear center located near Pretoria. This plant, which operated from 1977 until early 1990, was designed to make weapon-grade uranium. However, it experienced operational problems that led to the production of less than expected amounts of weapon-grade uranium and a considerable amount of HEU enriched less than 90 percent. In late 1989, then-President F.W. de Klerk ordered an end to the nuclear weapons program, including the shutdown of the Y Plant, and decided to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Following the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, South Africa brought the NPT into force in 1991, subjecting its entire inventory of HEU to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As part of the IAEA’s effort to verify South Africa’s initial nuclear material declaration, it conducted an unprecedented investigation aimed at determining that South Africa had declared its HEU inventory completely. After a two year investigation into both the production and use of HEU, the IAEA concluded in September 1993 that South Africa had satisfactorily declared its HEU.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

6. Israel’s Military Plutonium Inventory

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
Israel developed its first nuclear weapon shortly before the 1967 Six Day War, making it the sixth nation to develop nuclear weapons.2 To this day, Israel maintains an ambiguous posture about its nuclear weapons, despite the declassification of formerly secret U.S. government documents which assert the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. In addition, the revelations of Mordechai Vanunu in 1986 revealed a larger nuclear weapons program than commonly assessed at that time.3 The heart of Israel’s nuclear weapons production complex is the Dimona site near the city of Beersheva. This site contains a number of secret nuclear facilities for the production of plutonium, including a heavy water reactor, a fuel fabrication plant, and a plutonium separation plant, all provided by France in the 1950s and early 1960s. The site also reportedly contains facilities likely involved in tritium extraction and purification (using tritium also produced in the reactor), lithium production, and possibly facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment, at least on a research and development scale.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

7. Making the Grade 2000: Second Annual Review of Fissile Material Control Efforts

Author:
Kevin O'Neill
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Science and International Security
Abstract:
A little over a year ago, ISIS initiated an annual review of fissile material controls covering a broad spectrum of initiatives. To do so, 19 separate initiatives were identified and assessed. Based on this assessment, grades were awarded on a scale of A, B, C, D, and F, where an “A” is excellent and an “F” is failing. Numerically, an “A” corresponds to a numerical grade of four, and an “F” to zero. The results of the first review were disappointing. Only 12 of the 19 initiatives received a passing grade of “C” or higher. The average grade of the initiatives was a “C”-showing an unfortunate level of mediocrity across the fissile material control agenda. In ISIS’s 2000 review, we found that the outlook is worse today than it was a year ago. Rather than make progress during the past 12 months, the overall fissile material control agenda fared poorly. The average grade of the identified initiatives fell from a “C” to a “C-minus.” This overall finding is borne out if one looks at the individual grades assigned to each of the 19 identified initiatives. ISIS judged that five initiatives remained essentially static, nine received lower grades, and five initiatives received higher grades.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Fissile Material
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America