Search

Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Publishing Institution Center for International Security and Cooperation

11. Can North Korea nuclear crisis be resolved?

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
I thank Kyungnam University and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for inviting me to present my views on the situation in North Korea. My area of expertise is in the nuclear arena and that is primarily what I will address in my paper. However, it is not possible to solve the nuclear crisis without addressing the underlying fundamental political issues, so I will offer my views, as a non-expert in this area, at the outset.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Israel and North Korea

12. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
On November 12, during my most recent visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex with Stanford University colleagues John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction. It is North Korea's first attempt at LWR technology and we were told it is proceeding with strictly indigenous resources and talent. The target date for operation was said to be 2012, which appears much too optimistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

13. Taking the Path of Delegitimization to Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Amandeep Singh Gill
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This paper describes a “base camp” on the path to the “summit” of nuclear elimination in which the current tradition of nuclear non-use has been strengthened significantly, so that nuclear use and nuclear threats are delegitimized as instruments of national power. Before describing this future world and the steps that could lead up to or beyond it, the paper presents some essential background information on nuclear delegitimization.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

14. Thoughts on the Day After

Author:
Michael May
Publication Date:
04-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This note consists of some observations on the “Day After, ” or perhaps “Minutes to Months After” that I thought might be useful. They are derived from work done in the past few years, in part for DHS and its predecessor agencies. That work included observing and providing comments on the Topoff 2 Federal-State-Local coordination exercise of 2002-2003. These notes also derive from a workshop we did in 2002 that brought together first responders, media and scientists to discuss the aftermath of a nuclear explosion in the SF Bay Area. I make no attempt at being comprehensive but note a few things that, in our experience, have not seemed obvious to all participants. The notes are divided into two parts, “Response and Recovery” and “Political Reaction”.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
San Francisco

15. Coercion and Risk-Taking in Nuclear South Asia

Author:
Verghese Koithara
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The partition-bred conflict between India and Pakistan that began in 1947 went into remission in 1971 following India's emphatic victory in war that year. It reemerged in 1989 when serious disaffection in the Kashmir Valley gave Pakistan an opening to promote militancy. This created a dangerous situation because it was about the same time that both Pakistan and India also acquired nuclear weapons. There was a major confrontation between the two countries during March-May 1990. Since then there has been continuous tension with each attempting to coerce the other. In May 1998 both countries carried out several nuclear tests each. A year later, during May-July 1999, the two fought a two-month "limited war" in the Kargil region of Kashmir that caused over 1,200 fatalities. Kargil was a clear effort on Pakistan's part to test the deterrence value of its nuclear weapons. In December 2001 India resorted to an unprecedented military mobilization (Operation Parakram), holding out the clear threat of attacking Pakistan unless the latter stopped its sub-conventional operations.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, and India

16. Effectiveness of Nuclear Weapons against Buried Biological Agents

Author:
Michael May and Zachary Haldeman
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This report describes the results of some calculations on the effectiveness of penetrating nuclear weapons of yield 1 and 10 kilotons against targets containing biological agents. The effectiveness depends in detail on the construction of the bunkers, on how the bio-agents are stored, on the location of the explosions with respect to the bunkers, the bio-agent containers and the surface of the ground, and on the yield of the explosion and the geology of the explosion site. Completeness of sterilization of the bio-agents is crucial in determining effectiveness. For most likely cases, however, complete sterilization cannot be guaranteed. Better calculations and experiments on specific target types would improve the accuracy of such predictions for those targets, but significant uncertainties regarding actual geology, actual target layouts, and knowledge of the position of the explosion with respect to the target would remain. Aboveground effects of the nuclear explosions, all of which would vent to the surface, are estimated. They include intense local radioactivity and significant fallout, air blast, and seismic effects to kilometers distances. It is likely, however, that casualties from those effects would be less than the casualties that would result from the dispersal of large quantities of bio-agents.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

17. The Bush Administration's Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications for China's Security

Author:
Tian Jingmei
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Since the Bush administration took office, and especially since excerpts of the Nuclear Posture Review were released, there have appeared in America some heated arguments about the Bush administration's changes to the Clinton administration's nuclear strategy, what consequences these changes would produce, and what influences they would exert on international and regional security. Different people have different views. The purpose of this working paper is to find solutions to these key issues. The effects of the Bush administration's nuclear strategy on China's security are also discussed.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
China, America, and Asia

18. Container Security Report

Author:
Michael May, Tonya L. Putnam, and Dean Wilkening
Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
During the week of August 18–23, 2002, the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Stanford University hosted four summer studies sponsored by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. One of these studies, the Container Security study, examined how to apply existing technology and resources most effectively to prevent the transport of illicit nuclear materials for use in terrorist activities by means of international commercial shipping.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States

19. Communicating Nuclear Risk: Informing the Public about the Risks and Realities of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Tonya L. Putnam
Publication Date:
10-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Achieving adequate preparedness for a terrorist attack against the United States involving a nuclear or radiological weapon is simultaneously a technical problem, a public-policy challenge, and a public-education mission. Response to terrorist attacks differs in important ways from response to more familiar nuclear emergencies arising from reactor accidents, and also from response to conventional and chemical and biological terrorist attacks. The complications of risk communication in the realm of nuclear terrorism include overcoming misinformation about the nature of the threats posed by terrorist attacks involving nuclear and radiological weapons as well as mistrust of experts, the government, and the media.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
United States

20. How Verification Can Be Used to Ensure Irreversible Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Wu Jun
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Verifying nuclear disarmament is a complex technical process. This paper examines the techniques that could be used to verify future nuclear weapon reductions and analyzes the motivation for the nuclear states to accept deep weapon cuts and the prospect for future nuclear reductions. To allow large nuclear reductions and assure credible verification, several steps are suggested in this paper: all nuclear warheads should be registered and tagged; the total inventories of plutonium and high-enriched uranium as well as the fissile cores dismantled from the warheads should be verified; the nuclear delivery vehicles and launcher numbers and types should be monitored as outlined in the START and INF treaties; and agreed nuclear-capable delivery vehicle production should also be monitored.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States