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1. The Union for the Mediterranean Ten Years After Its Foundation - How to Overcome the Frustrated Ambitions

Author:
Inès Abdel Razek and Claudia Del Prado Sartorius
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
It is a busy diplomatic period among the Heads of State and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries. On the 24 and 25 February 2019, the EU and the League of Arab States (LAS) are set to hold their very first Euro-Arab Summit at the level of heads of state. The two regional blocks are meant to focus on “stability” and “migration”, going back to prioritising the security and stability agenda over the promotion of democracy and human rights. The aim is also to forge a new European-African Alliance, where Arab countries must play a necessary bridging role. This goal already questions whether the centre of gravity of EU-Arab cooperation is moving away from the Mediterranean to Africa. A few months back, the Conference of Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs – that includes all EU countries and 10 Arab countries – marking the tenth anniversary of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), was held on the 8th of October 2018. However, it passed almost unnoticed on mainstream media. The event could be considered as an achievement in itself given that it gathered the 43 UfM countries, with their divergent and sometimes antagonistic geopolitical agendas – including Israel, Turkey, alongside the European and Arab countries – and allowed to reaffirm a rhetorical commitment to this regional partnership that focuses more on the socioeconomic issues. The Conference did not manage to produce a formal conclusive document, but just a mere declaration signed by the co-presidents1 . The UfM Conference was followed more recently by the Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the 5+5 dialogue (Western Mediterranean Forum2 ) on 18 and 19 January 2019, where parties adopted a declaration focused on reinforcing western Mediterranean ties focusing on “sustainable development, youth, migration and mobility”3 . The more “Mediterranean” format of this dialogue only composed of riparian states in the western part of the Mediterranean is attractive to its member countries as more manageable than the UfM, composed of 43 countries, including countries that are remote from the Mediterranean itself. 1 https://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Conclusions-of-the-Co-Presidency.pdf 2 Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, 3 http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2019-01-18/local-news/5-5-Western-MediterraneanDialogue-Foreign-Ministers-meeting-held-in-Malta-6736202278 Memorandum Opex Nº 239/2019. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) ten years after its foundation - How to overcome the frustrated ambitions 2 In that regard, France is pushing for its initiative of the “Summit of the two shores”, announced by President Macron, that will take place on the 24th of June 2019 in Marseille. It aims to revive the 5+5 Dialogue format, with 10 of the 43 countries of the UfM, while making it more inclusive and less government-driven, including civil society and all actors of the “voices of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue”. It proposes a new “Mediterranean policy”, hinting on the existing failures of the UfM formula4 . In this paper, the authors zoom in the UfM, today considered, within the Mediterranean countries political and diplomatic circles, as a positive forum for formal political dialogue among its 43 member-states. However, throughout the past ten years, none have passed without analysts or politicians asking for revitalisation and necessary changes in the partnership, which lacks depth and vision. If you address the 43 capitals of the UfM, you are likely to find at least 20 different interpretations of the value and meaning of this somehow forgotten partnership. The EU, on a discursive level, presents the UfM as a model for regional integration complementing its Neighbourhood policy. Southern Mediterranean countries, on their end, continue to maintain low profiles, showing their moderate interest in an organisation which has failed to become a partnership based on equal footing – one country, one vote- that would increase regional economic integration with the EU. Critical security and geopolitical issues are put on the discussion table outside the UfM’s realm, through the League of Arab States or 5+5 Dialogue. The partnership’s lack of coherence and articulation with the other forums and partnerships (Neighbourhood Policy, 5+5, EU-Arab League) contributes to its weakening. At a time when multilateralism is vilified all around the world, when the EU is internally divided and marked by the rise of nationalist populist forces and securitydriven agendas; at a time when the Arab world, all the more divided, stands far from the short-lived optimism brought by the Arab Springs, is the Mediterranean agenda going to be central to its member states’ international cooperation? Will the UfM hold a central place in the Mediterranean agenda and more broadly EU-Arab relations, or just be one of many actors? Despite all its shortfalls, the authors believe in the added value of the UfM forum to advance people-centred socioeconomic models. We argue for reinforcing its 4 Foreign Policy Speech at the « conférence des Ambassadeurs » http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discoursdu-president-de-la-republique-a-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs/ Memorandum Opex Nº 239/2019. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) ten years after its foundation - How to overcome the frustrated ambitions 3 existing institutions in order for all Mediterranean countries to advance a progressive socio-economic agenda, whether in the North or the South.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Mediterranean, and Southern Europe

2. Europe`s migration crisis: threats to Schengen

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
2015 has been the year of refugees. Acording to ACNUR, around 1.006.768 migrants have arrived to the European Union running from war and poverty crossing the Mediterranean Sea. More than 850.000 asylum seekers arrived in Greece crossing the Egean Sea, standing for the 84,5% of the people who arrived in Europe in irregular conditions, while the number using the Italian route went slightly down from 170.000 in 2014 to 152.700 in 2015. Member states and EU institutions have a duty to respond to this situation under international law and agreed on an European Agenda on Migration that stated the “immediate imperative is a duty to protect those in need” adopting a substantial package of new measures: Setting out a common approach to managing Europe's external borders, migration flows and the implementation, strengthening and development of a common Asylum and immigration policy withing the Schengen Area. Under this agreement, an Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) has been set up for the period 2014-20, with a total of EUR 3.1 billion for the seven years. As part of this strategy, the European Commission, in its attempts to push forward an EU agenda, has proposed to establish a European Border and Coast Guard to ensure a strong and shared management of the external borders. In this line, Frontex recently accepted a Greek request to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) increasing the number of officers and technical equipment, such as boats and patrol cars, allowing to identify and register more migrants as soon after they arrive. In addition to 448 officers offered by Member States under thise mechanism, Frontex deploys 16 vessels and more than 260 officers assisting in new arrivals, as well as border surveillance officers, and document experts. However, and due to the lack of political commitment, after this serie of so-far unsuccessful attempts to address the stream of migrants and refugees the EU has opted to push the problem out of its borders following in Greece the model implemented in the West African migration route. According to EU data, the fact is incontestable: through subsidizing third countries to block the route to keeping migrants out of EU borders; express readmission agreements, reinforcing border control, guards and fences whilst dismantling camps at third countries soil; irregular immigration to Spain by sea decreased to very low levels. However, as in tthe Spanish case, this is not only illegal under international law. Human Right Watchdog organizations report gross and systematic violations of human rights since those measures may represent "an unjustified militarization of the border" and "an outsourcing of the control of external borders of the EU to a country that does not respect human rights". Following this strategy, in March 2016, the EU sealed an agreement with Turkey, temporary home to more than 2 million Syrians, to stop commuting to Greece. In return, Turkey will double the 3,000 million euros of aid approved by the European Union in exchange for their commitment to 6,000 million € to “improve border control and to cooperate in the fight against traffickers. Besides allowing the express devolution of irregular migrants and refugees to Turkey, the deal will cap the number of Syrian refugees resettled from Turkey at 72.000. Far from the 850.000 that arrived last year and even far from the 160.000 agreed last year. Undoubtedly, the agreement represents the last attempt to save Schengen after the continous EU failure to set up a common response to the crisis. The EU Parliament -which action is very limited due to the lack of compentencesis officially discussing the agreement in addition to the future of the Schengen zone; the rights of refugees under international law; and racism and violence suffered by these incomers. Many MEPs have expressed grave reservations about the deal, questioning whether the agreement with Turkey violated international conventions.
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Asylum, and Schengen
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

3. A new step towards a common European defense

Author:
José Enrique de Ayala Marín
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
EU security has reached a critical point unparalleled since the end of the cold war. The threat of Jihadism, instability in Eastern Europe, failing states and human trafficking are problems it must deal with at a moment at which the United States is seeking to play a lesser role in European defence. Although as many as 34 civilian and military operations have been conducted during the 16 years in which the CSDP has been active, this instrument is far from being sufficient to meet the EU's security requirements. Of the various areas in which the CSDP must now be strengthened – which range from strategy definition and the development of common capacities to financing and force structure – the most important is Command and Control, a point that has been resolved at the political-strategic level but remains pending at the military-strategic level due to the lack of a permanent European operational headquarters (OHQ) that obliges the Union to negotiate specific agreements in every instance that one is required. None of the three current options for establishing an OHQ satisfies the availability, rapid response and capacity requirements for conducting CSDP operations. The use of NATO assets contemplated in the Berlin Plus agreement has for all intents and purposes been blocked by the diplomatic deadlock between Cyprus and Turkey, the response provided by national OHQs (which are not exclusively devoted to EU defence) is slow, and the capacity of the EU Centre of Operations is severely limited. This problem can only be resolved by creating a permanent, joint, combined, modular and sustainable European Operational Headquarters (EOHQ) with the planning, command, control and coordination capacities needed to guarantee that a 6 military commander can carry out his responsibilities in close coordination with the commander of civilian operations and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. An EOHQ would give the CSDP the visibility and rapid response capability it must have to work effectively in an increasingly unstable environment in which heightened security measures are essential and the launch of new operations is inevitable. Its establishment would have a multiplier effect in that it would lead to other initiatives that would pave the way for the expansion of the CSDP – a crucial step towards the common European defence envisioned in EU Treaties that should be a key EU objective. Promoting the creation of this structure and participating in its realisation should be one of the priorities of those Member States, including Spain, that are in favour of strengthening the CSDP as part of a process of political convergence, and consider such a measure to be the most appropriate, urgent and effective action to afford European citizens a higher level of security and a collective contribution towards the achievement of the paramount goal of peace.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Brussels

4. Digital Single Market. SMEs and the Juncker Investment Plan for the European Union

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
A few months ago (25/11/2014), the European Commission disclosed the mechanism for its much-heralded €315 billion investment plan, revealing how a a scarce €21 billion of initial public money is intended to lift fifteen times as much in capital. In March 2015, EU finance ministers agreed upon delivering on the commitment they took at the European Councils in October and December 2014, to wind-off Juncker's flagship investment plan. The idea was to create a new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds designed to secure a further contribution of 16 billion Euro from the institutions. The €8 billion guarantee will come over a three-year period from the Connecting Europe Facility (€3.3 billion); Europe’s research programme Horizon 2020 (€2.7 billion) and socalled “budget margin”, or unused funds, worth €2 billion. On the one hand, the EFSI plans to generate investments into the European economy of about €315 billion, by providing guarantees for higher-risk projects which aim at developing telecommunications and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency projects, research, education and innovation activities to finally generating about 240 billion in long-term investments, showing a timid responsiveness for the claims against austerity over the past years. On the other hand, the alternative purpose of the Fund is to provide financing to SMEs to enhance the viability of new venture capital injections, loan guarantees, securitisations and seed financing designed to offer micro-loans to SMEs, to fund start-ups or offer mid-cap companies venture capital, projected to generate €75 billion for those SMEs and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017. In addition, the Commission aims to attract private investors to the Fund. Nevertheless, private investors seem sceptical about investing and assuming greater risks when the returns are not guaranteed. In fact, the basis for most longterm infrastructure or energy efficiency projects will most likely remain public funding -his is especially true of the newer EU member states, where the private sector is not strong enough-. In fact, the EU executive believes that more financing can be provided by individual member states. Two ways are being discussed: Capital contributions, which are not limited to the respective Member State and may entail voting rights and a claim on the fund´s return (if any); and that participation in investment platforms that can be restricted to the Member State itself. As an incentive, this amount will be then discounted from the calculations of their deficits within the European Semester. There is a rising concern between Member States that the new fund will turn into a parallel EU budget -where voting rights could be purchased- not subject to enough democratic control, since this is fund is expected to be managed by Commission and the EIB and. In order to prevent such situation, the Commission has announced that the fund will not consider to make investments on the basis of geographical distribution, but rather based on quality and viability. This may convince member states who fear the introduction of a parallel budget, but it might also raise problems of transparency and for those countries who wish to contribute voluntarily to the EFSI. Several alternatives to the current functioning of the EFSI -that still need to pass the European Parliament filter- has been tabled: e.g. the possibility that the EFSI regulation could establish mandatory national contributions in order to increase the credibility of the ratio 1:15; also, transforming the fund into a permanent financing system with legal personality, so it could access financial markets for funding; and that but not least, turning the EIB's contribution to EFSI into a regularly one rather a one-off, as it has been agreed so far. In any case -often accused of relying on leverage private investment unrealistic projections, lacking ambition, means and clear goals- this Juncker's investment plan goes along with several batteries of measures seeking to facilitate a boost in business activity, removing the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Budget, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

5. A More European Russia for a More Secure Europe; Proposals for a new European Union strategy towards Russia

Author:
Javier Morales
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
The conflict in Ukraine, which has caused more damage to relations between the West and Russia than any other event since the end of the Cold War, is a focal point of instability that threatens the wellbeing of the EU. The time has come to renew the Union’s strategy towards Russia, an effort that will entail not only the thorough analysis of long-term European objectives needed to make EU policy more efficient and bring it into line with European interests and values, but also a recognition of diplomatic blunders made at the onset of the Ukrainian crisis. Rather than entering into a new Cold War focused on Russian containment, the EU should accept Moscow as the great power that it is and a potential partner in the construction of a space of shared security. The best way to ensure long-term continental security and stability would be for Russia to increasingly feel and become more a part of Europe and for Europe to make a sincere effort to get to know its Russian neighbour better.
Topic:
Cold War, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe