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1041. The Military Balance in the Gulf: 2001-2002 Part III Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As is the case with North Korea, experts differ over the seriousness of the Iranian threat. Most experts believe that Iran continues to pursue the development of long-range missiles, and of nuclear and biological warheads. Much will depend heavily on whether President Khatami and the more moderate elements in Iran's leadership can consolidate power and rein in Iran's hardline extremists, as well as on Iran's perception of the threat the US poses once it is ready to deploy and the cost of that deployment. This creates an extremely uncertain political climate.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and North Korea

1042. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

1043. Defending America: Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defense

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
From a public policy viewpoint, these uncertainties mean the US must prepare for a wide variety of low probability attacks on the US, rather than to emphasize any given form of attack or group of attackers. The US must plan its Homeland defense policies and programs for a future in which there is no way to predict the weapon that will be used or the method chosen to deliver a weapon which can range from a small suicide attack by an American citizen to the covert delivery of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state. There is no reason the US should assume that some convenient Gaussian curve or standard deviation, will make small or medium level attacks a higher priority over time than more lethal forms.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States and America

1044. Turkey's Elections and the United States

Author:
Philip H. Gordon and Henri J. Barkey
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The landslide victory of an Islamic party in a Turkish election would hardly seem to be good news for Americans at anytime. Butwithwarlooming inIraq,Turkeytrying torecoverfromits worst financial crisis ever, emerging questions about European defense and NATO, Cyprus talks at a critical stage, and Ankara's application for membershipinthe EuropeanUnioninthe balance, the November3electoralvictory oftheJusticeand DevelopmentParty(AKP)probably struck many U.S. observers as the wrong outcome at the wrong time.
Topic:
NATO, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Middle East

1045. Euro-Focus, After The German Electoral Storm: Mending Bridges, Rebuilding Confidence

Author:
Simon Serfaty and Christina Balis
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This past summer began with predictions of the return of a new conservative government in Germany and the alleged demise of Europe's left. The consecutive victories of leftwing parties in Sweden and Germany this month proved the fallacy of both predictions, while raising serious questions in Europe and the United States about the future course of German policies.
Topic:
Economics and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and Sweden

1046. Euro-Focus, September 11, One Year Later A Fading Transatlantic Partnership?

Author:
Simon Serfaty
Publication Date:
09-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
One year ago, the two summits scheduled by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) for the end of 2002 were expected to start the final phase of the Euro-Atlantic vision: two institutions with overlapping sets of members engaged in missions that might not always be pursued in common but would always remain compatible in their goals and complementary in their methods. Instead, as the year has unfolded since September 11, that vision has become increasingly blurred. Now, there is a sense that the two sides of the Atlantic are drifting away from the lofty goals they set after World War II and during the Cold War, and sought to reassert after the Cold War. The relationship is not only said to be lacking coherence; it is also said to be losing its necessity, as Americans and Europeans no longer share values or even interests—and, even when they do, lose their commonalities in the increasing capabilities gap that divides them.
Topic:
NATO, Cold War, Economics, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

1047. Chirac's Blind Date with History

Author:
Simon Serfaty, Christina V. Balis, Pierre Messerlin, and Chris Wiley
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The French elections held during the past eight weeks—first for the presidency and then for the National Assembly—were the most significant elections held in France since 1981. On the whole, their outcome is good for France, for Europe, and for the United States. They restore a political coherence that had been lacking during seven of the last nine years, when the French political system lived under the strained conditions of political cohabitation (1993–1995 and 1997–2002). Moreover, by renewing the primacy of the French presidency, these elections enable Jacques Chirac to assert his leadership during the decisive years that loom ahead for the European Union (EU), as well as for its relations with the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Finally, these elections also confirm Europe's political drift to a center-right that the elections in Germany scheduled for September 23 are likely to make complete (Euro-Focus, September 15, 2002).
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and France

1048. Taxing Decisions for Europe

Author:
Jennifer Lee, Simon Serfaty, and Christina V. Balis
Publication Date:
04-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Ten years after the target date for the completion of the European internal market, much remains to be desired in the area of common policies. The absence of a coherent EU tax policy, in particular, has been a continued obstacle. Yet, with the introduction of the euro and in view of the EU's anticipated enlargement (Euro-Focus, January 9, 2002), the timeline for addressing these deficiencies is shortening.
Topic:
Economics, Migration, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

1049. Bigger Europe, Smaller Agenda

Author:
Simon Serfaty, Christina V. Balis, George Handy, and Georgeta Pourchot
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
“More Europe in every area” may sound like an ill-chosen motto for a six-month presidency facing an already demanding and inflated agenda. It is reflective of a concern, however, not to expand the current list of priorities to new initiatives that would risk the fate of past abortive attempts. Avoiding new confrontations, while ensuring the smooth pursuit of ongoing reforms, has become Spain's principal goal during its presidency in the first half of 2002.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

1050. The Year of Enlargement

Author:
Simon Serfaty and Christina V. Balis
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Preparations for EU enlargement, combined with more of the unfolding debate on the constitutional future of Europe, will dominate Europe's institutional agenda in 2002. The three Baltic countries and all four countries in central Europe, plus Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus should be able to conclude their bilateral access negotiations by December 2002, and even, in a few cases, on time for the European Council of June 21–22, in Seville, Spain. Expect, therefore, the enlargement of the EU to 25 members—one that might start as early as January 2004 and end, possibly, no later than June 30, 2007. What follows is a 17-step primer on the process and pattern, the various timetables, and the possible outcomes of an enlargement that will begin to emerge, at last, in 2002.
Topic:
NATO, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and France