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21. The European Union in a crowded Horn of Africa

Author:
Guido Lanfranchi
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This policy brief explores the engagement of the European Union (EU) in the Horn of Africa, in light of the growing regional presence of other foreign actors, namely the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, China, and Russia. Although the EU has defined the Horn as a “geo-strategic priority”, the bloc’s approach to the region is not yet well defined. The EU’s engagement would benefit from a clearer definition of the EU’s interests and objectives in the region in a clear order of priority. This could then inform a reflection on which tools can be best mobilized to achieve such interests. In this regard, the EU’s development cooperation efforts are an important added value that the bloc brings to the region, which may be leveraged more strategically to achieve the EU’s objectives.The growing presence of other foreign actors in the Horn has important implications not only for the Horn itself, but also for the EU’s regional engagement. When the interests of some of these actors overlap with those of the EU, a degree of cooperation would be beneficial for all sides. The domains of infrastructure development and humanitarian aid offer a meaningful entry point to explore such cooperation. In other instances, on the other hand, the EU may need to push back on the activities of other foreign actors when they directly run against the bloc’s interests. Overall, however, the EU should be careful not to allow geopolitical considerations to guide its approach towards the region. Rather than being preoccupied with keeping the Horn’s stakeholders outside of the orbit of its geopolitical rivals, the EU should focus on deepening ties with (state or non-state) actors that share its own interests and values – an approach that can lead to more reliable partnerships that deliver on the EU’s interests in the longer term.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Geopolitics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe and Horn of Africa

22. Fair Energy Transition for All: Final Recommendations National Report of the Netherlands

Author:
Louise Van Schaik, René Cuperus, and Paul Hofhuis
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the past year, the Clingendael Institute and Bureau Berenschot have participated in the Fair Energy Transition for All (FETA) project, which was also carried out in eight other European countries. The idea was to enter into a dialogue with both those who are potentially hard hit by the energy transition as well as experts, with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the emotions, fears, views and needs of vulnerable people with regard to energy transition and to develop policy recommendations for a fairer transition. Bureau Berenschot organised 14 focus groups with a total of 128 participants who had concerns about the current high energy prices and the possible effects of the energy transition/climate challenge on their daily lives. Based on the outcomes, Clingendael Institute organised two sessions with experts from government, academia and civil society to develop policy recommendations. Those policy recommendations were then discussed with the target group and validated in a Fair Energy Forum, organised by Berenschot, with input from Clingendael. The high energy prices and the consequences of the war in Ukraine gave the FETA project enormous urgency. In just a few months, energy transition has become an alarming issue with concerns about energy poverty and the ditsribution of energy topping political agenda's. What follows is a brief overview of policies already in place, followed by the key findings for the Netherlands and corresponding recommendations.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

23. Walking the tightrope towards the EU: Moldova’s vulnerabilities amid war in Ukraine

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the Council of the European Union decided on 23 June 2022 to grant Moldova the status of EU candidate country, it boosted the morale of a beleaguered government in Chișinău trying to circumnavigate a daunting series of crises. Since Maia Sandu ousted Socialist President Igor Dodon in the presidential election in 2020 and her reform-oriented Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained a parliamentary majority in 2021, Moldova has barely had a chance to catch its breath. In the year that followed, the country experienced an energy crisis that almost deprived it of gas in the winter of 2021-2022, a budding economic crisis with rampant inflation, and a security and refugee crisis as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war in its immediate neighbourhood, with Russian troops advancing in the spring along Ukraine’s southern coast to barely over 100 kilometres of Moldova’s borders, has further complicated the already difficult geopolitical balancing act of successive Moldovan governments. It has also aggravated existing security risks. For years, Moldova has balanced its aspirations to join the EU with its constitutional neutrality and its many dependencies on the Russian Federation. While President Putin was quick to congratulate Maia Sandu on her election and has so far refrained from open hostility towards her government, there are still many vulnerabilities that Moscow already leverages and could further exploit if it chose to destabilise Moldova. Not only is Moldova’s economy highly fragile and dependent on Russian energy, there are also political forces and regions that see their interests threatened by the reforms of the PAS government in Chișinău – and over which Moscow has different degrees of influence. Two of such regions are the separatist region of Transnistria in the east and the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the south of the country. A better understanding of these key vulnerabilities could help the EU and the Netherlands to assist Moldova in reducing them and to increase the stability and resilience of the EU’s newest candidate country. The central question of this research report therefore is to what extent Russia’s influence over Moldovan domestic politics as well as the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia poses risks to the internal and external stability of Moldova.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

