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141. Author's Response to Critical Commentary

Author:
D.A. Neill
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Science is about evidence, and Mr. Leiter has not provided any substantive response to either my evidence or my arguments. If he has any evidence to present, I would be delighted to consider it; however, appeals to authorities (argumentam ad verecundiam) and unsubstantiated complaint s about sources (argumentam ad hominem) do not constitute a scientific argument. Furthermore, it is peculiar to complain about anyone "disrespecting" the IPCC; the IPCC is an international organization that has made scientific arguments that are, therefore, open to scientific challenge. As US Democrats repeatedly reminded us during the George W. Bush Administration, disagreement is not disrespect. Moreover, my paper took the IPCC's conclusions as "the scientific reference point" of departure for my discussion, so I'm not entirely clear on why "disrespect" for the IPCC is even an issue.
Topic:
International Organization
Political Geography:
United States

142. Editorial

Author:
Christine Leppard and Abe Roof
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The papers in this issue were originally presented at the conference "Seventy Years On: New Perspectives on the Second World War," held in early autumn of 2009 at Lake Louise, Alberta. The core purpose of the conference was to bring together scholars from around the world who are using new methodologies and recently available archival sources to ask new questions or to revisit established narratives about the Second World War. Each of the following articles speaks to that purpose.
Political Geography:
United States and Germany

143. The War Hitler Won: The Battle for Europe, 1939-1941

Author:
Robert Citino
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the fall of 1939, the German army (Wehrmacht) began a run of decisive victories that was quite unlike anything in living military memory. With their fearsome tank (Panzer) formations operating as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force (Luftwaffe) circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through or around every defensive position thrown in its path. The opening campaign in Poland (Case White) smashed the Polish army in 18 days, although a bit more fighting was necessary to reduce the capital, Warsaw. Equally impressive was the invasion of Denmark and Norway (Exercise Weser), which saw two enemy capitals, Oslo and Copenhagen, fall on the first day to a well-coordinated combination of ground forces, seaborne landings, and paratroopers. Allied formations that arrived to intervene in Norway got a quick taste of the Luftwaffe, and were soon evacuating under heavy fire.
Political Geography:
Germany

144. German Counterinsurgency Revisited

Author:
Charles D. Melson
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Regular (external) war is, by way of underlying concepts, between nations using the entire spectrum of the people, army and state. In irregular (internal) war, some parties are neither independent states nor state sponsored actors, as in the case of rebellion against a foreign occupying power. It can also be conflict within a nation such as a revolution or civil war. Regular and irregular conflicts can take place together, separately, or even on a sliding scale. Subversion, sabotage, terrorism, partisan or guerilla fighting are techniques and are not ends in themselves, and are all regarded by Clausewitz as tactics and the ultimate school of the soldier.
Topic:
Terrorism
Political Geography:
Germany

145. Occupation Duty In The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Italian Second Army And Its Allies In The Balkans, 1941–43

Author:
Nicolas Gladstone Virtue
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Axis in the Second World War has been dubbed a "dysfunctional coalition." Its members failed to develop unified political objectives, joint planning, or a coherent grand strategy for the conduct of the war. As Richard DiNardo demonstrates, the lion's share of the blame must fall on Germany's shoulders; Hitler's ideological ambitions left little room for others, the Germans balked at supplying their allies with much-needed technology, and German liaison officers frequently came across as arrogant. While historical studies of the Axis coalition tend to focus on strategy and frontline operations, the Axis partners also came into contact with one another in occupied territories throughout Europe. Here, well away from the main fighting, coalition relations were even worse.
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Italy

146. Something is wrong with our army...' Command, Leadership Italian Military Failure in the First Libyan Campaign, 1940-41

