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1. America's Asia Pivot - A Return to Realism?

Author:
Sean Kay
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
This working paper demonstrates that the announced "pivot" to Asia by the United States represents a major break with twenty years of liberal and neoconservative priorities in American foreign policy. The pivot to Asia reflects a return to realist thinking in terms of America's international goals. The paper also shows that this shift is difficult to achieve due to existing priorities in other regions and domestic policy dynamics. The paper begins with a brief explanation of the traditions of idealism and realism in American foreign policy. The analysis then explains the various dynamics necessary to implement the "pivot" to Asia and shows the major constraints on implementing this new approach. The conclusion shows that emerging priorities suggest both a need and capacity for a realist alignment of American foreign policy. However, institutionalized constraints risk undermining America's ability to adjust to a new set of twenty-first century global economic and security interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Emerging Markets
Political Geography:
United States, China, and East Asia

2. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:
Harsh Pant
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

3. The U.S. Senate and Iraq: Who Changed their Views, and Why?

Author:
Andrew Bennet and Andrew Loomis
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Focusing on the evolving views of the 77 U.S. Senators who voted to authorize the use of force in Iraq in 2002, we seek to explain why some political leaders changed their views markedly from 2002 to 2008 and others did not. We argue that in view of the great preponderance of evidence that the initial premises of U.S. intervention in Iraq were not fulfilled, Bayesian updating cannot by itself explain the persistence of divergent views on Iraq. It is also puzzling that a half-dozen senators persisted in their support of Bush's position on Iraq even though this may have contributed to their electoral defeat. We use a combination of political and psychological variables, including ideology, party affiliation, safety of the senator's seat, military service, cognitive style, and presidential aspirations to explain why some senators changed their public positions on Iraq within a year, others did so by 2006, still others in 2007, and some changed very little in more than five years. We combine these variables into a typological theory and test it against a qualitative analysis of 20 senators' views on Iraq. We conclude that our model is relatively successful in predicting not only when senators' views changed but what rationales they gave for why their initial expectations were not borne out. We also note several senators who prove important anomalies for our model, including Senators Lieberman, who was the only Democrat who did not move toward opposing Bush's policies, and McCain, who thus far has not moved toward the political center on Iraq despite having effectively secured his party's nomination.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Arabia

4. Taming the Revisionist State: The Effects of Military Defeats on the War-Proneness of Germany vs. Iraq

Author:
Benjamin Miller and Moran Mandalbaum
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Following the post - 2003 US intervention in Iraq, and with a potential US use of force against Iran, one key analytical question stands out, which has major policy implications: Does military defeat by the great powers have stabilizing or de - stabilizing effects on the aggressive behavior of revisionist states? Somewhat similarly to the pre - 2003 Iraq invasion debate, the great powers have a number of options for dealing with the potential Iranian nuclear threat: diplomatic engagement, deterrence, or resort to military power -- either to bring about a regime change, or to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities. Taking into account the possibility of resorting to force against Iran, an intriguing question emerges: what does IR theory lead us to expect -- and what does the historical record show -- with regard to the effects of military defeats on the war - propensity of revisionist states? In other words, why do some militarily defeated states become war - like, while others peaceful?
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Germany

5. Debunking the 1930s Analogy: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Re-Examined

Author:
Christopher Layne
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
The key events of the 1930s Hitler's rise to power, Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, Munich and the subsequent German occupation of Prague in March 1939, and the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 transpired some seventy years ago. The events of the 1930s or at least Churchill's depiction of them have provided the standard images that have shaped U.S. foreign policy and scholarly research alike: falling dominoes, insatiable dictators, the interdependency of strategic commitments, the importance of demonstrating resolve, and the impossibility of achieving diplomatic accommodation with nondemocratic regimes. But does the myth track with the historical record? Does the 1930s myth accurately explain British grand strategy in the 1930s? Simply stated, my argument is that the 1930s myth as commonly understood in the United States is bad history, and that its use has contributed importantly to a series of dubious policy decisions by U.S. decisionmakers and still does. As I demonstrate, the British, in fact, were not willfully blind to the German threat or indifferent to the need to rearm to meet it. Rather, during the 1930s, London formulated a quintessentially realist grand strategy that attempted to blend deterrence and diplomacy to contain Hitler's Germany (and Japan and Italy), and defend Britain's interests as a world power by avoiding what, for Britain, could only be a disastrous war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, Japan, Europe, London, Germany, Italy, and Austria

6. America Adrift? Myths and Realities About the United States in the New World

Author:
Joseph M. Grieco
Publication Date:
11-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
The war in Iraq continues; its wisdom and consequences for the United States and the Middle East cannot yet be fully assessed. Still, it may be said that the lead-up to the war largely put to rest the view that an American president can readily respond to external threats with unilateral military force, and need not take into account the views of allies and the United Nations. Presidents, even those with unilateralist inclinations, such as that at present, are constrained to remain committed to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN Security Council because large majorities of the American public want their government to have allies and UN authorization when the United States goes to war. Americans are likely to want allies and international authorization because their possession increases the chances of pre-war coercive diplomatic success and, if war is necessary, success during and after it at lower cost. They may also want allies and international authorization for another reason, namely, to obtain a "second opinion" on the wisdom and the intentions of their leaders in taking them down a path that may end in war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, America, and Middle East