24. How to ‘open’ Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Luuk Molthof and Luc Köbben
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The EU’s open strategic autonomy agenda is quickly gathering pace, especially in the trade and industrial domain. A host of initiatives and autonomous instruments have been introduced to strengthen the EU’s resilience, reduce its strategic dependencies in key sectors, and protect its industries against economic coercion and unfair trade practices. The EU has generally been careful to ensure that its efforts do not undermine the openness of its economy. However, there is an undeniable tension between the ‘open’ and ‘autonomous’ components of the agenda. Guaranteeing compatibility will require a careful balancing act, contingent on a coherent strategy not only for strengthening the EU’s strategic autonomy but also for fostering and preserving its openness. This policy brief offers concrete suggestions for operationalising the ‘open’ component in the EU’s open strategic autonomy agenda.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Trade, Industry, Resilience, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

25. France and visa liberalisation for Kosovo: Ready to move forward?

Author:
Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Kosovo’s EU visa liberalisation process, for many years now, has been an ordeal for Kosovo citizens and a thorn in the image of the EU in the Western Balkans. Reaching a conclusion to this process would allow both the EU and Kosovo to move forwards in a regional and European context fraught with geopolitical instability. The position of France in this matter remains cardinal. Together with various other member states, it has since 2018 prevented the process from returning to the Council’s voting agenda. However, a recent shift in the French position could now set a positive course and have implications beyond Kosovo. This report builds on the analysis of official documents and a series of interviews with policymakers and politicians from France and Kosovo. It examines the French position on Kosovo’s visa liberalisation process since 2018, as well as its motives and driving forces. It discusses how Kosovo has approached the issue and how the last remaining obstacles could be removed. While highlighting the strategic character of the issue in the broader context, the report finally explores the implications that the completion of Kosovo’s visa liberalisation process could have for the EU, the region, as well as France and Kosovo.
Topic:
European Union, Borders, Visa, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Kosovo

26. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. Navigating an uncertain future: An exploration of China’s influence on the Netherlands’ future maritime logistics hub function

Author:
Frans-Paul van der Putten and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The maritime logistics hub function is of strategic importance to the Netherlands as a trading country. The Netherlands positions itself as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ thanks to its advanced logistics network and plays an important role in the global economy. This position nevertheless faces an uncertain future: there is no guarantee that the Netherlands will remain a leader in the years ahead. Geopolitics, and particularly the influence of China, will have a major impact on the Dutch maritime logistics hub function. On behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report examines China’s influence on the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function. The main question posed in the study is: How is China’s influence on the central position of the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function likely to evolve in the decades ahead and what possible actions could the Dutch government take in response to it? The purpose of this study is to assess scenarios as a basis for possible actions by the Dutch government and the Dutch maritime logistics sector, particularly with regard to the Netherlands’ central position and strategic autonomy as a maritime logistics hub.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Logistics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Netherlands

28. The instrumentalization of migration: A geopolitical perspective and toolbox

Author:
Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Myrthe Wijnkoop
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
As armies and weapons cross borders, geopolitics re-enters the western mindset. With his full-scale invasion of Ukraine President Putin attempts to redraw the borders in Europe, and carve out a Russian sphere of influence. Whereas his armies’ achievements on the battlefield fall short of Putin’s initial expectations, they did succeed in making his fears relevant. They more tightly united the West, increased support for further enlargement of NATO, convinced Europeans that massive defence investments make sense and energy dependency is a strategic mistake. This is a geopolitical turn that was deemed impossible only one year ago. After the COVID-19 shock, the Russia-shock has made western countries realize in full that economic globalization and interdependence create vulnerabilities (e.g. dependence from medical masks imported from China, and gas imported from Russia). Adversary states can use these economic vulnerabilities as geopolitical weapons. The growing awareness and scrutiny of our vulnerabilities extends to the field of migration as well. As Ukraine is fighting back, millions flee to Europe. UNHCR has counted almost 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine that have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in EuropeSee https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. Last updated: 29 November 2022. as a direct consequence of Putin’s geopolitical aspirations. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Ukraine reminds one of the Russian strategy in the war in Syria. NATO’s top commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, warned back then that Putin and Assad were trying to create a massive displacement of people. He suggested that refugees are the war, and the target of this destabilisation strategy was Europe. That interpretation of the indiscriminate bombing is deemed farfetched by some, but recent examples of the instrumentalization of migration abound. Libya used it against EU Member States, Morocco against Spain, Turkey against Greece, and Belarus against EU Member States. In this context there is an increased interest in understanding the phenomenon of the instrumentalization of migration. The aim of this paper is to use a geopolitical perspective to better understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of migration. Such a perspective is helpful to analyse the points of vulnerability of target countries, and to initiate a discussion about possible strategic responses to prevent, deter and combat its use. These insights could contribute to more resilience of potential target countries and better protection of potential victims.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

29. Open strategic autonomy in European defence: what countries must do

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has resulted in wide support for strengthening European defence capabilities. At the same time, the debate on whether to rely on NATO or to seek European strategic autonomy in the area of security and defence has withered away. There is wide recognition in Europe that both the EU and NATO are key actors in response to Russia’s armed aggression and violation of international law, agreements and norms. While the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture, the role of the EU in security and defence is growing. Better European capabilities will allow the EU to act on its own when needed – more in particular in areas and countries outside the Union – and simultaneously support NATO to defend its territory. Nevertheless, the question has to be asked how European defence capabilities can best be strengthened. In recent years, the European Commission has taken various initiatives to promote cross-border defence cooperation. These efforts have been further expanded after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The steps taken by Berlaymont are bold and most welcome, but the member states are in the driving seat: they continue to deliver the military forces that are needed to secure Europe’s interests. Defence policy and planning provides the basis for allocating money to investment programmes and the acquisition of military equipment. The procurement of military equipment is still primarily conducted on a national basis instead of collaboratively with European partner countries. This Policy Brief assesses the scope for a closer coordination and synchronisation of the defence policies, planning and investment of the European countries in order to contribute to open strategic autonomy. First, the author provides an overview of the recent EU initiatives and how these relate to the efforts of the member states. Next, the question of what the member states should do to increase cross-border defence cooperation in terms of decision-making, budget cycles and defence planning will be addressed. The subsequent section assesses how the hurdles to moving from national to multinational defence planning and investment can best be overcome. The final section points to the way forward, including suggestions on the specific role that the Netherlands can play in enhancing European collaboration in defence programmes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

30. Realising the EU Hybrid Toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Kenneth Lasoen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years European and other nations have been increasingly targeted by different manipulation or coercion tactics that remain under the threshold of violence, and are commonly referred to as hybrid threats.For the debate on defining hybrid threats, see Dick Zandee, Sico van der Meer and Adája Stoetman, Countering hybrid threats: steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, Clingendael Report, October 2021, p. 2-5; Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou, The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model, Publications Office of the European Union, February 2021. For instance, in 2016 the elections in the United States were manipulated by a foreign state actor through targeted propaganda and the leaking of hacked material that compromised one of the presidential candidates. In the same year the British referendum on remaining in the European Union was also targeted by sophisticated propaganda efforts.United States Senate, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, Committee on Foreign Relations, 115th Congress, 2018, p. 116-118. The need to counter these threats and deal with them comprehensively has therefore been acknowledged in the EU Strategic Compass. It provides for the development of a toolbox to put at the disposal of member states a wide range of measures to respond to hybrid campaigns, should they choose to invoke the assistance of the EU. This EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) intends to gather all civilian and military instruments that can be employed to counter hybrid campaigns. Operationalisation was intended by the end of 2022 but this no longer seems attainable. However, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having a coordinated reaction capability to counter hybrid campaigns and is likely to provide the momentum to bring the development of the EUHT to fruition. This policy brief examines the most recent progress on operationalising the EUHT. First, the rationale for the EUHT is explained. Next, the state of play in the operationalization process is analysed. The subsequent section focusses on the difficulties stemming from differences of opinion between the member states, followed by an assessment of the issues surrounding decision-making. After suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the EUHT are given, the policy brief ends with conclusions and a listing of opportunities and pitfalls.The methodology used for this policy brief consists of a combination of literature scanning and a limited number of interviews. The author would like to thank the interviewees for their valuable input that was given under the application of the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
European Union, Hybrid Threats, Coercion, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe