It may well be early 2011 before we know the actual results of the Iraqi election, and not because there were problems in the way the election was held, or in the counting of votes. Prime Minister Maliki is playing power politics with a relatively honest election, not protesting one with serious abuses. Elections, however, are ultimately about two things: Who gains power and who can govern.
Economics are as important to Iraq's stability and political accommodation as security and governance, and they are equally critical to creating a successful strategic partnership between Iraq and the United States. It is far from easy, however, to analyze many of the key factors and trends involved. Iraqi data are weak and sometimes absent. U.S. and Coalition forces generally failed to look in detail at many of Iraq's most serious economic problems, or they issued heavily politicized reports designed to show that Iraqi “reconstruction” had been far more successful than it really was.
The security arena will face the most drastic changes in U.S.-Iraqi strategic relations over the next two years. Iraq must assume all responsibility for its internal and external security once the United States withdraws by December 31, 2011, unless it invokes the terms of the Strategic Agreement to seek additional US aid. Iraq must both deal with its own insurgents and with problems in its relations with neighboring countries like Iran, Syria, and the Gulf states. This makes the continued improvement of all elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) vital both to Iraq and to the stability of the region, during the period of US withdrawal in 2010-2011 and in the years that follow.
In 2008, the United States agreed to extend and expand its historic global HIV/AIDS program, authorizing up to $48 billion over five years to combat global HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. In its first phase (2004–2008), the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) concentrated most of its resources and attention on countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a priority focus on expanding access to treatment with antiretroviral therapy (ART). Among the primary accomplishments of the initiative in its first phase was to demonstrate the feasibility of mass provision of life-saving ART treatment in low-income African countries hardest hit by the HIV pandemic. But despite the major gains in ART access since 2003, it is estimated that for every two people starting HIV treatment today, another five are newly infected. PEPFAR's second phase (2009–2013) continues and expands treatment scale-up and prevention with the intent of transitioning from an emergency program to a sustainable country-driven and-managed response. The program will be judged, in large part, on the progress it makes in halting the further spread of HIV.
Since 2008, CSIS staff have tracked, on a daily basis, incidents of violence occurring in the North Caucasus. We have released six previous reports, the last of whichillustrated the dramatic rise in violence in 2009.
Please note that the conventional provocations we listed herein only include major armed conflicts, military/espionage incursions, border infractions, acts of terrorism including sabotage bombings and political assassinations since the 1960s that resulted in casualties in order to analyze the significance of the attack on the Cheonan and loss of military personnel. This list excludes any North Korean verbal threats and instigation, kidnapping as well as the country's missile launches and nuclear tests.
Iran is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and ranks among the world's top three holders of both proven oil and natural gas reserves. Iran is OPEC's second-largest producer and exporter after Saudi Arabia, and is the fourth-largest exporter of crude oil globally after Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Norway. As of January 2009, Iran has an estimated 136.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, or roughly 10 percent of the world's total proven petroleum.
Topic:
OPEC
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Norway, and Saudi Arabia
Although Iraq has made political progress over the past few years it still falls far short of the level of political accommodation it needs to control its ethnic and sectarian divisions, ensure adequate representation for all ethno-religious groups, and create the conditions for effective governance. Despite the success of the national elections in March 2010, when over two thirds of the population defied threats of violence to cast their ballots—with a particularly strong turnout among Sunnis and Kurds—it is still unclear whether Iraq can form a stable ―national coalition government. If Iraq is successful, it will still take years for the new elected and appointed officials to develop the capacity they need to govern effectively.
In 2008, Congress reauthorized PEPFAR for Fiscal Years 2009–2013. In the first half of 2009, the Obama administration entered office and Dr. Eric Goosby began work as the new U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator. A new openness regarding some of the more difficult HIV-prevention issues emerged within U.S. policy circles. Language within the reauthorization legislation, as well as the repeal of the Mexico City provisions, helped create greater latitude to introduce policies and programs that could increase the effectiveness of critical prevention interventions.
It is my thesis that the national security risk posed by Russian energy policies are only tangentially related to Europe's dependency on Russian energy imports. The primary energy risk to Europe, and especially to the newer EU members, stems from the corrosive effect this dependency has on governance and on transatlantic cooperation. Moscow's divide-and-conquer tactics have successfully prevented greater inter-European cooperation on both economic and security issues. As we shall see, these factors have added to already existing strains in the U.S.-Europe relationship. Further NATO enlargement has been stopped, in part, due to Moscow's energy ties with the wealthier Western European states. It is in the U.S. interest to assist those Eastern and Central European (ECE) states that are highly dependent on Russian energy imports and are most susceptible to imported corruption. Kremlin officials, supported by 60 percent of Russian public opinion, favor reestablishing Soviet-era control or influence over ECE countries. The threat to the sovereignty of these new democracies cannot be dismissed.