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41. Assessment and Future Challenges of the U.S.-ROK Summit: From a Policy of Sanctions to a Policy of `Coevolution`

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
06-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-ROK alliance has gone through the greatest and most rapid changes in its fifty-six-year history. Yet the United States and South Korea have both failed to establish any strategic "Joint Vision" for the alliance in this new era. The Roh Moo-hyun administration dealt with many issues of alliance transformation. These included the relocation of U.S. military bases, the transfer of Wartime Operational Control (WOC) from the United States to South Korea, and efforts to facilitate the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. None of these changes, however, were fully based on any shared strategic vision between the two countries; rather, the alterations were limited bottom-up approaches. The Lee Myung-bak administration has managed to restore the previously damaged U.S.-ROK relations with the Bush administration in 2008. It also dealt with many issues affecting the future of the alliance. But an overall reenvisioning of the alliance only came about under the current Lee-Obama partnership. The culmination of the June 2009 U.S.-ROK Summit was the joint statement released by the two presidents entitled "Joint Vision for the Alliance of the U.S. and the ROK." This statement has been long overdue. It set out clearly the security problem confronting the two countries, and established their shared strategic interests. In a simple and concise way, the "Joint Vision" laid out the future direction of the alliance in a wide range of areas, including not only military issues but also international values, the economy, the environment, and human rights. Fundamentally, the document recognized that the geographic range of the alliance has expanded globally, beyond both the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region. The future of the alliance is significant not just for the United States but also for South Korea. Korea’s diplomatic outlook can no longer be limited to the Peninsula, because its national power has matured enough to warrant a new diplomatic strategy in its approach to its region and the world. As part of this vision, the Lee administration has issued a new strategic motto, "Global Korea." But the government still has a long way to go. It needs a more complete set of specific policies supported by a strong domestic consensus. The new vision for the U.S.-ROK alliance will help facilitate South Korea’s diplomatic leap forward. At this critical time, the United States needs assistance from its allies, including South Korea. Currently, global leadership faces numerous transnational problems such as the unprecedented global economic crisis, an insurgency in Afghanistan that is at its highest levels since the U.S. invasion in 2001, and a weakened U.S. global leadership in need of revitalization. If these major challenges are to be met, the "Joint Vision" needs to be converted into specific policies. The recent summit allowed a comprehensive discussion of both the new vision’s principles and the issues related to those principles, including the North Korean nuclear crisis, provisions for the global role of the alliance, and nonmilitary issues like the KORUS FTA (Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement). Naturally, given today’s circumstances, the North Korean nuclear program dominated the meetings. President Obama and President Lee have found considerable common ground in setting the strategic goals and policy direction that will be required to resolve the nuclear issue.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

42. Muddling along with Missiles

Author:
Dongho Jo
Publication Date:
07-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On April 5, 2009, North Korea carried out a rocket launch. North Korea argued that it was a satellite launch vehicle rather than a warhead-carrying ballistic missile, and portrayed the launch in innocuous and civilian terms, even naming the rocket “Unha,” which means “Galaxy” in Korean, to emphasize its space-oriented function. However, most nations, including Japan, South Korea, and the United States, suspect that these words were only a cover for a test of North Korea’s long-range missile technology. In addition, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on May 25, followed by several launches of short-range missiles from its east coast. Furthermore, North Korea test-fired four short-range missiles on July 2 and additional seven missiles on July 4, despite the United Nations Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1874 on June 12, condemning North Korea’s hostile activities in the strongest possible terms. Why has North Korea gone ahead with its provocative actions in the face of serious opposition from most of the outside world? To date, analysts have focused on the political aspects of the missile launch. They speculate that its purpose was to push the United States toward bilateral dialogue or to pressure the South Korean government to return to its more positive stance known as the “sunshine policy.” Others argue that the launch was meant to strengthen leadership’s weakening hold inside the country and to ensure its dynastic line of succession. All of these explanations are plausible, and North Korea, of course, may have had multiple goals. But observers seeking to understand the North Korea’s actions are missing one critical component: the economic factor. The North Korean economy was in very poor shape in the 1990s and is still experiencing difficulties. This economic hardship, however, has not only been evident in recent decades but had already begun in the early 1970s, mainly due to lack of capital. Since then, the country’s top economic priority has been to determine how to encourage foreign capital to help the North Korea escape from economic shortages. One alternative pursued since the mid-1990s has been to develop the missile program as an effective means of earning foreign exchange. Understanding the part played by the economic situation in North Korea’s decisions about its missile program is the purpose of this brief article.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

