Search

Begin New Search Topic Autonomy Publishing Institution Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)

1. Sí o no? Will Catalonia go it alone?

Author:
Janko Bekić
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The United Kingdom and Spain have many things in common. Both countries are former empires, constitutional monarchies and parliamentarydemocracies;of�iciallytheyare unitary states, however, devolution in the UK and the model of autonomous communities in Spain make them “federations without federalism”. Furthermore, they are both plurinational, in the sense that Britishness and Spanishness serve as overarching identities for the stateless nations of the English, Scots and Welsh within the UK, and the Castilians, Catalans, Basques and others within Spain (although, one could argue that the English and the Castilians are the real “owners” of the two countries). In the past, London as well as Madrid fought minority nationalisms with violence, triggering terrorist attacks by armed separatist and secessionist groups like the IRA and ETA. More recently, the central governments of the UK and Spain have been faced with peaceful and democratic independence movements in Scotland and Catalonia, to which they responded quite differently. While London allowed the Scottish independence referendum of September 2014, and promised to honor its result, Madrid remains adamantly opposed to a similar plebiscite in Catalonia, and vows to disrupt it with all legal means at its disposal (which, ultimately, includes the use of force). The differing approaches of British and Spanish governments to secessionism within their borders are mirrored in their foreign policies: the UK recognized the Serbian breakaway province of Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state, while Spain (along with four other EU members) refuses to do so.
Topic:
Federalism, Autonomy, and Independence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Spain, Catalonia, Scotland, and Western Europe

2. Kurds in Iraq seek independence 100 years after Sykes-Picot

Author:
Janko Bekić
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In February, Masoud Barzani, President of Iraqi Kurdistan, announced that a referendum on the independence of the autonomous region would be held by the end of 2016. He stressed that Kurdistan had the same grounds for demanding statehood as Scotland, Catalonia or Quebec. Equally, he opined, the right of the Kurdish people to decide their own fate was unnegotiable. During an earlier encounter with Western journalists, Barzani pointed to the upcoming centenary of the Sykes-Picot agreement (16 May 1916), which divided Ottoman assets in the Middle East into British and French zones of interest, laying the foundations for the creation of multi-ethnic and multi-religious Iraq and Syria. The President of the Kurdistan Region underlined that 2016 would be the year in which the Franco-British agreement of World War I would be annulled and the policy of “compulsory co-existence” in the Middle East �inally abandoned. The purpose of this brief is to succinctly discuss the case made for Kurdish independence, but also the many obstacles on the way towards it. Solid arguments in favour of secession Mr. Barzani’s central argument in favour of Kurdish statehood is the fact that international borders in the Middle East largely do not correspond to popular will; i.e. they have no legitimacy, only legality. Historically, they are by-products of foreign – Ottoman, and later Western European – rule. As such, they are open for revision, especially if the states in question have a track record of discriminating, forcibly assimilating, or – in the worst case – physically exterminating segments of the population. Another argument made by Mr. Barzani is one concerning “compulsory co-existence”. It's well-known that international power brokers are rather conservative when it comes to recognizing border changes or granting independence to secessionist entities. As a rule, these are considered only in instances of grave human rights violations, and only as a last resort. The Westphalian sovereignty of states has been greatly eroded by the concept of humanitarian intervention. However, international borders are still considered to be sacrosanct and – generally – untouchable. This often leads to the involuntary co-existence of ethnic, national and/or religious groups with no sense of shared identity or mutual interests. In such unfavourable conditions, democracies – if they exist – are little more than tyrannies of the majority.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

3. Brexit and its discontents

Author:
Janko Bekić
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In the weeks following June 23rd, the day of the historic Brexit vote, it seemed as if the United Kingdom was on the brink of dissolution. Exasperated by the prospect of Scotland being dragged out of the European Union against the clearly expressed will of its population (62 percent voted “remain”), Scottish First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon announced the preparation of a second independence referendum, which – if successful – would sever Scotland’s ties with the UK, and keep it in the EU. Emboldened by SNP’s move, Sinn Fein’s deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland Martin McGuinness called for a border poll on the uni�ication of Ireland. His line of reasoning was the same as Sturgeon’s: the majority of voters in Northern Ireland voted “remain” (56 percent) and would not be forced out of the EU by English and Welsh “leave” voters. Less than two years after the original Scottish independence referendum Downing Street was faced with a new wave of secessionism and separatism. It was generally accepted that the surprising result of the plebiscite on UK’s EU membership might persuade a portion of the “no” voters from the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum to change their minds and tip the scales in favour of secession. Namely, a considerable number of Scottish “no” voters in 2014 opted for the continuation of the union with England precisely out of fear that an independent Scotland would have to exit the EU and renegotiate its admission into the club. SNP’s rationale after June 23rd was that these people would now naturally join the pro-independence camp and help it pass the 50 percent hurdle. However, polling conducted by YouGov during the summer showed that 50 percent of Scots opposed a new referendum on independence, while only 37 percent supported it. If a new referendum was to be held nevertheless, 54 percent would vote against independence and 46 percent in favour – a shift of only one percent point compared to the original referendum which ended with the result 55 percent to 45 percent.
Topic:
Europe Union, Brexit, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, England, North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales