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1. Rethinking Cybersecurity Strategy, Mass Effect, and States

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite all the attention, cyberspace is far from secure. Why this is so reflects conceptual weaknesses as much as imperfect technologies. Two questions highlight shortcomings in the discussion of cybersecurity. The first is why, after more than two decades, we have not seen anything like a cyber Pearl Harbor, cyber 9/11, or cyber catastrophe, despite constant warnings. The second is why, despite the increasing quantity of recommendations, there has been so little improvement, even when these recommendations are implemented. These questions share an answer: the concepts underlying cybersecurity are an aggregation of ideas conceived in a different time, based on millennial expectations about governance and international security. Similarly, the internet of the 1990s has become “cyber,” a portmanteau term that encompassed the broad range of global economic, political, and military activities transformed by the revolution created by digital technologies. If our perceptions of the nature of cybersecurity are skewed, so are our defenses. This report examines the accuracy of our perceptions of cybersecurity. It attempts to embed the problem of cyber attack (not crime or espionage) in the context of larger strategic calculations and effects. It argues that policies and perceptions of cybersecurity are determined by factors external to cyberspace, such as political trends affecting relations among states, by thinking on the role of government, and by public attitudes toward risk. We can begin to approach the problem of cybersecurity by defining attack. While public usage calls every malicious action in cyberspace an attack, it is more accurate to define attacks as those actions using cyber techniques or tools for violence or coercion to achieve political effect. This places espionage and crime in a separate discussion (while noting that some states use crime for political ends and rampant espionage creates a deep sense of concern among states). Cyber attack does not threaten crippling surprise or existential risk. This means that the incentives for improvement that might motivate governments and companies are, in fact, much smaller than we assume. Nor is cyber attack random and unpredictable. It reflects national policies for coercion and crime. Grounding policy in a more objective appreciation of risk and intent is a first step toward better security.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The New Southbound Policy Deepening Taiwan’s Regional Integration

Author:
Bonnie Glaser, Scott Kennedy, and Matthew Funaiole
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In a concerted effort to expand Taiwan’s presence across the Indo-Pacific, President Tsai Ing-wen has introduced the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to strengthen Taipei’s relationships with the 10 countries of ASEAN, six states in South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan), Australia, and New Zealand. The policy is designed to leverage Taiwan’s cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to deepen its regional integration. This report tracks the ongoing implementation of the NSP and assesses what has been achieved since Tsai was elected in January 2016. The Guidelines for the New Southbound Policy issued by the Tsai administration detail that the policy is designed to (1) forge a “sense of economy community” by fostering links between Taiwan and the 18 NSP target countries; and (2) establish mechanisms for wide-ranging negotiations and dialogues, and to “form a consensus for cooperation” with NSP target countries. In the short and medium term, the Guidelines identify four goals: (1) use national will, policy incentives, and business opportunities to spur and expand “two-way” exchanges with NSP target countries; (2) encourage industry to adopt “a New Southbound strategy” in their planning; (3) cultivate more people with the skills needed to support the NSP; and (4) expand multilateral and bilateral negotiations and dialogues to enhance economic cooperation and resolve disputes and disagreements.1 The NSP follows from similarly named policies initiated under Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, which were aimed at diversifying Taiwan’s outbound investment away from Mainland China and into Southeast Asia. Since these prior efforts had only a limited impact, skeptics often mischaracterize the NSP as the latest iteration of a failed policy. Such naysayers fail to appreciate, however, that Tsai’s approach is both more strategic and more comprehensive than those of her predecessors. While diversifying and reinvigorating Taiwan’s economy remain fundamental to the NSP, the policy also outlines mechanisms for more effectively integrating Taiwan into the region through cultivating interpersonal connections. Moreover, the NSP is being implemented at a time of slowing growth and rising wages in Mainland China, while investment opportunities are booming in Southeast Asia and South Asia. The core economic goals of the NSP include institutional initiatives, such as updating and expanding economic agreements with targeted countries. At the same time, Taiwan is seeking to encourage small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to explore opportunities overseas. Taipei has also identified avenues for improving bilateral ties by engaging with the general publics of NSP target countries, as well as with government officials and business executives. As such, Taiwan has invested heavily in expanding cultural and educational exchanges to help promote a deeper under- standing of South and Southeast Asian cultures, languages, and business practices among the people of Taiwan. These “people-centered” exchanges serve to realize Taipei’s twin goals of strengthening Taiwan’s integration with the region and facilitating its economic diversification. It is too early to determine whether the NSP will ultimately achieve its ambitious goals, and it may take years before the Tsai government’s investment will start paying dividends. Furthermore, the NSP should be carefully examined by both the countries targeted by Tsai and partners further afield—including the United States. Many of these countries have a vested interest in bolstering the mechanisms available for Taiwan to contribute to the peaceful development of Asia. These countries may find that the goals of the NSP overlap with their own objectives in the region, and therefore may be eager to lend additional support to the endeavor. Selected Policy Recommendations for the United States The United States has a profound interest in the success of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy. Taiwan has been a long-standing partner of the United States. Its democracy and free society are a beacon of liberal values in the region, while its economic development model has been admired and studied for decades by nations in Asia and beyond. To date, the United States does not appear to have given much thought or expended much effort to support the NSP within Asia. We suggest the United States consider actively supporting the NSP. We recommend the following specific actions: The assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs should coordinate with his/ her counterpart in the South and Central Asia division to create an internal working group to consider how the U.S. government can support the NSP. The U.S. government should engage Japan, Australia, and India, the other members of the “quad,” in support of the NSP. The U.S. government should continue to support Taiwan’s inclusion and active participation in international and regional initiatives where statehood is not required. U.S. nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), particularly those with programs in NSP target countries, should consider partnerships with NGOs in Taiwan to integrate their work where appropriate in support of the NSP. The Commerce Department’s U.S. Commercial Service should engage with American industry associations and companies, and explore potential avenues of collaboration be- tween American and Taiwan industry in NSP target countries. The United States should consider bilateral (U.S.-Taiwan) cultural initiatives that may be brought to third countries in Asia. The United States should include Taiwan youth in relevant regional programs and networks.
Topic:
Agriculture, Education, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Culture, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan

3. Measuring the Impact of Sequestration and the Drawdown on the Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Rhys McCormick, Andrew Philip Hunter, and Gregory Sanders
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The presence of a technologically superior defense industrial base has been a foundation of U.S. strategy since 1945. While the implementation of the budget cuts in the Budget Control Act of 2011 has caused concerns for the industrial base, the resulting debate has been lacking in empirical analysis. The purpose of this research is to measure the impact of the current defense drawdown across all the tiers of the industrial base. This report analyzes prime and subprime Defense Department contract data to measure the impacts of the drawdown by sector to better understand how prime and subprime contractors have responded to this external market shock.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Budget, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
United States

4. How the Blockchain Can Help Venezuela’s Future Recovery Promoting Sound Policy Foundations for Venezuela’s Postcrisis Recovery and Reform

Author:
Moises Rendon
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Nicolas Maduro’s misguided attempt to create a government-controlled and natural resource-backed cryptocurrency (“Petro”) is nothing more than a desperate effort to try to facilitate international finance while avoiding U.S. sanctions on new debt issuance. However, there remains the potential for blockchain platforms to empower Venezuelans through legitimate means during the country’s future recovery. These benefits can extend to future government institutions, the private sector, and nonprofit organizations. Blockchain technology can radically shape the rebuilding of Venezuela during a “Day After” scenario for the better.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cryptocurrencies, and Recovery
Political Geography:
United States, South America, Venezuela, and North America

5. Countering Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions

Author:
Suzanne Spaulding
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This report, informed by a CSIS-convened Experts Group, calls for a whole-of-nation approach to address the threat to, and improve the resilience of, the country's democratic institutions. The report proceeds in four sections. First, it outlines the nature of the threat posed by the Russian government, building upon what Russia has done in other countries, as well as in the United States. The second section describes how technology has magnified this threat. The third section examines essential elements of a "National Strategy to Counter Russian and Other Foreign Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions." The final section is a call for action.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

6. A National Machine Intelligence Strategy for the United States

Author:
William A Carter and William Crumpler
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Machine Intelligence (MI) is poised to create profound changes to our lives, jobs, and economy. In breadth and scale of impact, MI will rival or exceed past technological revolutions while potentially altering centers of economic power and regional and global influence. Many countries are already making significant policy decisions to prepare for the impact of MI and are investing in MI research and development to outpace allies and competitors across economic and national security dimensions. If the United States wants to avoid being left behind in the “MI Revolution” we need to develop a coordinated national strategy that covers research and development, industrial specialization, and the social impacts of these technologies. This report offers a framework for determining which guiding principles should shape U.S. policy in response to the growth of MI applications in defense, education, health care, and the economy. The authors offer recommendations for how the United States can maintain a competitive advantage in MI and navigate the risks and challenges associated with it.
Topic:
Intelligence, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Industrialization
Political Geography:
United States and North America

7. National Technology and Industrial Base Integration How to Overcome Barriers and Capitalize on Cooperation

Author:
Rhys McCormick, Andrew Philip Hunter, and Gregory Sanders
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In light of Section 881 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which expanded the legal definition of the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include the United Kingdom and Australia, this report informs NTIB partners on barriers and opportunities for effective integration. The expansion of the NTIB is based on the principle that defense trade between the United States and its closest allies enables a host of benefits, including increased access to innovation, economies of scale, and interoperability. In order to reap the greatest benefits of a new era of NTIB, this report uses the lessons learned from study of the present state of integration to identify areas of opportunity for policy reforms and greater cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Reform
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Australia

8. Institutional Foundations of Federated Defense

Author:
Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Rhys McCormick
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
While the united states has long acknowledged the value of working with partner nations to address shared security concerns, drawdowns in defense spending have underscored the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to leverage capabilities and investments. the Center for strategic and International studies' multiyear Federated Defense Project aims to inform policymakers about global and regional security architectures and defense capabilities that support the achievement of common security goals, as well as ways to improve defense cooperation among nations to address those goals together. This report on institutional foundations of federated defense recognizes that successful cooperation in a budget-constrained environment often rests on the u.s. ability and willing-ness to provide assistance and/or equipment to partner nations. CSIS project staff drew on a literature review, workshops, and a public event (“the Future of the security Cooperation Enterprise”) to identify key findings in five areas: Priorities/Strategic Guidance: Proponents of federated defense should better articulate priorities. A proactive, interagency component that includes, at a minimum, officials from the Defense Department, State Department, and White House is necessary to effect a cultural shift and combat potential backsliding into unilateral approaches. Foreign Military Sales: In a federated approach, officials should identify capabilities that could most effectively support partner nations' contributions to federated defense. Toward that end, officials should also emphasize the establishment and maintenance of high-demand capabilities over time. other key issues related to potential difficulties in foreign sales include surcharges, overhead costs, and transparency in offsets. Export Controls: study participants noted that recent export control reform efforts have not yet resulted in significant change and have inadequately addressed industry concerns. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of appetite for these reforms in Congress. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure: Improvements are needed to coordinate and speed technology transfer and foreign disclosure decisions. transparency across stovepipes within the executive branch is critical to create a common vision and objectives for federated defense, which is especially important when working with industry and foreign government partners. Acquisition and Requirements Processes: Within the Department of Defense, there is insufficient consideration of the export value and challenges of systems in early stages of the acquisition and requirements processes. Modifications during late stages of development are often far more expensive than building in exportability earlier. Having examined these key areas, the study team identified and analyzed three over-arching institutional challenges to and opportunities for federated defense. First, study participants remarked upon the lack of sufficient advocacy for federated defense among senior U.S. government officials. A second challenge was the cultural resistance to federated defense; experts noted that significant cultural change, such as that brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Pub.L. 99-433), may require top-down direction, years to implement, and decades to be accepted. A third challenge was the need for a perceived or actual budget crisis to drive change. The study team's recommendations resulting from this examination were five-fold. First, U.S. national strategies should address the grand strategy questions that could imperil implementation of a federated approach. Implementation of the u.s. National security strategy could impel a new effort to focus on partner capabilities and areas for sharing the common global security burden, as well as to prioritize interests and activities related to U.S. security cooperation, export controls, and technology security/foreign disclosure. Second, proactive U.S. leaders should articulate a vision, objectives, and priorities for a federated approach to defense. third, the Administration and Congress should work together to ensure completion of legal and regulatory reforms already under way (e.g., on export controls). Fourth, executive and legislative officials—perhaps through an interagency task force that works with committee staffs—should identify additional reforms to streamline or create authorities and to eliminate unhelpful directed spending on capabilities and systems that do not contribute to federated defense. Finally, the Department of Defense should start with incremental steps to create a culture that values federated defense; for example, the Defense Acquisition University and Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management could update coursework to institutionalize knowledge regarding federated approaches. This study made it clear that enduring changes in these five areas—from strategy to culture—are necessary to ensure the success of a federated approach to defense.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States

9. Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Gulf has become a flashpoint for cyber conflict. Cyberspace has become an arena for covert struggle, with the United States, Israel and other nations on one side, and Iran and Russia on the other. Iran has far outpaced the GCC states in developing its cyber capabilities, both for monitoring internal dissent and deploying hackers to disrupt or attack foreign targets. Several such attacks over the past two years were likely either directed or permitted by Iranian state authorities. Even if Iran holds back from offensive actions as nuclear talks progress, the growth in Iranian capabilities remains a potential security threat for other Gulf states. The GCC countries have begun to develop their defensive capabilities, but they will need to expand their defenses and collaborate more effectively to deter future threats.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

10. Liberty, Equality, Connectivity

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Europe and the United States have a collective interest in the promotion of a stable international order based on the rule of law, open and equitable arrangements for trade, and a commitment to democratic government and individual rights. These interests face renewed challenges in a complex global political environment.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and International Security
Political Geography:
Europe