Author:
Dr. Craig Stockings
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
There is no question that the First Libyan Campaign of 1940-41 was an Italian military disaster of the highest order. Within hours of Mussolini's declaration of war British troops began launching a series of very successful raids by air, sea and land in the North African theatre. Despite such early setbacks a long-anticipated Italian invasion of Egypt began on 13 September 1940. After three days of ponderous and costly advance, elements of the Italian 10th Army halted 95 kilometres into Egyptian territory and dug into a series of fortified camps southwest of the small coastal village of Sidi Barrani. From 9-11 December, these camps were attacked by Western Desert Force (WDF) in the opening stages of Operation Compass - the British counter-offensive against the Italian invasion. Italian troops not killed or captured in the rout that followed began a desperate and disjointed withdrawal back over the Libyan border, with the British in pursuit. The next significant engagement of the campaign was at the port-village Bardia, 30 kilometres inside Libya, in the first week of 1941. There the Australian 6 Division, having recently replaced 4 Indian Division as the infantry component of WDF (now renamed 13 Corps), broke the Italian fortress and its 40,000 defenders with few casualties. The feat was repeated at the port of Tobruk, deeper into Libya, when another 27,000 Italian prisoners were taken. After further success at Derna, 6 Division entered Benghazi on 7 February 1941, while 7 Armoured Division blocked and destroyed the remnants of the 10th Army trying to flee Cyrenaica at Beda Fomm.
Political Geography:
Libya, Australia, Italy, and Egypt

147. A Stepping Stone to Success: Operation Battleaxe (June 1941) and the Development of the British Tactical Air Doctrine

Author:
Mike Bechthold
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
On 16 February 1943 a meeting was held in Tripoli attended by senior American and British officers to discuss the various lessons learned during the Libyan campaign. The focus of the meeting was a presentation by General Bernard Montgomery. This "gospel according to Montgomery," as it was referred to by Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, set out very clearly Monty's beliefs on how air power should be used to support the army. Among the tenets Montgomery articulated was his conviction of the importance of air power: "Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain principles regarding the use of air power."Montgomery also believed that flexibility was the greatest asset of air power. This allowed it to be applied as a "battle-winning factor of the first importance."As well, he fully endorsed the air force view of centralized control: "Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resource into small packets placed under the control of army formation commanders, with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect, or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces." Montgomery concluded his discussion by stating that it was of prime importance for the army and air force to "work together at the same H.Q. in complete harmony, and with complete mutual understanding and confidence.
Political Geography:
Libya

148. Bomber Harris and Precision Bombing – No Oxymoron Here

Author:
Dr. Randall Wakelam
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Criticisms as to the efficacy or lack thereof of the RAF's strategic bombing campaign against Germany have been fuelled in Canada in recent years first by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's docudrama miniseries, The Valour and the Horror, in the mid 1990s and more recently by a debate over the wording of the Bomber Command panel in the new Canadian War Museum. The essence of these debates centres on the morality of Sir Arthur Harris's apparently bloody-minded city busting tactics compared to the US Army Air Forces' ethical and restrained precision bombing of military and strategic target systems.
Political Geography:
Germany

149. 'Steel my soldiers' hearts': El Alamein Reappraised

Author:
Jonathan Fennell
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The Oxford Bodleian Library holds 293 titles under the subject of the 'North African Campaign of the Second World War', the British Library 308. That amounts to over four books a year on the subject, or about one book published every three months, for the sixty-nine years since November 1942. This constitutes a remarkable body of scholarship on what historians today might refer to as a secondary theatre in the Second World War.
Political Geography:
North Africa

150. Airpower in the Battle of the Bulge: A Case for Effects-Based Operations?

Author:
Harold R. Winton
Publication Date:
10-2011
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
These words were penned in the introduction to Wing Commander Slessor's work, Air Power and Armies, the published version of lectures he presented to his army brethren at the Staff College, Camberley in the mid-1930s. Like Slessor's work, this paper is focused historically on an air effort to defeat an enemy army, or in this case an army group—Field Marshal Walter Model's Army Group B, the operational formation to which Adolf Hitler entrusted his last, desperate gamble to win World War II—a campaign that became known in history as the Battle of the Bulge. But in keeping with the theme of "New Perspectives," it will relate the course and consequences of that campaign to an ongoing doctrinal debate in the American armed forces over a concept known as Effects-Based Operations, or EBO. The issue on the table is to determine the extent to which the evidence of using airpower in the Bulge confirms, qualifies, or refutes the tenets of EBO.

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