Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Iraq Publishing Institution Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University

21. The Commander as Investor: Changing CERP Practices

Author:
Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Postinvasion Iraq and Afghanistan have compelled the United States to expand its focus on and capacity for conflict resolution and postwar reconstruction. Our strategic objective in both countries has become the transformation of dysfunctional and war-affected societies into stable, viable, and sustainable states. To this end, economic development and security are regarded as mutually reinforcing elements: without security, development cannot progress far, yet development is essential to attaining security. With civilian aid agencies impaired by prohibitive security conditions and burdensome bureaucratic requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) has, for the first time in 60 years, become a dominant player in creating the conditions for economic growth in conflict areas
Topic:
Conflict Resolution
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

22. Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations

Author:
Norton A. Schwartz
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 2001, the U.S. military, aided by indigenous forces, swiftly toppled a Taliban government responsible for providing sanctuary to al Qaeda. In 2003, the Iraqi military disintegrated in the face of a devastating demonstration of American power that ended the regime of Saddam Hussein. America showcased its unique ability to project power over vast distances to achieve substantial results. Unfortunately, those initial victories were short-lived. As the security situations deteriorated in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States became engaged in longer term irregular conflicts. American and allied militaries struggled to adapt their doctrine, training, and technology to counter an elusive foe. While ground forces relearned and incorporated counterinsurgency (COIN) lessons, Airmen explored how airpower's flexibility, responsiveness, and bird's-eye view of the battlefield could respond to those lessons.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, America, and Taliban

23. Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond

Author:
Robert Killebrew
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the global context for American security policy was changing. While the traditional state-based international system continued to function and the United States reacted to challenges by states in conventional ways (for example, by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11), a cascade of enormous technological and social change was revolutionizing international affairs. As early as the 1990s, theorists were writing that with modern transnational communications, international organizations and corporate conglomerates would increasingly act independently of national borders and international regulation. What was not generally foreseen until about the time of 9/11, though, was the darker side: that the same technology could empower corrupt transnational organizations to threaten the international order itself. In fact, the globalization of crime, from piracy's financial backers in London and Nairobi to the Taliban and Hizballah's representatives in West Africa, may well be the most important emerging fact of today's global security environment.
Topic:
International Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

24. Irregular Conflict and the Wicked Problem Dilemma: Strategies of Imperfection

Author:
Franklin Kramer
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Irregular conflict is neither neat nor fair. Definitionally, it is hard to describe, including as it does conflicts ranging from Somalia to Bosnia to Sierra Leone to Colombia to Iraq to Afghanistan (to say nothing of Sudan, the Philippines, or Yemen). Hybrid, counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations, counterterrorism, and civil war have all been utilized as descriptions, often in combination. But if defining irregular conflict is difficult, even more difficult is knowing how to respond, especially for an outside intervener like the United States. Doctrine has now been developed, but in practice the context of an irregular conflict is generally so complex and contradictory that it is difficult to put the full doctrine effectively into practice.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Sudan, Bosnia, Philippines, Yemen, Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia

25. Negotiating Afghanistan: When? With Whom? About What?

Author:
Thomas Pickering
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Under the George W. Bush administration, negotiations were not included in the strategic mix of dealing with Afghanistan or, for that matter, Iraq. One can only conjecture about reasons. They may have included a sense that a military victory was possible; a belief that talk about negotiations was in itself a sign of weakness that should not—and could not—be conveyed to the opponent; full-blown distrust of the Taliban; a need to have a better balance of forces and more success behind us before we took on the task; a hope that a reintegration process, together with raising the military stakes, would be sufficient to win the day; and a distrust of diplomats and politicians who might be expected to conduct the negotiations—a sense that all achieved with the expenditure of so much blood and treasure would be given away if diplomats and politicians were turned loose on the problem.
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Taliban

26. The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach

Author:
Brian M. Burton
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a wide range of military activities abroad intended to degrade, dismantle, and defeat the al Qaeda organization and its network of loosely affiliated Islamist extremist groups. A disproportionate number of these efforts—in terms of manpower, materiel, money, and media attention—focus on two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. In both instances, the United States toppled existing hostile regimes and is attempting to rebuild institutions of security and governance from the ground up. However, these intensive and expensive efforts at state-building are not necessarily the most important from the standpoint of understanding the future direction of U.S. strategy against violent Islamist extremist groups. Instead, U.S. strategy against transnational terrorist groups abroad is increasingly focused on a concept commonly referred to as the indirect approach.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

27. Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring

Author:
Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. and Elizabeth C. Packard
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
During the past decade, the most visible military activities in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) have been decidedly kinetic, showcased primarily through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This year marks important transitions in both of these campaigns as Afghan National Security Forces begin to take the lead on security operations and the United States shifts to a more traditional security relationship with Baghdad. Building partner capacity in Afghan and Iraqi forces—one of USCENTCOM's key nonkinetic activities—is a central component to success in both of these missions.
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Arabia

28. Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military Capacity, 2007–2010

Author:
Bradford Baylor, Jeanne Burrington, Bradford Davis, and Russell Goehring
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Low per capita income is linked to economic instability and state insecurity in postconflict societies. While domestic state capacity is the long-term goal, low-income societies emerging from conflict do not have the luxury to wait. Thus, given the current limitations of state performance, the immediate security solutions for low per capita income countries need to focus on host-government reform policies and alternatives for delivering basic services, rather than long-term state capacity-building. Even with low government capacity, certain economic policies can be put in place to improve per capita income and stimulate employment creation and other public goods. Establishing incentives for practical local economic reform policies, creating an environment that supports private economic investment, and enhancing the delivery of basic social services by the host government contribute to security and stability as they also ultimately contribute to building state capacity.
Topic:
Reform
Political Geography:
Iraq

29. How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle

Author:
James N. Soligan
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Ongoing engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq have resurrected one of the most important and challenging questions facing political and military leaders in the United States and other nations: how to set objectives, conduct operations, and terminate wars in a manner that achieves intended political outcomes. The collective track record leaves much to be desired, and results of even the most recent conflicts would argue that we have not yet learned the necessary lessons from wars in the 20 th century to prevent making many of the same mistakes and suffering similar consequences in the 21 st century.
Topic:
War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq

30. Security Is More Than "20" Percent

Author:
Ronald Neumann
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
Security is only 20 percent of the solution; 80 percent is governance and development." "There is no military solution to insurgency." These and similar statements have rightly refocused counterinsurgency doctrine and popular thinking away from purely military solutions to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet these catchphrases have become substitutes for deeper consideration of the role of security in the current conflicts and in insurgency in general, hiding some important points and leading to assumptions that are an insufficient basis for policy.
Topic:
Development and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Iraq