43. Japan between Alliance and Community

Author:
Yul Sohn
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In a series of town hall meetings during the winter of 2005–2006, Aso Taro, then Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Koizumi cabinet, introduced an interesting concept of Japan’s role in Asia. Japan can and should play the role of a “thought leader,” who through fate has been forced to face certain very difficult issues earlier than others. Because Japan has put great effort, both monetarily and socio-politically, into resolving issues that include ultra-nationalism, an aging society, and environmental protection, it has become the forerunner for other Asians to emulate (Aso 2005). This role as a soft power leader contrasts with the existing hard power–oriented (i.e., economic) discourse of international contribution as well as the conventional soft power discourse that is rooted in the Japanese culture and sensibilities, such as animation, fashion, and cultural products. Japan’s strength lies in the firstmover knowledge it provides for Asia, creating a network of knowledge available to others (Aso 2006). Three years later, Aso, this time as the Japanese Prime Minister, proudly announced a "Growth Initiative" that planned to double the current scale of Asia's economy by 2020 (Aso 2009a). This initiative, Aso’s first and thus far most important vision for Asia as Prime Minister, is aimed at moving Asia's economy from one driven by exports to one led by domestic demand, through encouraging region-wide development and expanded consumption. To make this effort, Japan has committed (a) US$20 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA); (b) US$20 billion for infrastructure development in Asia; (c) US$5 billion over two years for an initiative investing in Asian environmental projects; and (d) US$22 billion over two years to provide additional support for trade financing in order to underpin trade credit, and so on. Japan will mobilize all possible policy measures to support the efforts being made by Asian countries. In addition, Aso seeks to increase the attractiveness of Japan by utilizing cultural sources (such as manga, animation, fashion, authentic food) to create jobs in Japan and the region (Aso 2009b). Aso’s recent initiative appears to have tilted in a direction different from his earlier vision of Japan as a thought leader, a well thought out and creative idea. Today, given Japan’s rapid economic contraction caused by its “once in a century” crisis, Japan finds it difficult to attain the regional leadership it desires merely by spending more money. Utilizing cultural resources will yield only a limited outcome. Finally, the initiative is targeted at Southeast Asia and the Pacific, with few attempts to assist or engage the members of Northeast Asia such as China and South Korea. Japan has so far failed to play its desired role as a thought leader for Asia. The inconsistency between words and actions underlines the strategic dilemmas that Japan has faced as China has risen to be a formidable rival in the region.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Culture, Alliance, and Community
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

44. North Korea at the Crossroads

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
North Korea is now at the crossroads. It needs to make a strategic decision on whether to defend its nuclear program and “military-first politics” against the pressure of increasing international sanctions or to denuclearize and pursue “economy-first politics.” Depending on which decision Kim Jong-il makes, his successor will face either the path of opportunity or the path of peril. Currently, Kim faces the challenge of ensuring a smooth transition of power to his successor. At the same time, he must negotiate with an international community that is trying to induce Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program by simultaneously imposing sanctions on it while offering a comprehensive negotiation package. In this situation, the surrounding countries must construct an international environment that is favorable to convincing North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and join the international community. Furthermore, the neighboring countries need to actively support and develop a clear formula for establishing a lasting peace framework on the Korean Peninsula. Since the death of Kim Il-sung in 1994, Kim Jong-il has faithfully followed the will of his father, who stated that North Korea will denuclearize if and only if the United States withdraws its hostile policy and nuclear threat toward Pyongyang. Amidst the backdrop of its increasing international isolation in the post-Cold War era, the North Korean regime made the decision to develop nuclear weapons as to safeguard its survival. However, this decision brought it into sharp conflict with the United States, who strongly opposed Pyongyang’s nuclear program. The United States could not allow a nuclear-armed North Korea that would destabilize the East Asian region. Subsequently, its strategic decision to pursue the nuclear military-first politics has led North Korea to become a “weak and vulnerable nation” rather than a “strong and prosperous nation,” enduring hardships along the “arduous march.” Compared to circumstances in 1994 and 2003, the current situation confronting Kim Jong-il is far more complex and difficult. Not only must he revive a shattered economy but he must also adroitly manage the sensitive process of leadership succession that is still ongoing. If Kim fails to take the initiative to give up his nuclear program and allows the nuclear military-first politics to dominate the succeeding regime, it will become even more difficult for North Korea to make the transition toward a non-nuclear economy-first politics. Given the fact that external pressure from the international community for denuclearization and internal pressure of attenuating stability will only continue to increase, the succeeding regime will be in a position where giving up the card that guarantees its survival is impossible. Moreover, it would be political suicide for the new regime to abandon the nuclear military-first politics. As the son of Kim Il-sung who is the embodiment of Chuche ideology, Kim Jong-il needs to make the critical decision to abandon North Korea’s nuclear program. There is no other method for resolving the tense situation without denuclearization. Nuclear weapons might be a shot of morphine to ease the pain temporarily, but it cannot be the remedy to cure a dying patient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

45. Japan under the DPJ: Changes in Foreign and Defense Policies

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee and Young-June Park
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 31, 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) landslide victory in the country’s national election brought fifty-four years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) political dominance to an end. The DPJ won 308 of the 480 seats in the Lower House. Combined with 118 of the 237 seats in the Upper House that it won in July 2007, for the first time, the DPJ now controls both houses. By contrast, the LDP performed miserably. It managed to hold onto only 119 of the original 304 seats that it had held in the Lower House. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP had only lost power very briefly for a ten-month period between 1993 and 1994 when a non-LDP coalition came to power. The DPJ’s rise to power has been remarkable. The party was formed in 1996 during the run-up to the Lower House election of that year. The formation of the DPJ was in opposition to the LDP’s long dominance of Japanese politics and the policies of the reformist parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party. The DPJ emerged as the third largest party behind the LDP and the now defunct New Frontier Party. By merging with members who had seceded from other opposition parties, such as the New Frontier Party, it would soon come to be a major challenger as it became the second largest party with the 1998 Upper House elections. However, its political influence waned and was only strengthened again through its merger with the Liberal Party, then led by the powerful Ichiro Ozawa in September 2003. This merger would also considerably boost its low public approval rating. However, it still trailed behind the LDP with a comparatively lower approval rating and a smaller number of parliamentary seats. In spite of these initial disadvantages, the DPJ’s victory was mainly due to a public backlash against the neoliberal reforms initiated during the 2001-2006 Koizumi administration and the inefficiencies of the short-lived cabinets of Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso. With this election victory, analysts widely expect that there will be considerable changes in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies under the DPJ. On its domestic agenda, the DPJ is likely to increase its political control over the bureaucracy and to strengthen the social safety net by providing farming subsidies and cash allowances for child-rearing families. In its foreign policy, the DPJ is expected to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance but pursue a more independent stance than that of the LDP. At the same time, the DPJ will place greater emphasis on improving its relations with other Asian countries. This will also mean that South Korea-Japan relations will be improved as the DPJ addresses from a different perspective the controversial historical issues that have strained relations between the two countries. In general, there will not be significant changes to Japan’s foreign policy while substantial reforms will be focused on domestic political issues. Based on an analysis of the DPJ’s foreign and security policy, this commentary examines the prospects for South Korea-Japan relations as well as changes to Japan’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Elections, and Domestic politics
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

46. Toward a Smart Alliance: The ROK-U.S. Relationship after President Obama’s Asia Trip

Author:
EAI Security Net
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Asia is the region where a quarter of the total of American products is consumed, major bilateral allies exist, various networks of mul-tilateral institutions operate, and new powers are rising. President Obama, during his first Asia trip, tried to emphasize that America is an Asia-Pacific power that will continue its commitment through a renewed East Asia strategy of “power of balance.” Now at the crossroads of China’s foreign policy of “har-mony,” Japan’s new concept of “fraternity,” and South Korea’s catchphrase of “pragmatic for-eign policy,” the United States needs to refresh its role which has been defined as a “regional stabilizer.” People in Asia are eager to see Pres-ident Obama’s new approach to his East Asia strategy, because he inherited from his prede-cessor a triple crisis in the areas of security, soft power, and economy. President Obama’s recent Asia trip has certainly attracted the minds of many people in Asia with his concepts of strong “partnership,” and a positive-sum Asian future, as expressed in his address at the Suntory Hall, Japan. As the communication power of a network becomes more important in 21st century international politics, President Obama’s Asia trip means a lot with his efforts for public diplomacy. Putting aside images and metaphors, the strategic orientation of the United States’ East Asia strategy still needs to be more specified. People in Asia are concerned about four areas: 1) how the United States will cooperate with a rising China in producing a consensus in many sensitive and difficult areas such as mili-tary competition, economic interdependence, climate change, and ideational orientation; 2) how the United States will redefine the role of bilateral alliances which should go beyond the task of military cooperation, stretching to re-gional security and non-traditional security issues; 3) how the United States will facilitate the creation and the development of multila-teral cooperative institutions by actively par-ticipating in them; 4) and how the US will deal with security threats such as the North Korean nuclear crisis, cross-Strait relations, East Asian nationalism, and, most of all, regional power transition. So far, the United States seems to be more focused upon recovery from the economic crisis and getting help from various Asian partners in this effort. That leaves open the question of how to redefine the United States’ role in the rapidly changing environment of Asian international relations. Despite a relatively short stay in Seoul for about 20 hours, President Obama confirmed his commitment to South Korea with renewed words and statements: he underscored the importance of the KORUS FTA not just from an economic perspective, but also from a stra-tegic standpoint; he promised to provide con-tinued extended nuclear deterrence; he basi-cally agreed with South Korea’s approach to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through a more comprehensive deal; and he highlighted new areas of cooperation at the global level such as climate change, Afghanis-tan, economic recovery, and the development of the G-20. South Koreans expect that the KORUS FTA will be the stepping stone for strengthening bilateral economic and strategic relations, recovery of both countries’ econo-mies, and improving interdependent regional economic relations. Regarding the North Ko-rean nuclear crisis, it seems that there is still a lot more to be done in making North Korea give up completely its nuclear program. This will require more intense and creative dialo-gue between Seoul and Washington. As North Korea has not made any strategic decision regarding its nuclear program and any future national strategic orientation, its return to the Six-Party Talks will only just be the beginning in yet another difficult series of negotiations. South Korea, as a strong American ally and a potential global middle power, will continue to work closely with the United States. The two countries need to search for new tasks and functions for bilateral cooperation in a world of rapidly changing international relations, where “smart” alliance and “21st century international statecraft” are required.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

47. Prospects for Change in the Beijing-Pyongyang Nexus

Author:
Sukhee Han
Publication Date:
12-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Having detonated its first nuclear device in October 2006, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009. Having consistently attempted to dissuade the North from such tests, China has been infuriated by the North’s defiance of Chinese advice and interests. Immediately after the 2009 test, China released a statement almost identical to the one it announced in the wake of the 2006 test. Beijing’s unprecedented wrath and “resolute opposition” to Pyongyang’s unmannerly behavior had been clearly expressed in the 2006 statement. In the 2009 statement, the Chinese government “strongly demands” that Pyongyang abide by its non-nuclearization commitments, “stop actions that may lead to a further deterioration of the situation,” and “return to the track of the Six-Party Talks.” Furthermore, China’s subsequent vote in favor of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, which was designed to impose tougher sanctions on the Pyongyang regime than its previous resolution passed in 2006, seemed to indicate that China may implement a strategic shift away from North Korea and may also increase its strategic cooperation with the international community in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue. Witnessing China’s stern behavior toward the North, some China watchers in Washington and Seoul have argued that North Korea’s second nuclear test, along with a series of other provocations in the first half of 2009, which included a rocket launch and a complete withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, have prompted China to reconsider its long-standing policy of amity toward North Korea. In contrast to its traditional policy, China since the 2009 nuclear test has not hesitated to make it clear in its official statements that North Korea has become a liability than a strategic asset, and that it was not satisfied with North Korea’s arbitrary behavior threatening the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Remarkably open discussions about North Korea have also been permitted in the Chinese academia and media. In the debates, some Chinese analysts have criticized their government for its failure to get tough with North Korea; others have also advocated for Beijing to take a firmer stance toward North Korea. These debates seem to be a departure from the traditional brotherly attitudes many Chinese have shared concerning North Korea, and also serve as convincing reasons for many experts to argue that China may change its policy toward North Korea. At the same time, however, China has made clear that it intends to continue its traditional policy of friendship toward North Korea. U.S. foreign policy circles have frequently commented that the Chinese leadership has become increasingly angry at the Kim Jong-il regime, especially in the wake of the second nuclear test, and that Beijing is willing and able to use its leverage to pressure Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program. In contrast, however, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to Pyongyang to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of PRC-DPRK(People’s Republic of China-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) diplomatic relations, reassured North Korea of its economic patronage by providing a number of economic measures for expanding China’s economic exchanges with the North. Furthermore, the recent visit of Liang Guanglie, China’s defense minister, to North Korea has also consolidated the Sino–North Korean military alliance. His avowal of “China’s willingness to have closer military contacts with the DPRK” must have provided more confidence for the North Korean leaders in dealing with post–nuclear test reactions. Given this situation, that China’s national interest concerning North Korea has been the maintenance of peace and stability is reconfirmed. On the one hand, in order to keep Pyongyang from further undermining peninsular security, Beijing has resolutely opposed North Korea’s provocations. China’s statements have emphasized its diplomatic pursuit of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and have also underscored that China, as a great power, acknowledges that it shares responsibility for preserving regional order and stability. On the other hand, China still places more importance on the maintenance of the status quo, in the sense of supporting the North Korean regime itself. China has exerted much more effort on behalf of the North’s survival than on behalf of its denuclearization. While China has in principle supported the UN economic sanctions on the North, it has never been sympathetic to the implementation of realistically effective sanctions. In facing Kim Jong-il’s presumed health concerns and subsequent contingencies in the North, however, China has realized that the status quo on the Peninsula cannot always guarantee regional peace and stability. Given that the demise of Kim Jong-il himself is relatively imminent and certainly inevitable, China has to adopt a new approach to North Korea. China’s chief concern is to strengthen its economic and military grip over the North with the intention of keeping the regime afloat and its leadership under China’s control even after Kim Jong-il has passed from the scene.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

48. South Korea’s Soft Power Diplomacy

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee
Publication Date:
06-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Seoul Policymakers have begun to use the concept of "soft power" in recent years, and they have found it to be an attractive foreign policy tool. Since the end of the Korean War, South Korea has strived to build up its "hard power"—a strong military to contain an aggressive North Korea and economic growth to pull the South out of poverty. Having achieved rapid economic development, a consolidated democracy, and reconciliation with the North, South Korea now looks out at the world from a small peninsula. For policy entrepreneurs seeking the best way to enhance their country’s international standing, Joseph Nye’s celebrated notion of soft power—defined as "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment" (Nye 2004)—is appealing. Scholarly debates now have turned to the more difficult and practical question of how to infuse South Korean diplomacy with this notion of soft power following the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government. Adding the marketing concept of "branding" to soft power, the government established the Presidential Committee on Nation Branding in January of 2009.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea