In an important sense, emerging debates on the war's lessons are premature. The war in Afghanistan is not over; nor is it ending anytime soon. Nevertheless, before conventional wisdom consolidates, two observations on counterinsurgency are worth considering now: whether it can work and how to approach governance reform.
For India, the Western drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will represent the greatest adverse structural shift in its security environment for over a decade. Yet, a fundamental congruity of interests between Washington and New Delhi, and opportunities for cooperation, remain.
If the West wants to harness the potential of cooperating with India in Afghanistan, it needs a better appreciation of India's engagement and motivations, as well as of New Delhi's assets and concerns about Afghanistan's future.
Since 2001, this Iranian scholar argues, Iran has sought to establish security and stability, while advancing regional cooperation in Afghanistan. The only way to manage conflict in the post-exit era is for the West to accept the legitimacy of increased regional cooperation, including Iran's involvement.
When it comes to Afghanistan's future, the United States ironically has more in common with Iran than it does with Pakistan. As Western troops draw down, a look inside Iran's enduring interests, means to secure them, unique assets, and goals that may or not conflict with other regional actors.
The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) historic victory in the spring 2014 Lok Sabha1 election was a tremendous accomplishment—yet it still leaves the party with impartial control, at best. Weakness in the Rajya Sabha, where the BJP only holds 43 out of 243 seats, may limit the party's ability to enact legislative reforms. And the fact that the BJP only controls 5 of India's 29 states will also blunt the impact of any policy measures adopted at the center. In order to enact a true economic transformation, the BJP will either need the support of a wide range of unaligned parties—which would be a historical abnormality—or to consolidate its power at the state level by winning upcoming state elections. With the BJP's powerful show of force across India in the Lok Sabha election, winning state elections appears to be a viable path.
Topic:
Democratization, Regime Change, Governance, and Reform
At a time when economics has become a more central feature of international relations, the United States needs to raise its game in international economic policy to sustain global leadership. Yet the U.S. government is not well organized at present to meet this challenge.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Reform
Tensions in the South China Sea have continued to build over the last year, with the Philippines submitting its evidence against Chinese claims to an arbitration tribunal, Beijing parking an oil rig in waters claimed by Vietnam, and Malaysia growing increasingly anxious about Chinese displays of sovereignty at the disputed James Shoal. These and other developments underscore just how critical managing tensions in the South China Sea are, for the region and for the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, and Territorial Disputes
Iran has good strategic reasons to seek political accommodation with its Arab Gulf neighbors, to reach an agreement with the P5+1 over its nuclear programs, and to put an end to decades of tension with the US and other Western countries. It is as vulnerable-or more vulnerable-to any interruption in the flow of maritime traffic in the Gulf region as its neighbors, and cannot match the combination of US, UK, British, and Arab Gulf countries in any sustained military conflict.
The United States currently maintains formal diplomatic relations with all but five United Nations member-states. In addition to these five countries, there are states—including Venezuela—with which U.S. relations continue to be strained. In most such relationships, cooperation across societies is challenging, hampered by seemingly insurmountable political differences between governments. When official cooperation at the higher levels of government proves infeasible, it is often in the interest of both countries to pursue alternative, more informal approaches, sometimes referred to as "Track II diplomacy" Such forms of diplomacy allow for exchanges of people and ideas to build confidence between the two sides. Ideally, the modest gains in trust from Track II diplomacy will translate into a broader opening for political rapprochement.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations