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1. A scramble for legitimacy: Iraq’s political elites since the October 2019 protests

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Iraqi political elites exhibited a variety of responses to the 2019 October protests, the largest demonstrations in post-2003 Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr, a cleric-turned politician and leader of the Sadrist movement, vacillated between attempting to co-opt and repressing the protests. Other Shi’a political elites portrayed the predominantly Shi’a protestors as foreign agents and encouraged violent repression. Yet others who urged reform and response went largely unheard. Iraq’s political system emerged largely unscathed from the protests, even though the threat of recurrence inspired the new government to undertake limited service-oriented reforms. However, traditional political elites continue to view reformists, including the politicians that emerged from the protest movement, as illegitimate usurpers of governing power they feel rightly belongs to them.
Topic:
Reform, Domestic Politics, Protests, Elites, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Shiite
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

2. UNDP’s stabilization programme in and around Mosul, 2017–2022

Author:
Hugo de Vries
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Between 2014 and 2017, the occupation of northwestern Iraq by the Islamic State in the Levant and the military campaign to defeat it left chaos and destruction in its wake. Six million people were displaced and damages ran to an estimated USD 88 billion. At the time, the international community swiftly threw its support behind the Iraqi government to reconstruct the affected areas. This paper tells the story of a major programmatic contribution to the reconstruction effort by assessing the rollout, implementation and impact of UNDP’s USD 1,5 billion USD Funding Facility for Stabilization (FFS) with a focus on Mosul. Tracing the frontline as it advanced, the program worked via the private sector to rebuild thousands of houses, water treatment plants, electrical stations, hospitals, schools and other key infrastructure and provided thousands of temporary jobs to people. To accomplish this, it had to negotiate security arrangements, deal with the limited capacity of the Iraqi state and above all, anticipate corruption by different actors. While the FFS was a programmatic success in terms of its own original objectives, one can also argue that the program did not significantly increase trust in the Iraqi government, positively influence Iraq’s political economy or mitigate local conflict dynamics ‘beyond the numbers’ of its concrete deliverables. As the paper has been written by the FFS’s former program coordinator in Mosul, it provides an insider perspective into the operational dynamics of a major UN program.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Infrastructure, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Iraq, United States of America, and Mosul

3. The New Iraqi Opposition: The anti-establishment movement after the 2021 elections

Author:
Marsin Alshamary
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
At the start of Iraq’s longest government formation process in October 2021, one key question on everyone’s mind was whether Iraq might get its first majoritarian government. The Sadrist Movement tried for months, but ultimately Muqtada Al-Sadr conceded defeat by calling on his MPs to resign. The result was another consensus government with all the traditional political parties sharing the spoils, minus the Sadrists. A second key question on everyone’s mind was whether a genuine parliamentary opposition could develop in Iraq given the election of many independent MPs and the rise of reformist parties. This brief outlines the conditions needed for such a parliamentary opposition to emerge, discusses both technical and political elements, and analyses the challenges facing the ‘new Iraqi opposition’, i.e. veteran independent politicians, civil society activists and even former members of established parties. It argues that a sound electoral environment, unification of reformist parties and a higher turnout can contribute to making meaningful opposition a reality, which is needed to confront Iraq’s collusive democracy.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

4. The crisis of representation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Any discussion about democratization starts with a discussion about representation because the latter is a necessary – but insufficient condition – for the former. How and by whom are policy preferences of citizens identified, aggregated and articulated in public debate and public decision-making? Does this happen in part or in full, for all citizens or just some? Assessing the ‘state of representation’ provides a lens for examining the democratic potential of a particular structure of power. At least four dimensions matter: the level of citizens’ political awareness, the diversity of the ecology of social organisations that help identify citizen policy preferences, the depth of existing communal identity and mutual trust, as well as the nature of intermediaries that identify and nurture political talent. This paper applies the concept of representation to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and takes stock of its potential for improvement. It finds that all four dimensions of representation are in a poor state in the KRI at present. This manifests itself in, for example, low turnout rates, high levels of disenchantment with the ruling elite and growing polarization within and between political parties. The KRI remains a long way from being governed in a representative fashion, let alone in a democratic one. The region’s transition from totalitarian control, guerrilla-style rebellion and internal strife to a more stable, modern and representative polity was stymied by the emergence of family parties as key power brokers. Their capture of the Kurdistan Regional Government was largely enabled by the appropriation of unearned rents, especially from hydrocarbon sales, and maintained by armed groups linked to political parties. A process of de-representation has ensued. But the Barzani and Talabani family conglomerates that run the KRI face declining levels of public confidence and growing economic problems today. If Western countries wish to improve the state of representation in the KRI in this context, they will have to consider conditioning their engagement on improvements in the quality of governance, leveraging the importance of their presence to the high wire act that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) perform to balance Iran, Turkey and Baghdad. Practically, this can be done by a coordinated diplomatic strategy that: a) engages the KDP and PUK leadership in a strategic conversation that clarifies how the extent of future Western presence, diplomatic attention and trade/investment are linked with the quality of representation; b) provides long-term support for locally-led civil society development; and c) pushes for limited but real Peshmerga reform in exchange for greater support.
Topic:
Democratization, Development, and Representation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

5. Al-Sudani’s first 100 days – Or how to keep everyone happy

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The job of an Iraqi Prime Minister is a complex balancing act on both the domestic and international fronts. To begin with, there is the challenge of managing competition between the country’s factitious elites. Then there is the unresolved tension between self-interested elites and a citizenry that has largely lost faith in its political leaders. Finally, there is the foreign policy dilemma of balancing political and economic dependence on both the US and Iran. By these standards, Prime Minister Mohammed Shiya al-Sudani’s first 100 days in office have provided a crash course on how to please all sides. He has allocated government positions to his supporters with gusto, provisionally left most Sadrist bastions of power in the state untouched (even though Sadrists are excluded from the government) and offered extensive ‘bread and games’ for the population by promising jobs and social security. Al-Sudani has furthermore sought to reassure opposing foreign actors through a hitherto fairly balanced foreign policy. His approach has been enabled by the broad coalition of Iraqi political elites that brought him to the premiership, along with record oil revenues that help grease the wheels of patronage politics. While structural reforms in politics, administration and economics are overdue, they will not happen because Iraq’s political leaders have no need for them in the immediate term. However, unresolved elite contention, a lack of public investment and the absence of reform mean that Iraq is likely heading for tougher times within the space of a couple of years.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Elites, and Public Investment
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

6. Big brother is watching: Evolving relations between Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Author:
Kamal Chomani
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The relationship between Iran and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) will remain securitised in the short term due to the unresolved business of a return to the nuclear deal and its possible aftermath, the gradual reduction of the US military footprint in Iraq and the strengthening hold on power of Iran’s conservatives. Iran’s response to the Iraqi Kurdish referendum for independence in 2017 and its suppression of the revival of armed activity by Iranian Kurdish parties operating from Iraq makes it clear that Tehran does not hesitate to intervene to defend its security interests either. Iran is also likely to seek to counter growing Turkish intrusiveness in northern Iraq. Because the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is currently weak and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) stuck between Turkey, dissatisfaction with its own rule and pro-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) sentiments among segments of Kurdish public opinion, the KRI is more vulnerable to Iranian and Turkish pressure than it used to be. In other words, dependency and dominance will continue to characterise the Iran-KRI relation to Tehran’s benefit for the foreseeable future. Ironically, deeper integration of the KRI into a federal Iraq could reduce this risk in the medium-term.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

7. Turkish interventions in its near abroad: The case of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The primary objective of Turkey’s recent interventions in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is to cut the Gordian knot of its own Kurdish question by engaging the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its affiliates militarily until they no longer control any territory. To this end, it is essential that Ankara maintains Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – and especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – as a junior and compliant partner. A secondary Turkish objective is to balance Iran’s influence in Iraq’s disputed territories, mainly by acting as protector of Turkmen and Sunni groups. In the background, the Turkish Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) desire to maintain regime stability at home plays an important role since its alliance with the ultranationalist-conservative Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and some of its domestic legitimacy depends on the success of Turkish interventions into the KRI. Such interventions have historical precedent, but their scope and scale have increased significantly since 2018, with the effect that Ankara has been able to force the PKK into a defensive position. This has been achieved at the cost of the KDP’s popular legitimacy, an increase in PKK popularity and significant collateral damage among ordinary Iraqi (Kurdish) citizens. Further intensification of Turkish interventions into Sinjar, the Nineveh Plains or Sulaymaniyah will lead to greater tensions with both Baghdad and Iran. An extension of UNAMI’s security sector reform work to include border control can help prevent further conflict escalation by inserting a more neutral actor into this volatile situation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)

8. A stubborn threat: Islamic State in Iraq in early 2022

Author:
Nancy Ezzeddine and Matteo Colombo
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In the four years since its territorial defeat, Islamic State (IS) has proved to be resilient as it continues to mount attacks across Iraq. Analysis of IS activity from September 2021 to February 2022 (six months) shows that the geography, type and targets of IS attacks remained broadly similar to the year preceding this period. The volume of IS attacks increased but this mostly took the form of small-scale and local incidents. By and large, the group seems to be stable and shows neither decline nor growth. It operates nimbly and is mostly active in the arc between Sinjar and Baghdad. Counter-terrorism (CT) operations decreased in volume over the same period but are nevertheless keeping IS in check. However, as CT operations are mostly tactical affairs that remain inadequately coordinated and low on intelligence in some aspects, they have not been able to eliminate IS capacity to mount major operations, or to remove it from entire areas. Broadly speaking, IS attacks and CT operations are in a state of equilibrium. As Iraqi CT efforts emphasise security interventions over socio-political remedies, conditions for IS survival, as well as future revival, remain relatively favourable.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

9. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

10. Trapped in a vicious cycle: Factors of instability in the Nineveh Plains

Author:
Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Nineveh Plains have long been characterised by ethnoreligious diversity that has triggered waves of marginalisation and sectarian violence far more often than peaceful co-existence over the past decades. The Islamic State occupation represented only the latest of many episodes of violence. Although it was short-lived, the impact of IS has been profound as it further ruptured the Plains’ social fabric and dysfunctional governance. Indeed, as the threat of IS has gone and violence abated, old vulnerabilities persist while new ones have arisen. This report analyses four major factors of instability that characterise the Nineveh Plains today from a perspective of crisis and conflict: the current administrative and governance vacuum produced by the weak capacity of local authorities and a paralysing dispute between Baghdad and Erbil; fragmented security arrangements with each actor exerting autonomous control within their part(s) of the Nineveh Plains; chronic displacement without coherent policy on how to enable safe returns or support vulnerable communities; growing social tensions in the aftermath of the war sowing feelings of anger, betrayal and disillusionment among communities. As the weight of these issues drags communities down and a government response remains absent, desperation and misery grow. Because the different factors of instability reinforce each other – consider for example how continued insecurity prevents the displaced from returning – they create a vicious cycle.
Topic:
Sectarian violence, Islamic State, Political stability, and Marginalization
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East