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1. South China Sea Threat Assessment: Is China a Threat or a Paper Tiger?

Author:
Shaoyu Yuan
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Tensions in the South China Sea continue to rise. China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)’s Rear Admiral Lou Yuan, regarded as a hawkish military commentator, recently proclaimed that the continuing dispute over the ownership of the South China Sea could be resolved by sinking two US aircraft carriers. Statements like these result in a legitimate fear that China’s increasing presence in the South China Sea might spark a kinetic military conflict with the United States. However, while most Western scholars and media are paying excessive attention to the rise of China, few are contemplating China’s weaknesses in the region. Despite China’s constant verbal objections and rising tensions with the United States in the last century, the world has yet to witness any major military confrontation between the two superpowers. China will continue to avoid directly confronting the United States in the South China Sea for at least another decade because China’s military remains immature and defective.
Topic:
Security, Power Politics, Territorial Disputes, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, South China, and United States of America

2. Nationalist Underpinnings of Turkey’s Damaging “Kurdish” Policy

Author:
Max Erdemandi
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Recent discussions on the Turkish state’s actions, which have devastated Kurdish people within and outside of its borders, suffer from a familiar deficiency: they neglect the historical and cultural foundations of the dynamics that placed the Kurdish people at the center of Turkey’s national security policy. Serious human rights violations and voter suppression in southeast Turkey, the massacre of Kurdish people in various parts of northern Syria, and purging of Kurdish politicians on false accusations are all extensions of Turkey’s decades-long, repeated policy mistakes, deeply rooted in its nationalist history. Unless there is a seismic shift in the drivers of Turkish security policy, especially as it pertains to the Kurdish people, Turkey is bound to repeat these mistakes. Furthermore, threat externalization with linkage to legitimacy of rule will further erode the democratic institutions of the state and other authentic aspects of Turkish identity.
Topic:
Security, Nationalism, Ethnicity, Syrian War, Borders, Violence, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

3. Ambassador Richard Morningstar on Energy and Geopolitics in the Caspian Region

Author:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs and Richard L. Morningstar
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
On November 18, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service welcomed former U.S. Ambassador to the European Union Richard Morningstar for a conversation on energy security in the Caspian region. Prior to the event, GJIA sat down with Ambassador Morningstar to discuss the intersection of energy and geopolitics, legacies from the Soviet Union, and energy security challenges facing Central Asian states.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Interview
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Soviet Union, Caspian Sea, and United States of America

4. Civilians Versus Their Governments: China, the United States, and the Changing Nature of Conflict and Security in Africa

Author:
Obert Hodzi
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
With a few exceptions, armed civil wars are no longer commonplace in Africa, but anti-government protests are. Instead of armed rebels, unarmed civilians are challenging regimes across Africa to reconsider their governance practices and deliver both political and economic change. In their responses, regimes in countries like Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Rwanda, and Burundi have favored the combat mode—responding to dissent with military and repressive means. With few options, civilian movements look to the United States for protection and support while their governments look to China for reinforcement. If the United States seeks to reassert its influence in Africa and strengthen its democratic influence, its strategy needs to go beyond counterterrorism and respond to Africa’s pressing needs while supporting the African people in their quest for democracy and human rights.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, State Violence, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Positive Evolution or More of the Same?

Author:
David Smith
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Civilian governance in Pakistan has never lasted longer than eleven years. 2019 is the eleventh year since General Pervez Musharraf resigned the presidency and fears of a coup may exist, but one is not probable—at least not in the near-term future. In fact, two recent Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS)—Generals Kayani and Raheel in 2009 and 2014, respectively—considered taking, but decided not to take, direct control of the government. These decisions demonstrate that military rule is no longer necessary because the Army has already attained its major goals of de facto control of the country’s nuclear and missile programs, key foreign relationships, the military budget, and national security decision-making. In effect, the military has achieved what I have previously termed a “coup-less coup.” Instead of the traditionally fraught civil-military relationship, it seems that, for the first time in Pakistan’s turbulent history, the government and military agree on the three major issues facing Pakistan: domestic politics, the economy, and India. However, key variables, such as economic stability, could quickly change the course of this relationship.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Governance, Conflict, Civilians, and Military Government
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

6. Catching Up: China’s Developing Military Power

Author:
Ian Williams
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
For decades, China has engaged in a fervent game of “catch-up” with U.S. military capabilities. This effort, which has ballooned China’s defense spending to 620 percent of its 1990 level, is beginning to bear real fruit. While still far from achieving military parity, China’s military technology and doctrine are quickly coalescing into a coherent form of warfare, tailored to overpowering the U.S. military in a short, sharp conflict in the Eastern Pacific. This strategy of “informationized” warfare focuses first on eroding U.S. situational awareness, communications, and precision targeting capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, Military Spending, Conflict, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. What North Korea’s Push for Economic Development Means for Human Rights

Author:
Bradley O. Babson
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since his first-annual New Year’s speech in 2012 setting North Korea’s policy priorities, Kim Jong Un has emphasized his commitment to economic development, notably promising his people that they will never have to tighten their belts again. The Byunjin policy of equally prioritizing economic development and security through nuclear and missile programs reflects Kim’s desire to assure regime stability by delivering broad-based economic development while establishing a security environment that deters external threats and potential domestic unrest. While United States policy has used sanctions and other pressures to stymie Kim’s ambitions, the Kim regime has nonetheless modestly furthered economic development and significantly advanced security through its nuclear and missile testing programs.
Topic:
Security, Development, Economics, Human Rights, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

8. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The SCO grew out of a Chinese initiative (hence its name) from the late 1990s that brought together all the states that had emerged from the Soviet Union in 1991 and signed bilateral border-delimiting treaties with China: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In 2001, these states and Uzbekistan formally created the SCO. Since then it has added observer states—Mongolia, Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan—and dialogue partners—Turkey, Belarus, and Sri Lanka. The SCO's original mandate seemingly formulated it as a collective security organization pledged to the defense of any member threatened by secession, terrorism, or extremism—for example, from Islamic militancy. This pre-9/11 threat listing reflected the fact that each member confronted restive Muslim minorities within its own borders. That threat may indeed be what brought them together since China's concern for its territorial integrity in Xinjiang drives its overall Central Asian policy. Thus, the SCO's original charter and mandate formally debarred Central Asian states from helping Uyghur Muslim citizens fight the repression of their Uyghur kinsmen in China. Likewise, the charter formally precludes Russian or Chinese assistance to disaffected minorities in one or more Central Asian states should they launch an insurgency. In practice the SCO has refrained from defense activities and followed an idiosyncratic, even elusive, path; it is an organization that is supposed to be promoting its members' security, yet it is difficult to see what, if anything, it actually does. Officially published accounts are of little help in assessing the SCO since they confine themselves to high-flown, vague language and are short on specifics. We see from members' actual behavior that they primarily rely on bilateral ties with Washington, Beijing, or Moscow, or on other multilateral formations like the Russian-organized Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), itself an organization of questionable effectiveness. Therefore, this essay argues that the SCO is not primarily a security organization. Rather, it provides a platform and regulatory framework for Central Asian nations to engage and cope with China's rise and with Sino-Russian efforts to dominate the area. As such, it is attractive to small nations and neighboring powers but problematic for Russia and the United States. Analyzing the SCO's lack of genuine security provision, its membership expansion considerations, and Russia's decline in power will help clarify the organization's current and future roles.
Topic:
Security
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Iran, Washington, Central Asia, India, Shanghai, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Beijing, Tajikistan, Soviet Union, and Moscow

9. Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism

Author:
Stevan Weine
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Obama administration's landmark new approach to countering violent extremism through engaging community partners calls for no less than a paradigm shift in how we understand the causes of terrorism. The shift is away from a pathways approach focused on how push and pull factors influenced one person's trajectory toward or away from violent extremism, and towards an ecological view that looks at how characteristics of the social environment can either lead to or diminish involvement in violent extremism for the persons living there. The core idea of this new paradigm, conveyed in the White House's December 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP), is that of countering violent extremism through building resilience. Denis McDonough, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Obama, expressed this at an Islamic center in Virginia, stating, “we know, as the President said, that the best defense against terrorist ideologies is strong and resilient individuals and communities.” Subsequent White House documents have further unpacked this, for example, in stating: “[n]ational security draws on the strength and resilience of our citizens, communities, and economy.” Resilience usually refers to persons' capacities to withstand or bounce back from adversity. It is a concept derived from engineering perspectives upon the durability of materials to bend and not break. In recent years, resilience has come to the forefront in the fields of public health, child development, and disaster relief. To scientists and policymakers, resilience is not just a property of individuals, but of families, communities, organizations, networks, and societies. Resilience-focused policies and interventions that support or enhance its components have yielded significant and cost effective gains in preventing HIV/AIDS transmission, and helping high-risk children and disaster-impacted populations. Though the present use of resilience sounds more like resistance, today's hope is that such approaches could also keep young Americans away from violent extremism. A resilience approach offers no quick fix, not in any of the aforementioned fields or in countering violent extremism. It depends upon adequately understanding what resilience means for a particular group of persons and how it has been shaped by history, politics, social context, and culture. It also depends upon government establishing and sustaining partnerships with the impacted families, communities, networks, and organizations. Additionally, it depends on government working in partnership to design, implement, and evaluate what interventions can really make a difference in building resilience, a process certain to involve trial and error
Topic:
Security and Islam
Political Geography:
United States

10. How is NATO Dealing with Emerging Security Challenges?

Author:
Jamie Shea
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
For most of human history, states have seen their primary role in the field of security as the defence of their borders and their territories against the predations of other states. Though populations faced other threats, such as famine, major epidemics or starvation, governments felt no need to intervene unless there was an immediate threat to the state or social order. Today, states have taken on the responsibility to cope with a much broader spectrum of threats because of voters' increased expectations of protection and the impact of globalization, which has made states much more vulnerable to non-traditional security threats. These can be easily transmitted across borders and can originate virtually everywhere: local and international terrorism, cyber threats to public and private networks, the spread of diseases and pandemics, vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and energy grids, dependency on globalized supply chains, extreme weather conditions, uncontrolled immigration, organized criminal networks, and the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices with greater use of delivery vehicles such as missiles. The national security strategies of most NATO countries today prioritize these non-traditional threats before the more traditional threats from rising and rival powers or collapsing states. Although most of these non-traditional threats have existed for some time, NATO has only recently focused its attention on them. However, the Alliance is still associated with more classical military operations that take place outside its territory and emphasize flexible and deployable forces capable of cooperating with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), election observers, police trainers and democratic institution builders. The “Responsibility to Protect” is partly responsible for NATO's shift away from the defence of states to the defence of populations. Simultaneously, NATO linked its interventions to traditional security interests. Thus, despite the frequent portrayal of interventions as part and parcel of a new international morality to uphold human rights in foreign lands, in reality NATO has not strayed far from its traditional focus on the security of its member states. Given this focus on defending and protecting interests, NATO has recently had to consider the new spectrum of threats which are not classically military in nature but which will undoubtedly be frequent sources of disruption in the years ahead. Moreover, these threats can originate just as easily from within our borders as from outside. Malicious individuals may easily gain access to modern technologies (int. al. malware, drones, robotics and bioengineering), giving them the disruptive power that used to be the preserve of states. We could live in a future in which anyone could be targeted, anywhere, and at any time. These non-conventional threats cannot be deterred by the threat of military retaliation in the way that nuclear weapons could maintain a balance of power and peace, albeit uneasy, throughout the Cold War. Cyber attacks, for instance, have been a daily occurrence almost everywhere and most can still be carried out with relative impunity. The gain from espionage or financial crime greatly outweighs the risk of being caught or even the current legal penalties. Thus there is yet no significant incentives for the attackers to desist other than that they may damage and degrade information and communications infrastructure on which they also depend. It would be good if this “deterrence through interdependence” would eventually take hold, but we are clearly still a long way from it
Topic:
Security, NATO, and History