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1. RESET OF AMERICA’S NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT

Author:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The U.S. government has worked for decades and spent tens of billions of dollars in search of a permanent resting place for the Nation’s nuclear waste. Some 80,000 tons of highly radioactive spent fuel from commercial nuclear power plants and millions of gallons of high-level nuclear waste from defense programs are stored in pools, dry casks and large tanks throughout the country at more than 75 sites in 39 states. A Stanford-led study recommends that the United States “reset” its nuclear waste program by moving responsibility for commercially generated, used nuclear fuel away from the federal government and into the hands of an independent, not-for-profit, utility-owned and funded nuclear waste management organization. The three year study led by Rod Ewing in the Center for International Security and Cooperation has made a series of recommendations focused on the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Privatization, NGOs, and Nuclear Waste
Political Geography:
United States, North America, Washington, and D.C.

2. Structuring Cooperative Nuclear Risk Reduction Initiatives with China

Author:
Larry Brandt, Jason Reinhardt, and Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation engaged several Chinese nuclear organizations in cooperative research that focused on responses to radiological and nuclear terrorism. The objective was to identify joint research initiatives to reduce the global dangers of such threats and to pursue initial technical collaborations in several high priority areas. Initiatives were identified in three primary research areas: 1) detection and interdiction of smuggled nuclear materials; 2) nuclear forensics; and 3) radiological (“dirty bomb”) threats and countermeasures. Initial work emphasized the application of systems and risk analysis tools, which proved effective in structuring the collaborations. The extensive engagements between national security nuclear experts in China and the U.S. during the research strengthened professional relationships between these important communities.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

3. Japan’s Shift in the Nuclear Debate: A Changing Identity?

Author:
Sayuri Romei
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Throughout the Cold War, Japanese leaders and policy-makers have generally been careful to reflect the public’s firm opposition to anti-nuclear sentiment. However, the turn of the 21st century has witnessed a remarkable shift in the political debate, with élites alluding to a nuclear option for Japan. This sudden proliferation of nuclear statements among Japanese élites in 2002 has been directly linked by Japan watchers to the break out of the second North Korean nuclear crisis and the rapid buildup of China’s military capabilities. Is the Japanese perception of this double military threat in Northeast Asia really the main factor that triggered this shift in the nuclear debate? This paper argues that Japanese élites’ behavior rather indicates that the new threats in the regional strategic context is merely used as a pretext to solve a more deep-rooted and long-standing anxiety that stems from Japan’s own unsuccessful quest for a less reactive, and more proactive post-Cold War identity.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

4. Department of Energy Cyber Security Incidents

Author:
Marshall Kuypers and Elizabeth Pate-Cornell
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Despite significant interest in cybersecurity, data on cyber security incidents remains scarce. On April 16, 2015, the US Department of Energy released data on 1,131 cybersecurity incidents through a Freedom of Information Act Request. While only containing the date, location, and type of incident, several interesting insights can be kneaded from the data. In this paper, we analyze the DOE security incident data and perform a statistical analysis on the rate of incidents. We find that the rate of cybersecurity incidents is decreasing over time and that incidents can be modeled stochastically. We believe that this is further evidence that cyber risk can be accurately evaluated with data-driven models.
Topic:
Security and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
United States

5. Summary and Briefings from the Stanford-China Workshop on Reducing Risks of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Elliot Serbin and Larry Brandt
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
A collaborative project engaging researchers from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University and several Chinese nuclear organizations focused on the response to nuclear terrorism threats. A goal of the research was to identify prospective joint research initiatives that might reduce the global and regional dangers of such threats. Initiatives were identified in three technical areas: interdiction of smuggled nuclear and radiological materials; nuclear forensics; and countermeasures to radiological (“dirty bomb”) threats. Application of the methodologies of systems and risk analysis to the framing and initial assessment of these areas was emphasized in the project. The workshop summarized in this report brought together the analysis work from this project and related efforts by both Chinese and U.S. analysts.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
China and Global Focus

6. Documenting Cyber Security Incidents

Author:
Marshall Kuypers and Elizabeth Pate-Cornell
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Organizations often record cyber security incidents to track employee workload, satisfy auditors, fulfill reporting requirements, or to analyze cyber risk. While security incident databases are often neglected, they contain invaluable information that can be leveraged to assess the threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts of cyber attacks, providing a detailed view of cyber risk in an organization. This paper emphasizes what data is useful for a risk assessments and how data should be recorded. When a security incident occurs, it is often unclear what information should be recorded about the incident. Currently, the data that are tracked are largely driven by compliance for reporting requirements and valuable information is not recorded, or information is not recorded in a way that makes analysis easy. For example, incidents are often documented in unstructured reports that require a manual analysis to identify trends. Explicitly recording certain data in structured form makes analysis much more accurate and efficient. This paper is focused on answering the question, ‘What should we record?’
Topic:
Cybersecurity

7. Making discoveries in virtual worlds via the Cloud

Author:
Frank Pabian
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Analysts at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) together with colleagues at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), are playing a leading role in deriving new, timely, and value‐added information of global security and earth science relevance from a variety of open-­source geospatial tools that include digital virtual globes like Google Earth together with satellite imagery available from commercial vendors via the internet Cloud. This article provides some discovery exemplars, by CISAC researchers and others, which have only quite recently become possible through the use of such tools.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology

8. A Worst Practices Guide to Insider Threats: Lessons from Past Mistakes

Author:
Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Insider threats are perhaps the most serious challenges that nuclear security systems face. All of the cases of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known were perpetrated either by insiders or with the help of insiders; given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well. Similarly, disgruntled workers from inside nuclear facilities have perpetrated many of the known incidents of nuclear sabotage. The most recent example of which we are aware is the apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear plant in the United States in 2012; the most spectacular was an incident three decades ago in which an insider placed explosives directly on the steel pressure vessel head of a nuclear reactor and then detonated them. While many such incidents, including the two just mentioned, appear to have been intended to send a message to management, not to spread radioactivity, they highlight the immense dangers that could arise from insiders with more malevolent intent. As it turns out, insiders perpetrate a large fraction of thefts from heavily guarded non-nuclear facilities as well. Yet organizations often find it difficult to under - stand and protect against insider threats. Why is this the case?
Topic:
Security and Nuclear Weapons

9. Stanford Working Group on Responding to Refugees

Author:
James C. Hathaway and Roland Hsu
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
As a matter of principle, the international community has agreed to a treaty-based rights regime designed to make refugees autonomous drivers of their own survival and future. Under international law, refugee status and rights accrue based on facts, not formalities. The interests of receiving states are addressed by the treaty's emphasis on incremental acquisition of rights as attachment increases; by a contingent rights structure; by rules addressing legitimate security concerns and the duties of refugees; and by the limitation of obligations to the duration of risk in the refugee's country of origin. In reality, and despite the treaty-based regime's focus on ensuring refugee self-reliance by the granting to them of rights focused on self-reliance, most of the world's refugees live either in camps where they have little if any autonomy or, if outside camps, face the ongoing risk of summary detention or deportation. More than 80% of refugees live in the less developed world and spend an average of nearly 20 years in a first country of refuge without access to either resettlement or the ability safely to repatriate. This discrepancy between principle and the reality for most refugees might be explained by conflicts with other priorities of receiving states; limitations on UNHCR's ability as an institution effectively to ensure compliance with treaty-based rules; and the absence of convincing evidence of refugees' net economic contributions to host societies.
Topic:
Human Rights, Human Welfare, and Treaties and Agreements

10. Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy

Author:
Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pelopidas, Heather Williams, and Sasan Aghlani
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in violent conflict since 1945. The decades since then are commonly perceived – particularly in those countries that possess nuclear weapons – as an era of successful nuclear non-use and a vindication of the framework of nuclear deterrence. In this narrative, the fear of massive retaliation and a shared understanding and set of behaviours are believed to have prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Yet the decades since 1945 have been punctuated by a series of disturbing close calls. Evidence from many declassified documents, testimonies and interviews suggests that the world has, indeed, been lucky, given the number of instances in which nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result of miscalculation or error.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Washington