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1. Making discoveries in virtual worlds via the Cloud

Author:
Frank Pabian
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Analysts at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) together with colleagues at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), are playing a leading role in deriving new, timely, and value‐added information of global security and earth science relevance from a variety of open-­source geospatial tools that include digital virtual globes like Google Earth together with satellite imagery available from commercial vendors via the internet Cloud. This article provides some discovery exemplars, by CISAC researchers and others, which have only quite recently become possible through the use of such tools.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology

2. Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy

Author:
Patricia Lewis, Benoît Pelopidas, Heather Williams, and Sasan Aghlani
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in violent conflict since 1945. The decades since then are commonly perceived – particularly in those countries that possess nuclear weapons – as an era of successful nuclear non-use and a vindication of the framework of nuclear deterrence. In this narrative, the fear of massive retaliation and a shared understanding and set of behaviours are believed to have prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Yet the decades since 1945 have been punctuated by a series of disturbing close calls. Evidence from many declassified documents, testimonies and interviews suggests that the world has, indeed, been lucky, given the number of instances in which nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result of miscalculation or error.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Washington

3. A more in-depth, technical Q from Siegfried Hecker on North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
North Korea announced on April 2, 2013, that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, and North Korea

4. Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security in South Korea

Author:
Chaim Braun, Siegfried S. Hecker, Robert Forrest, and Peter Davis
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This study employed diverse teams of scholars organized by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and the Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) to examine future opportunities for bilateral nuclear cooperation between South Korea and the United States and how to strengthen global nuclear governance. During the past 15 months, the teams exchanged ideas and perspectives of the nuclear industries in each country and their future trajectories, and analyzed future challenges and opportunities through multiple visits, workshops and conferences.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, South Korea, and North Korea

5. Nuclear Developments in North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Three years ago, Pyongyang expelled the international inspectors from its Yongbyon nuclear complex and abandoned the Six - Party talks. The crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 turned into diplomatic calm in 2011, but Pyongyang continued to expand its nuclear program. It conducted a second nuclear test in 2009, unveiled a modern, sophisticated uranium centrifuge facility, and rolled out a road - mobile intermediate - range ballistic missile in 2010. Its coopera tion in missile technologies with Iran continued and nuclear cooperation is suspected. Beijing protected Pyongyang from crippling sanctions while Washington and Seoul remained reluctant to engage having been burned by Pyongyang's unveiling of its clandestine uranium enrichment program. Prospects for resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis looked grim. Then, surprisingly in December 2011, just before the death of Kim Jong - il, American and North Korean diplomats nearly reached a deal to return to the negotiating table. Even more surprisingly, the new Kim regime agreed to take initial steps with Washington in February. In this paper, I describe the troubling nuclear developments in 2011 and suggest targets for the upcoming negotiations to further reduce the nuclear risks while the parties resume the long road toward eventual denuclearization and normalization of relations on the Korean peninsula.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
North Korea

6. A Winning Gambit

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker explains why nuclear arms states stand to gain more than they lose by ratifying the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). He explains why it is crucial to prevent states from testing nuclear weapons, with the strongest barrier to testing being the CTBT.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States

7. Taking the Path of Delegitimization to Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Amandeep Singh Gill
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
This paper describes a “base camp” on the path to the “summit” of nuclear elimination in which the current tradition of nuclear non-use has been strengthened significantly, so that nuclear use and nuclear threats are delegitimized as instruments of national power. Before describing this future world and the steps that could lead up to or beyond it, the paper presents some essential background information on nuclear delegitimization.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction

8. How Verification Can Be Used to Ensure Irreversible Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Wu Jun
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Verifying nuclear disarmament is a complex technical process. This paper examines the techniques that could be used to verify future nuclear weapon reductions and analyzes the motivation for the nuclear states to accept deep weapon cuts and the prospect for future nuclear reductions. To allow large nuclear reductions and assure credible verification, several steps are suggested in this paper: all nuclear warheads should be registered and tagged; the total inventories of plutonium and high-enriched uranium as well as the fissile cores dismantled from the warheads should be verified; the nuclear delivery vehicles and launcher numbers and types should be monitored as outlined in the START and INF treaties; and agreed nuclear-capable delivery vehicle production should also be monitored.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States

9. Verifying the Agreed Framework

Author:
Michael May, Nancy Suski, Robert Schock, William Sailor, Wayne Ruhter, Ronald Lehman, James Hassberger, Zachary Davis, George Bunn, and Chaim Braun
Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
The Agreed Framework (AF) between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), signed in Geneva on October 21, 1994, has become the centerpiece of recent US efforts to reduce the threat of conflict with North Korea. In particular, it seeks to bring the DPRK into compliance with its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) not to acquire nuclear weapons. The AF document sets goals, outlines programs, initiates a US-led nuclear-power consortium, and notes linkages. The AF refers to a wider range of diplomatic and international security initiatives, such as the NPT and the agreement on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and is meant to reinforce others, including those related to the reconciliation of the two Koreas.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, East Asia, and Korea

10. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Next Steps

Author:
Thomas Jr. Graham and Christopher Chyba
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation
Abstract:
Dr. Sid Drell: With the end of the Cold War there's been a major change in the U.S. nuclear weapons program, because the continuous cycle of developing and testing and deploying new warheads has ended. President George Bush announced in 1992 that we have no need for new nuclear weapons designs for deployment. It was this decision that, of course, opened the possibility of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is why we now have a Stockpile Stewardship Program with the three requirements: we must maintain an enduring stockpile that's reliable, effective and safe for the indefinite future without nuclear explosive testing; we must maintain competence in nuclear weapons; and we must retain a technical capability and a manufacturing infrastructure in order to respond if required to any change in strategic circumstances. This will be one of the factors in our net assessment of whether to enter a CTBT.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, International Law, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States