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41. Response to the Decade of War

Author:
James Dobbins
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Last summer, in response to a directive from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Martin Dempsey, the Joint Staff issued a short summary of lessons learned from the past decade of military operations. The document, entitled Decade of War, Volume 1 frankly and cogently acknowledges mistakes made over this period, and particularly during the first half of the decade, that is to say between the invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001 and the surge of troops into Iraq in early 2007. Among the admitted deficiencies were the failure to adequately grasp the operating environment, a reliance on conventional tactics to fight unconventional enemies, an inability to articulate a convincing public narrative, and poor interagency coordination. The document is testimony to the capacity of the American military for self-criticism and eventual correction, albeit not always in time to avoid costly setbacks.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

42. An Interview with Dennis Blair

Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
What lessons have you personally drawn from the decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan? Blair: The decade of war is really two decades of war–from the time the Cold War ended in about 1989 through the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the involvement of the United States in a series of individual military actions. What I've learned is that we need to do a better job thinking these conflicts all the way through before we engage in them. Because it turns out that we are relearning an old lesson, which is the use of military force is only a part of improving a situation and protecting American interests in a particular country or region. Too often, we think that a military victory itself will cause the desired result. In fact many other factors come in to play; economic development, social development, government improvement. These are not accomplished by the U.S. alone, and certainly not by American military force alone, but often with allies and other partners, and with other civilian capabilities. I think we have not thought them through carefully as to the end state that we are trying to achieve. Next we need to be realistic about the resources that are required; military, civil, and other. I'm afraid these are old lessons that need to be relearned, not new lessons, but they certainly have been borne out as some of the shortcomings of the interventions we have made in recent years. I would add, by the way, that I am not one who says our military interventions since 1989 have all been disasters. I think on the whole they have made the world a better place; bad people who were around then aren't around now, from Manuel Noriega to Saddam Hussein through Slobodan Milosevic and others; so it is not that our military interventions have been wasted. On the contrary–but we need to make sure that we get the maximum possible benefit from them and intervene in a smart way.
Topic:
Cold War and Government
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

43. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

Author:
Jeff Rice
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Fred Kaplan's The Insurgents is a highly successful and compelling intermingling of three stories: the rise and eventual fall of General David Petraeus; the intellectual history of counterinsurgency; and the broadening of the learning culture within the United States Military during the Iraq war. Indeed, the heroes of the book are the “insurgents” within the U.S. Army who all but overthrew the dominant paradigm of kinetic warfare in favor of ideas derived from England and France during the end of the colonial era.1 Kaplan's book picks up on the story told by Tom Ricks in The Gamble2 about how this intellectual insurgency transformed the way the U.S. fought the war in Iraq, preferring the counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to protecting civilians from insurgents and lowering their casualty rate, and building alliances in order to reduce the number of insurgents. For Kaplan this is nothing short of a profound alteration of the American way of war, one that caused enormous consternation amongst certain sectors of the military who were wedded to a more conventional approach to war.
Topic:
Government and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and America

44. Post-Asad Syria

Author:
Daniel Serwer
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The situation in Syria has gone from bad to worse. United Nations (UN) observers have been unable to do more than report on numerous violations of the UN Security Council (UNSC)–sponsored ceasefire as well as atrocities committed against civilians. The authorities restrict their movements, threaten their security, and interfere with their communications. The Syrian government continues to use artillery, helicopter gunships, and paramilitary shabiha (loosely translated as “thugs”) against peaceful protesters as well as armed insurgents. The Free Syrian Army and other insurgent forces control at least some territory and are attacking Syrian security forces and installations. Unknown assailants have committed a series of bombings against government offices and assassinated senior defense figures. Arms are flowing to the government from Russia while Saudi Arabia and Qatar are supplying the Free Syrian Army.
Political Geography:
Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Syria

45. "Left of Bang": The Value of Sociocultural Analysis in Today's Environment

Author:
Michael T. Flynn, James Sisco, and David C. Ellis
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Hard lessons learned during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, counterterrorist operations across continents, and the Arab Spring all contributed to a growing recognition within the Intelligence Community (IC)1 of the importance of understanding the “human terrain” of operating environments. The Department of Defense (DOD), its Service branches and combatant commands, and the broader IC responded to the demand for sociocultural analysis (SCA) by creating organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Socio-Cultural Capabilities Council, Human Terrain System, and U.S. Central Command's Human Terrain Analysis Branch, among others. For large bureaucracies, DOD and the IC reacted agilely to the requirement, but the robust SCA capabilities generated across the government over the last decade were largely operationally and tactically organized, resourced, and focused. What remains is for the IC to formulate a strategic understanding of SCA and establish a paradigm for incorporating it into the intelligence process.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

46. Evolved Irregular Threats

Author:
Ben Fitzgerald and Pia Wanek
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Almost every aspect of national security is colored by uncertainty. While it would be arrogant to consider that this moment in history carries more uncertainty than others, we presently find ourselves facing a multiplicity of uncertainties that pull us simultaneously in different directions. Drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the future implications of those conflicts, the ongoing events of the Arab Spring, the rise and increased assertiveness of near-peer competitors, a variety of nonstate actors with increasingly sophisticated capability, and economic crises in Europe create additional contingencies that require our attention. Simultaneously, economic uncertainty at home limits our means, requiring prioritization and the acceptance of additional risk.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Europe

47. Challenges Developing Host Nation Police Capacity

Author:
James K. Wither
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Stability operations embrace a wide range of civil-military missions in fragile or conflictaffected states, and they range from traditional peacekeeping to combat with well-armed insurgents or criminal elements. Often different activities, including combat, policing, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction, occur concurrently in the theater of operations. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has described these operations as: military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.
Political Geography:
United States

48. Logistics Islands: The Global Supply Archipelago and the Topologics of Defense

Author:
Pierre Bélanger and Alexander Scott Arroyo
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
For the Department of Defense (DOD), the most important difference between Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan is neither cultural nor political, but logistical. Admiral Mike Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up the difference with terse precision: “We don't have a Kuwait.” Lacking a secure staging ground adjacent to the theater of operations exponentially complicates getting materiel to and from forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs), in turn requiring a longer and more complex logistical supply chain. Landlocked among non– International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) states, unstable allies (Pakistan and China to the east, Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan to the north), and regional “rogue states” (Iran), Afghanistan is, for logistical operations, a desert island.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, and Island

49. The Stabilization Dilemma

Author:
Greg Mills
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Nanette is pleased to have a job at the Hotel Ivoire, the somewhat bizarre, Israeli-designed 1970s grand statement located in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. This elegant woman in her 40s travels 15 kilometers from her home every night, a journey that daily soaks up $6 of her $240 monthly salary. But she is grateful to have a job, especially since her husband is paralyzed from the neck down, the result of an industrial accident. And things are looking up. The hotel is being renovated, occupancy is climbing, and the giant pool surrounding the entire resort has been freshly painted and is once more full of water. Côte d'Ivoire is slowly getting back on its feet after a devastating civil war. In the longer term, Nanette's prosperity—like that of her 21 million countrymen and women—is linked to the things she cannot see and, in a fragile democracy, has little power over: the effectiveness of the process of political reconciliation, economic growth, and the governance necessary to ensure that the growth is spread beyond a tiny elite, and, above all, the maintenance of peace. The role of outside powers in this transition is limited, and they have to learn, first, to do no harm and, second, to link private sector–led growth better with donor interests and flows.
Political Geography:
Israel

50. Political-Military Lessons from U.S. Operations in Vietnam and Afghanistan

Author:
Michael J. Williams
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Using history to understand the present can be a useful tool, but it is also a limited one. Historical cases are not identical to contemporary ones, and there is a danger of conflating challenges in such a manner that, rather than illuminating a present challenge, history obfuscates it. This problem tends to be evident in the inaccurate use of analogies by policymakers, commentators, and analysts. Such may be the case in the contemporary American debate over the state of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. Since President Barack Obama came to office in 2009 and deployed an additional 60,000 troops to Afghanistan in the first year of his administration, the debate over continued U.S. involvement has been dogged by analogies to Vietnam. But it is not readily apparent that Vietnam is an appropriate analogy for understanding the current challenge the United States faces in Afghanistan.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and America

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