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1. Waiting for blowback: The Kurdish question and Turkey’s new regional militarism

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Recent Turkish interventions in parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself, look like pushing various Kurdish armed forces and political groupings towards ‘defeat’ via a concerted regional strategy that combines battlefield action with repression and co-optation. But the ‘anti-terrorist’ frame and tactics that Ankara uses in a bid to solve its Kurdish problem feature many sticks and no compromises to improve Kurdish collective minority rights. It is likely that this approach will inhibit peaceful resistance and fail to reduce support for armed groups like the PKK and PYD despite their own authoritarian practices. Moreover, Turkey’s new regional militarism risks escalating conflict across the Middle East because of the complex international and transnational contexts in which Ankara’s interventions take place.
Topic:
International Affairs, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2. Eagles riding the storm of war: The role of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party

Author:
Nick Grinstead, Christopher Solomon, and Jesse McDonald
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Eagles of the Whirlwind are one of the many militias that have fought on the part of President Assad’s forces in the Syrian civil war. The regime allowed it to defend and police Syrian territory and, in some cases, to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army on the frontlines. The group proved to be a capable and effective paramilitary auxiliary. What makes the Eagles of interest is that its parent political party - the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) – was able to increase the space for its political activities in exchange for the battlefield services of its militia. This is not a mean feat under the authoritarian system of decades of Assad-rule that brooked no political diversity whatsoever. It is all the more remarkable because the SSNP has historically been a political rival to the Syrian Ba’ath party. This policy brief analyses the main interests and dynamics by which the SSNP managed to translate the battlefield support and achievements of the Eagles into ministerial positions and open recruitment rallies for party members across regime-held territory. It also examines the SSNP as a novel form of support to the Assad regime that traded greater political auton¬omy for paramilitary mobilization in support of the regime - without, so far, resulting in a more permanent role for the Eagles in the Syrian security architecture. While accepting greater political autonomy for the SSNP was a price the Assad regime was willing to pay for extra auxiliary fighting capacity, it remains to be seen how durable the SSNP’s hard-won autonomy will be.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Authoritarianism, Syrian War, Militias, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

3. The Status Quo Defied: The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya

Author:
Fransje Molenaar, Jonathan Tossell, Anna Schmauder, and Rida Lyammouri
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The legitimacy of traditional authorities in areas of limited statehood in Mali, Niger and Libya In many countries in the Sahel and northern Africa, the state lacks an effective presence in border regions. This has dire consequences for communities that reside there, as the state is generally unable or unwilling to provide them with basic security and services. State absence has become a particularly pressing concern since the 2011 fall of Gaddafi in Libya, which set in motion a chain reaction of armed group formation and the spread of violent extremist organisations that now threaten the stability of the region. By capitalising on both the absence of state security and local populations’ grievances about central state neglect, these groups have been able to cement their presence throughout the Sahel, in Mali and Niger for example. This report explores whether traditional authorities in Mali, Niger and Libya could play a role in addressing these dynamics. Since pre-colonial times, traditional authorities such as tribal chiefs and religious leaders have performed governance tasks, such as the administration of justice and conflict mediation. They also play ‘an important symbolic role as representatives of community identity, unity, continuity, and stability. This has earned them a high degree of legitimacy among the public. In areas of state absence, traditional authorities could therefore provide pivotal entry points for local dispute resolution and mediation initiatives. Yet, as this report shows, traditional authorities have always been part of the political context, and are thus liable to be drawn into political – and sometimes violent – conflict. To assess whether traditional authorities can contribute to governance and stability, this report aims to provide a better understanding of how traditional authorities come to power, the extent to which their communities regard them as legitimate authorities, and the extent to which communities feel that traditional leaders are best-placed to address their concerns. The application of this multidimensional perspective to legitimacy, as advanced by Beetham (2013), leads to the following central research questions: How do the traditional authorities engaged in local governance in fragile settings, such as areas of limited statehood, build and maintain legitimacy? And what consequences does this have for (inter)national interventions that aim to foster (formal) local government and stability?
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Borders, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, Mali, Sahel, and Niger

4. Under the gun: Resource conflicts and embattled traditional authorities in Central Mali

Author:
Anca-Elena Ursu
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In the Mopti region of Mali, the livelihoods of most people depend on agriculture and pastoralism. Here, a variety of socio-professional groups - such as herders, farmers and fishers - coexist amidst the great natural richness of the inner Delta of the river Niger. Over recent years, poor resource management and subsequent conflict over access to these resources has threatened the livelihoods of virtually every community in central Mali. Formal and traditional justice mechanisms have each often proven incapable of mediating conflicts effectively and bringing justice to the victims and disputants. Moreover, the increase in communal conflicts in central Mali has created a fertile breeding ground for radical, armed groups. These groups have become actively involved in the regulation of access to natural resources, as well as in the mediation of related conflicts, to help create local legitimacy for their rule. That these groups could exploit conflicts to consolidate their power demonstrates that fighting them will not be enough to stop destabilisation in the Mopti region. Only solutions that address the underlying drivers of instability will enable sustainable peace to emerge. This report explores the lack of governance as a structural driver of resource conflict in the region and identifies a mix of short- and long-term measures to increase the legitimacy of the Malian state.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Non State Actors, Governance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

5. Dealing with tools of political (dis)order: Coercive organisations in the Levant

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Feike Fliervoet
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Militancy is a common method to exercise influence in a given political order. It has become a widespread tactic and necessity across the Levant, especially since 2011. While militancy is sometimes downright violent and destructive, it can also be a force for positive change and even emancipation. Much of the time it sits in between these extremes. But the use of confrontational methods almost always requires organisation and possession of coercive capabilities. This report examines the purpose, nature and development of five types of organisation through which coercion is exerted across the Levant - namely, governmental coercive organisations, quasi-governmental coercive organisations, hybrid coercive organisations, anti-regime coercive organisations and anti-state coercive organisations. The analysis focuses on hybrid coercive organisations because of their paradoxical tendency to work with and against the state at the same time. Consider Iraq's Peshmerga or Badr Corps, for example. The report makes a strong case for being more cautious with the near-automaticity of peacebuilding efforts to focus on coercive organisations representing 'the state'. More precisely, the evidence-base underpinning the report suggests that effective peacebuilding efforts should: Assess the demerits and merits of coercive organisations based on their interests, constituencies and behaviours in relation to the legitimacy of the political order they seek to realise. View the violence mobilised by coercive organisations as a manifestation rather than a cause of the breakdown of political order. Influence coercive organisations on the basis of their behavioural incentives. These incentives are grounded in the domestic political economy interests of coercive organisations, the nature and level of foreign support they receive, and the expectations of their social constituencies. Ensure that the aim of external interventions corresponds with the prevailing interaction dynamic between a particular hybrid coercive organisation and governmental coercive organisations (this point only pertains to hybrid coercive organisations). The report provides a range of basic ideas for how external parties might nudge the interaction between hybrid coercive organisations and the government in a direction that helps to reduce violence.
Topic:
Government, Non State Actors, and Violence
Political Geography:
Middle East and Levant

6. From soldiers to politicians? Iraq’s Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi ‘on the march’

Author:
Nancy Ezzeddine and Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
It has become clear since Iraq’s May 2018 elections that many of the armed groups that make up the country’s Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (aka Popular Mobilization Forces) intend to fully integrate into the Iraqi Security Forces and/or disband at some point now that the fight against the Islamic State (IS) has reached a much lower level of intensity. Several groups are less likely to do so, however, including those linked with Iran. Although all 50+ Hashd groups have been brought under the legal purview of the Iraqi state, in practice a number continue to operate autonomously. The fragmented nature of both the Iraqi state’s coercive capabilities and the country’s political landscape will make it difficult, in the short term, to compel reluctant groups to integrate into state security forces or disband. Pushing for enforcement of such compliance risks violence and is best avoided. At the same time, using a broad set of indicators to monitor Hashd-related events and incidents based on open, online sources, this policy brief provides substantial evidence that some Hashd groups are using their autonomy to strengthen their power base in ways that will complicate achieving greater integration in the future. Our research suggests that policy makers in Baghdad and Western capitals should support four initiatives that can help limit this risk without triggering large-scale violence: Gradually establish a direct, incentive-based relationship between Hashd fighters and the state to shift the loyalties of fighters over time. Tighten local command, control and coordination mechanisms of all state security actors to compartmentalise the way in which Hashd groups operate, especially locally. Ensure that (international) reconstruction funds have strong in-built safeguards and standards that reduce corruption and do not contribute to the growing penetration of the Iraqi economy by armed actors, e.g. by contracting them. Address the root causes of the emergence of IS to remove the rationale for some Hashd groups to retain arms (and to make Iraq safer).
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, and Militias
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East