1. Electoral Proximity and the Political Involvement of Bureaucrats: A Natural Experiment in Argentina, 1904
- Author:
- Valentin Figueroa
- Publication Date:
- 04-2016
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Institution:
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- Abstract:
- In this paper, I use a slightly modified version of the Becker– Stigler model of corrupt behavior to explain bureaucratic political in- volvement. Since bureaucrats prefer higher rewards and not to support losing candidates, we expect them to become politically involved near elections – when rewards are expected to be higher, and information more abundant. Taking advantage of a natural experiment, I employ differences-in-means and differences-in-differences techniques to esti- mate the effect of electoral proximity on the political involvement of justices of the peace in the city of Buenos Aires in 1904. I find a large, positive, and highly local effect of electoral proximity on their political involvement, with no appreciable impact in the months before or after elections.
- Topic:
- Corruption, Elections, Justice, and Bureaucracy
- Political Geography:
- Argentina, South America, and Latin America