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1. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

2. Southeast Asia Is the Soft Underbelly of American Power in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is not just the swing sub-region in the Indo-Pacific but also the soft underbelly of the region—the area most susceptible to Chinese coercion, influence, and expansion. Except for Vietnam, Southeast Asian states have strong fence-sitting tendencies and are reluctant to properly balance and counter Beijing due to their proximity to China, smaller size, limited capabilities, and economic integration with and reliance on China. They are also constantly fearful that the US and its allies will abandon and leave them to fend for themselves against a hostile China. This means that while one can identify pockets of creative and proactive thinking in this sub-region, the prevailing inclinations of the region’s countries are to never back a side before the result is obvious, do the minimum when it comes to burden sharing, and receive maximum economic and security benefits for minimum risk, price, and commitment. In short, they are often inclined toward free riding. It is easy for the US and its allies to become frustrated with Southeast Asian states that give the impression they are seeking various forms of “strategic welfare.” The more constructive approach is to understand their domestic and external vulnerabilities and work within these.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, ASEAN, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

4. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

5. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

6. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

10. Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable Resource Allocation

Author:
Dan Patt and William C. Greenwalt
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The keystone of the Department of Defense’s institutional architecture is not acquisition, but rather the budgeting process. This governs its ability to allocate funding to achieve national security objectives, links together requirements and purchasing, sets the calendar of the department, controls changes to investment priority, and serves as the mechanism for Congress to exercise its constitutionally granted appropriations powers. While there have been dozens of acquisition reform efforts, the budgeting process has been nearly untouched since 1961. Bureaucratic resource allocation processes—especially planning, budgeting, and appropriations—are a critical engine for maintaining an edge in a long-term military competition. In the 1950s, this realization was mechanized by the US, when fast-paced military developments with shifting directions were used to drive cost into ponderous Soviet planning processes. Ultimately, Soviet strategists also recognized that agility in resource allocation would ultimately determine the outcome of competition given a sufficiently long horizon. The Department of Defense (DoD) allocates resources through the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) system. PPBE is the scheme by which DoD sets its own plans and priorities and also how it asks Congress to approve its spending and provide oversight (often by verifying actual execution against predicted schedule and performance). The history of the PPBE dates to 1961 and is based on period industrial planning concepts. The PPBE’s inflexibility increases the difficulty of rapidly shifting funding to emergent innovations that appear promising, as new programs must typically wait more than two years to be included in the budget. Additionally, the PPBE encodes divisions between research, production, and operations activities that stymy iterative or feedback-based development. A common theme across core DoD processes including the PPBE is an emphasis on long-term prediction of future needs and an attempt to optimize high-performance weapons against projected requirements. When these conditions are not met (whether from shifting technology or shifting adversaries), these processes may not yield optimal, relevant, or militarily effective results. Historical analysis of innovation time cycles—the time measured from the origin of a new concept for military capability until its initial fielding—indicates the cycles were shorter prior to the implementation of the triad of McNamara-era processes, commonly with an average time around five years for both ships and aircraft, and have grown steadily since. Emerging technologies, especially information technologies, are central to future conflict and are largely commercial and globalized. The defense acquisition process and legacy defense industrial base approach struggle to accommodate timely adoption of these technologies, as evidenced by lengthy modern time cycles (more than ten years) for development and fielding of new-start weapon systems. China may have an edge in its resource allocation process, although this topic merits further investigation. Evidence includes their ability to develop and field twenty-five new unmanned aircraft systems from 2010 to 2020, including stealthy carrier-based unmanned systems. Efforts to improve adaptability that focus on acquisition milestones have been only partially successful. Analysis of the chained and linear components of the modern military capability development and fielding process suggests that it is difficult to create a competitive, adaptable resource allocation scheme without revisiting the PPBE and key decision processes that govern the ability to make rapid, early investments in new operational capability or concepts. Incoming administration leadership, military leaders, and Congressional leaders need to revisit institutional structure and the budgeting process recognizing the central role of time in driving innovation, adaptability, and resilience. It is not yet too late to favorably shape the trajectory of long-term military competition with China, but the only hope of an upper hand rests on agility and initiative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America