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1. “The Exigencies of the Military Situation Must be the Primary Consideration”: the Department of Indian Affairs, Communication Control, and Indigenous Families in the First World War

Author:
Tim Clarke
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
During the First World War Indigenous peoples in Canada contributed to the war effort through enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), the Patriotic Fund, and agricultural and industrial production. Their contributions, however, were not universally accepted in Indigenous communities. For many aging, non-military eligible, individuals, enlistment and off-reserve work deprived families of care-givers, bread-winners, and youth, essential to household and community well-being. Their petitions to the Canadian government, filtered through the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA), reveal the breadth of opinion and sources of frustration from across Indigenous communities in Canada. For the DIA, however, the years from 1914-1918 provided a crucial opportunity to solidify its power over Indigenous communities. Through a three-pillared archetype of communication control, the DIA increased its unilateral dominion over Indigenous affairs, largely at the expense of the eldest members of Indigenous communities, remaining traditional governance structures, and especially women. While the DIA rightly lauded Indigenous contributions to Canada’s war effort in post-war declarations, it conveniently ignored the costs associated with such contributions, thus denying a crucial aspect of Indigenous First World War history; an omission historians have too often indulged.
Topic:
Communications, Military Strategy, World War I, Indigenous, and Indian Affairs
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

2. “Growing Together”: The Cultural Contribution of Indigenous People in the Canadian Military since the First World War

Author:
John MacFarlane
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
During the First World War the culture of the Canadian Army reflected the society of the time. Today Indigenous peoples are welcomed, their cultural heritage appreciated and encouraged. This transformation of the Canadian military can be explained in part by how our society has evolved but even more by how Indigenous members of the CAF have proven that they can ‘do the job.’ This article presents the perceptions of some Indigenous veterans who adapted, in various ways, to military culture while also retaining elements of their own culture. In most histories of Indigenous peoples in the Canadian military, the focus has been on how the Armed Forces changed them; but after a century it is increasingly clear how much Indigenous people have changed the military.
Topic:
Military Affairs, World War I, Indigenous, and Military Service
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

3. Strategic Bombing if Possible, but Possibly not Strategic Bombing: an examination of ends, ways, and means and the use of strategic airpower during the Great War

Author:
Dr. Randall Wakelam
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper is an offshoot of research conducted in preparation for the University of Calgary History conference of 2014 focussing on new perspectives of the Great War. My primary intent in that research was to explore the notion that air services were, using the recent educational concept of the Learning Organization, in fact precursors of this concept within a military context. One of the conclusions I came to is that this learning was not just happening within the air services but took place even at the national, or grand strategic, level where decisions had to be made both about how to use this new means of warfare and about the allocation of resources while continuing to support the needs of the army and navy. The former had to do with strategic bombing of enemy targets and the balance of this paper looks at how the concepts and practice of strategic bombing evolved in France, Germany and Britain.
Topic:
Military Strategy, World War I, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, France, and Germany

4. A Tran-Atlantic Condominium of Democratic Power: the grand design for a post-war order at the heart of French policy at the Paris Peace Conference

Author:
Peter Jackson
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
France’s policy at the Paris Peace Conference has long been characterised as a bid to destroy German power and to secure a dominant position in the post-1918 European political order. The strategy and tactics of French premier Georges Clemenceau are nearly always contrasted with those of American president Woodrow Wilson. Clemenceau is represented as an arch cynic and committed practitioner of Realpolitik while Wilson is depicted as an idealist proponent of a new approach to international politics. The earliest, and one of the most extreme, articulation of this view was advanced by John Maynard Keynes in his Economic Consequences of the Peace. In what remains the most influential book ever written about the peace conference, Keynes characterised Clemenceau as a French Bismarck and the chief advocate of a ‘Carthaginian peace’.1 This judgement has reverberated through the historiography of the European international politics ever since.2 This general picture misses important dimensions to French planning and thus to the possibilities for peace in 1919. The evidence reveals that the peace programme of the Clemenceau government was much more open-ended and innovative than is generally recognised. French negotiators did propose a highly traditional project to overthrow the European balance of power by detaching the Left Bank of the Rhine from Germany and placing this region under permanent occupation. But there were other currents in French planning and policy that have been neglected. The French peace programme, as it emerged in February-March 1919, was a complex combination of power political calculation and an ideological commitment to a democratic peace based on new principles of international politics. Alongside the aim of territorial adjustment and a weakening of German power was a thoroughly trans-Atlantic conception of a democratic post-war order that allowed for the possibility of political and economic co- operation with a reformed and democratic Germany. The flexible and fundamentally multilateral character of this ‘larger strategic design’ overlapped with prevailing internationalist visions of peace and security in ways that have been missed by most scholars. French policy was much more ambiguous than Clemenceau was later willing to admit. Along with his chief lieutenant André Tardieu, he would spend much of the 1920s denouncing the failure of successive governments to impose the letter of the Versailles Treaty.4 But this post-war posturing has done much to obscure the complex character of his government’s peace programme.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, World War I, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany

5. Revolution, Civil War, and the 'Long' First World War in Russia

Author:
Evan Mawdsley
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This essay has two related themes. The first is the causal link between the First World War and the Russian Revolution. The second is the periodization of Russia’s crisis; in particular the essay examines the ‘continuum’ between the First World War, the 1917 Revolution, and the Civil War of 1917-20 which formed, for Russia at least, a ‘long’ First World War. The link between war and revolution is important, especially as Imperial Russia was the only major participant in the Great War to fall victim to radical political overturn during the conflict, and the only one which continued to fight in 1917 after a drastic change of government. One of the most famous documents relating to the war-revolution link was a memorandum written by P. I. Durnovo to Emperor Nicholas II in February 1914, six months before the outbreak of the Great War. Durnovo had been Minister of the Interior during the 1905 Revolution; following his ministerial appointment he was one of the leaders of the State Council. The 1914 memorandum warned about the extreme danger of becoming involved in a war with Germany. [I]n the event of defeat, the possibility of which in a struggle with a foe like Germany cannot be overlooked, social revolution in its most extreme form is inevitable .... [I]t will start with the blaming of the government for all disasters. In the legislative institutions a bitter campaign against [the government] will begin, followed by revolutionary manifestations throughout the country, with socialist slogans, capable of arousing and rallying the masses, beginning with the complete division of the land and succeeded by a division of all valuables and property. The defeated army, having lost its most dependable men, and carried away by the tide of primitive peasant desire for land, will find itself too demoralized to serve as a bulwark of law and order. The legislative institutions and the opposition parties of the intelligentsia, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless of stem the popular tide, aroused in fact by themselves, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the end-result of which cannot be foreseen.1 Durnovo died in 1915 and did not live to see how closely his fears would correspond to reality. However, since his Memorandum was published by the Soviet historians in 1922 it has been noted for its predictive quality; a recent Russian biography was published with the title ‘Russian Nostradamus’.2 Meanwhile, the notion of continuum has recently become an important theme in the study of early twentieth-century Russia, as the centenary of those events is reached. A major international research project, ‘Russia's Great War & Revolution’, is currently under development; it aims to ‘fundamentally transform understanding of Russia's “continuum of crisis” during the years 1914-1922’. The key phrase comes from the subtitle (Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921) of a 2002 book by Peter Holquist’s on the Don region.3 To make more sense of both the link between war and revolution and the continuum, the period 1914-1920 can be divided into four periods - 1914-1917, 1917, 1917-18, and 1918-20.
Topic:
Communism, World War I, Revolution, and Russian Revolution
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe