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1. U.S. Foreign Policy in Syria: Why Action is Needed Now to Rehabilitate and Reintegrate Children Exploited by the Islamic State

Author:
Cecilia Polizzi
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
For the past nine years, two U.S. administration have sought to end the catastrophic war in Syria, reach a negotiated political settlement to the conflict and ensure the enduring defeat of the Islamic State (IS). Yet, the Syrian crisis has not been meaningfully contained and IS continues to threaten regional and global security. While U.S. counterterrorism strategy remains stagnant, heavily reliant on technological superiority and prioritizing aggressive intervention, IS has continuously found opportunities to evolve. The IS has systematically recruited and indoctrinated children across Syria and Iraq and demonstrated unprecedented capacity to influence children and youth around the world to conduct spontaneous acts of violence. Precious few new options have been put forth to defeat IS militarily. Any new strategy that fails to address the victimization and exploitation of children by IS, and does not embrace a long-term sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration strategy, will lead to instability continuing apace and regional allies finding themselves unable to contain a resurgent IS.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Syria, and North America

2. Does the New Saudi Reactor Justify Proliferation Fears?

Author:
Basel Ammane
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
In early April 2019, Saudi Arabia’s progress in constructing its first nuclear reactor with the assistance of Argentine firm INVAP was the subject of considerable media attention that speculated on the dangers of this development. This was made all the more alarming given the reported nuclear technological assistance to the kingdom that the American administration approved. In fact, a cursory review of events surrounding this development reveals that there are at least two indicators that can be seen as cause for concern. First, Saudi leadership rhetoric pertaining to proliferation has not been reassuring, as crown prince Mohammed bin Salman signaled his country’s resolve to pursue the path of nuclear armament in the event that Iran, its regional rival, moves in that direction too. Second, the construction of this reactor is seen as the first step toward acquiring the knowledge and experience necessary for developing a sizeable nuclear power infrastructure that will supply the kingdom’s needs in the future. The kingdom has plans to build two large nuclear reactors to diversify its energy sources and meet its electricity needs, as well as a number of small reactors for desalination purposes. As these plans begin to materialize, the importance of Saudi compliance under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) will become indispensable and equivocation on the matter unacceptable. Having said this, speculation that is largely focused on a handful of events reported by the media is not good at providing a clear picture. Grounding analysis in an understanding of regional politics and global nonproliferation dynamics is likely to capture a clearer picture of the situation. There are at least two factors should be grounds for concern about potential Saudi nuclear proliferation.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Middle East and Saudi Arabia

3. What to Make of the Government’s Decision not to Extend its Mission in Mali

Author:
Basel Ammane
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
News stories about the Ogossagou massacre that killed more than 161 people, the death of Malian soldiers at the hands of jihadi terrorists, as well as the resignation of the Malian Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga hardly paint a picture of progress towards inter-communal peace in that country. In fact, an analysis of MINUSMA (the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) attributed the continued instability to the low ranking of ‘protection of civilians’ on the list of priorities for that mission. In other words, it assessed that the situation was so dire that it required substantial changes to the framework of the operation for tangible improvement to materialize. Yet despite UN overtures and the “bad optics” of leaving before replacements have arrived, the Canadian government has been adamant about its objections to extending the mission in the West African country beyond July, citing its previously-set duration for the mission of one year. With less than three months remaining till the end of Operation PRESENCE, Canada’s contribution of peacekeeping efforts under MINUSMA, it is worth reflecting on the significance of this endeavour and attempting to understand the limitations that shaped it and have come to define it. The announcement of the mission came on the back of the Liberals’ success in the 2015 federal election which was preceded by a campaign that prominently featured the idea of returning Canada to its place as a country heavily involved in peacekeeping. Unfortunately, though, exclusive involvement in this peacekeeping mission falls massively short of campaign promises to commit up to 600 troops to such missions. Moreover, many experts have voiced their concerns about lack of progress in Mali and the need for a stronger commitment in terms of resources, but their pleas have fallen on deaf ears. Does that reflect a downgrading of peacekeeping as an international security priority for this government? There is evidence that suggests this is the case. A brief look at the Department of National Defence spending plans for 2019-2020 is sufficient to reveal the movement of funding to other operations. The most prominent of such operations are Operation LIMPID, REASSURANCE, and FOUNDATION. Operation LIMPID refers to CAF efforts to counter threats to the country sovereignty in a variety of realms including land, maritime, space and cyber domains; operation REASSURANCE deals with shoring up NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe to assure these countries of its support, while operation FOUNDATION deals with counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East, North Africa, and South West Asia. So what accounts for this shift?
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, Governance, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali