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Begin New Search Publishing Institution Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University

131. Reflections on the Human Terrain System During the First 4 Years

Author:
Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program that recruits, trains, and deploys mixed military and civilian Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), which embed with military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. These teams conduct social science research about the local popula¬tion to provide situational awareness to the military and “enable culturally astute decision-making, enhance operational effectiveness, and preserve and share socio-cultural institutional knowledge.” The teams rely on the HTS Research Reachback Center to provide secondary source research and the Mapping the Human Terrain Toolkit (MAP–HT) to support analysis, storage, and retrieval of sociocultural information.
Topic:
Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

132. Patronage versus Professionalism in New Security Institutions

Author:
Kimberly Marten
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Where do effective military and police institutions come from in a society that is not already based on the rule of law? In particular, can informal militias based on patron/ client relations be successfully reformed or integrated into professional and effective state security institutions? We do not have good answers to these questions. Yet the United States and its allies are wrestling with them daily in many locations around the globe. My goal in this article is to examine what we do know about historical and recent situations that to some degree mirror these current challenges, and to draw out some unexpected practical suggestions about what might work on the ground.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

133. Regional Engagement in Africa: Closing the Gap Between Strategic Ends and Ways

Author:
Laura R. Varhola and Christopher H. Varhola
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The East African Standby Force (EASF) is East Africa's contribution to the African Union's African Standby Force, which is an international and continental military force with both a civilian and police component to be deployed in Africa during times of crisis. Although the EASF is still under development and in need of capacity-building assistance, the United States does not have the authorities to provide direct assistance to this regional force. Instead, Washington must rely on bilateral assistance mechanisms that are cumbersome and less efficient than dealing directly with the EASF.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, and Washington

134. NATO Countering the Hybrid Threat

Author:
Michael Aaronson, Sverre Diessen, Yves de Kermabon, Mary Beth Long, and Michael Miklaucic
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the most successful collective security arrangement among states in the 20 th century. Having deterred and outlasted its primary adversary, the Soviet Union, NATO now faces the challenge of redefining its roles and purposes in the 21 st century. Like all pluralist organizations, the Alliance must reflect the common interests of its 28 members, and defining common interests that motivate all members to sacrifice for the good of the whole has been difficult. In the absence of a direct common military threat, disparate interests, commitments, and visions of the transatlantic future have fragmented Alliance coherence.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
North Atlantic

135. COIN in Peace-building: Case Study of the 2009 Malakand Operation

Author:
Nadeem Ahmed
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Since 2007, Islamic militants and law enforcement agencies have remained locked in a sporadic tussle for control in the Malakand Division of Pakistan. The division is located in the northern part of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province and borders the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It consists of the districts of Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Swat, Shangla, and Buner. An increased influx of radical elements from across the border and from other parts of the country resulted in the strengthening of informal miscreants' networks and fundamentalist actors, ultimately resulting in the creation of a parallel state structure. Rapprochement and efforts of reconciliation between these groups and Pakistan government authorities continued for nearly 2 years, resulting in the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation of 2009, which conceded to the demand for the implementation of Sharia law in the entire division. However, within the space of 1 month, a failure on the part of the Islamist groups to maintain their end of the bargain, and their growing expansionary tendencies, resulted in the government deciding to intervene, using the army to conduct a rapid law enforcement operation with the goal of reestablishing the writ of formal state institutions.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Republika Srpska, Lower Dir, Malakand, Shangla, Buner, and Upper Dir

136. The Premature Debate on CERP Effectiveness

Author:
Michael Fischerkeller
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
What does the Department of Defense (DOD) community know about the effectiveness of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), how to use it to greatest effect, and cost versus its value to operations? DOD has been employing this “weapons system” for over a decade, and so much has been written on the topic that one would think quite a lot should be known. In fact, the surface of understanding has barely been scratched.

137. Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis

Author:
David Ucko
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Six years have passed since the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3−24, Counterinsurgency. Embraced by sections of the military and civilian defense community seeking a fresh approach to the conflict in Iraq, the new field manual gained a political significance and profile unlike previous doctrinal publications. When General David Petraeus was able to incorporate some of the manual's core precepts into the new U.S. strategy for Iraq, and casualties and instability in Iraq declined over the following few years, both counterinsurgency doctrine and the people associated with it gained unprecedented influence.
Topic:
Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

138. Negotiating Afghanistan: When? With Whom? About What?

Author:
Thomas Pickering
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Under the George W. Bush administration, negotiations were not included in the strategic mix of dealing with Afghanistan or, for that matter, Iraq. One can only conjecture about reasons. They may have included a sense that a military victory was possible; a belief that talk about negotiations was in itself a sign of weakness that should not—and could not—be conveyed to the opponent; full-blown distrust of the Taliban; a need to have a better balance of forces and more success behind us before we took on the task; a hope that a reintegration process, together with raising the military stakes, would be sufficient to win the day; and a distrust of diplomats and politicians who might be expected to conduct the negotiations—a sense that all achieved with the expenditure of so much blood and treasure would be given away if diplomats and politicians were turned loose on the problem.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Taliban

139. The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction

Author:
Renanah Miles
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Fanfare as the last combat brigade departed, a prime-time Oval Office address, and an official ceremony in Baghdad marked the end of combat operations in Iraq in August 2010. Less scrutinized, but no less significant, is the December 31, 2011, deadline when the last U.S. troops plan to exit the stage, leaving operations completely in civilian hands. Concerns have centered on security and logistics, areas where the Department of State relies heavily on the military. Beyond the ability to physically maneuver, there is a pressing question over State's ability to execute the mission: does the State Department have the capacity to finish the reconstruction mission and manage the transition to long-term diplomacy and development? Given the lessons of the past 10 years, the answer is no.
Political Geography:
United States

140. The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach

Author:
Brian M. Burton
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a wide range of military activities abroad intended to degrade, dismantle, and defeat the al Qaeda organization and its network of loosely affiliated Islamist extremist groups. A disproportionate number of these efforts—in terms of manpower, materiel, money, and media attention—focus on two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. In both instances, the United States toppled existing hostile regimes and is attempting to rebuild institutions of security and governance from the ground up. However, these intensive and expensive efforts at state-building are not necessarily the most important from the standpoint of understanding the future direction of U.S. strategy against violent Islamist extremist groups. Instead, U.S. strategy against transnational terrorist groups abroad is increasingly focused on a concept commonly referred to as the indirect approach.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq