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11. The Applicability of International and Domestic Immigration Law to Relocated Guantanamo Detainees

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
The physical relocation of detainees from Guantanamo to the United States would not meaningfully alter U.S. obligations under domestic immigration law or international law concerning refoulement. Domestic immigration law would not affect U.S. authority to bring aliens into the United States and to detain those aliens under the laws of war. Detainees would not enter the United States as immigrants, but rather would remain legally “at the border” during their detention. If a detainee secures his release from law-of-war detention, then the United States would be prohibited from transferring the former detainee to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. This obligation applies equally to detainees held at Guantanamo and in the United States. If the United States could not find a suitable country to accept the former detainee, then the United States may have the authority to hold the alien indefinitely in immigration detention, provided that his custody meets statutory requirements. This authority is constitutionally untested and potentially inconsistent with obligations under international law, but these concerns would apply equally to both Guantanamo- and U.S.-located former detainees.
Topic:
Law, Prisons/Penal Systems, War on Terror, and Detention
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Guantanamo

12. State Responsibility for Non-State Actors That Detain In The Course of a NIAC

Author:
Emily Chertoff, Lara Dominguez, Zak Manfriedi, and Peter Tzeng
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
This white paper addresses three questions that arise when a non-state actor that is receiving assistance from a state actor in a non-international armed conflict engages in detention activities: (1) Under international law, when does a non-state actor have the authority to detain individuals captured in the course of a non-international armed conflict? (2) When does a state providing assistance to a non-state actor become responsible under international law for the non- state actor’s actions? (3) Assuming such responsibility exists, what actions must the state take if it believes the non-state actor may engage in human rights abuses or violations of the law of armed conflict? In response to the first question, neither the Geneva Conventions nor customary international humanitarian law provides a legal basis for non-state actors to detain captured individuals in non-international armed conflicts. However, international humanitarian law also does not expressly prohibit non-state actors from detaining individuals. Instead, it regulates the conditions of detention. If non-state actors comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and relevant provisions of the Second Additional Protocol, detention by armed groups in non-international armed conflict does not violate an explicit provision of international humanitarian law. As long as detention is not arbitrary, internment by non-state actors is also unlikely to constitute the war crime of unlawful confinement. In response to the second question, under agency-based theories of the state responsibility doctrine, actions of non-state actors may be directly attributed to the state if (1) the state exercises either strict or overall control over the non-state actor such that the group operates as a de jure or de facto state organ or (2) the state exercises effective control over a specific operation undertaken by the non-state actor. Additionally, to the extent Common Article 1 requires states to ensure that all parties to an armed conflict respect the Geneva Conventions, it may create an alternative and additional source of state liability for the actions of non-state actors. Finally, in response to the third question, this white paper recommends a series of ex ante and ex post measures states can adopt when engaging with a non-state actor. These include, vetting, training, acquiring written agreements, providing punishment frameworks, and ceasing support when actors commit violations of IHL. Since existing jurisprudence does not contemplate mitigation of state responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors, it is difficult to assess to what extent any of the proposed measures would limit the state’s liability. Nevertheless, states adopting these recommendations will both make violations less likely and be more likely to discharge their duties under international humanitarian and human rights law. By taking ex ante measures designed to prevent violations and creating ex post incentives for non-state partners to comply with IHL norms, states reduce the risk armed groups will engage in detention practices that violate international law.
Topic:
International Law, Non State Actors, Humanitarian Intervention, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Historical Examples of Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention

Author:
Julia Brower, Ryan Liss, Tina Thomas, and Jacob Victor
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
In December 1971, India sent troops into what was at the time known as East Pakistan. For the preceding months, Pakistani forces had been engaged in a violent conflict with a Bangladeshi separatist group.1 The Indo-Pakistani conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation War, a conflict between the West Pakistanis and the East Pakistanis, who were mainly of Bengali ethnicity.2 In the 1970 Pakistani election, the East Pakistani Awami League secured a simple majority in the Parliament of Pakistan.3 The West Pakistani leadership, however, stalled in relinquishing power.4 The Awami League declared the independence of East Pakistan as Bangla Desh on April 10, 1971.5 West Pakistani forces engaged in violent attempts to end the insurrection, committing widespread atrocities against the Bengali population of East Pakistan.6 Over a million Bengalis were killed.7 And, an estimated 8 million refugees fled to India.8 In December 1971, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan when India sent armed troops into East Pakistan.9 U.N. debates over the conflict took on a distinctly Cold War tone, stalling any action on the part of the United Nations.10 The military conflict between India and Pakistan lasted only thirteen days before Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered.11 By January 4, 1972, the Secretary-General was able to report that the cease-fire between the two states “appeared relatively stable.”12 As a result of India’s intervention, East Pakistan ultimately achieved independence and became modern-day Bangladesh.13 In justifying its unauthorized intervention, India framed the issue as mainly one of self-defense and regional security. Citing the millions of refugees flowing from East Pakistan into India, the Prime Minister of India wrote to the U.N. Secretary General that Pakistan’s actions “pose a serious threat to our security” and that the resulting military action taken against Pakistan was “entirely defensive.”14 The Indian Ambassador to the Security Council argued that Pakistan had committed a crime of “refugee aggression,” that is, its aggression came from the strain its actions placed on India’s social structure and finances.15 India also argued that it had a right to intervene in light of the humanitarian catastrophe engulfing East Pakistan. The Indian Ambassador to the U.N. claimed that India had “absolutely nothing but the purest of . . . intentions: to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering.”16 India also maintained that its authority to intervene to end the humanitarian catastrophe was based in part on the consent of Bangladeshi people, even though Bangladesh was not yet an independent state.17 In making this argument, India argued that the rule of self-determination might be applied to the Bengali people.18
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, Legal Theory, and Humanitarian Intervention
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, and Asia

14. Collective Self-Action

Author:
Ananth Padmanabhan and Michael Shih
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Collective self-defense is an express exception to the U.N. Charter’s prohibition on the use of force by states. It permits a member state to intervene in the defense of another member state when that state has been subject to an unlawful armed attack. Here we consider (1) the obligations that international law places on an intervening state and (2) the best practices for an intervening state that may be derived from past state practice.
Topic:
United Nations, Military Strategy, Legal Theory, Military Intervention, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. The Meaning of "Assist, Encourage, or Induce" in the Weapons Ban Context

Author:
Christina Koningisor
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
More than half of all multilateral disarmament treaties currently in force prohibit member states from “assist[ing], encourag[ing], or induc[ing]” another party in its pursuit or use of the prohibited weapon. This report examines this provision across five major disarmament treaties and arrives at three key findings
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Optimal Deterrence: An Evaluation of the Leaks-Regulating Regime

Author:
Ananth Padmanabhan, Tina Thomas, and Jacob Victor
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
Recent high-profile leaks have led to renewed calls, especially from some members of Congress, for a more rigorous leaks-prosecuting regime. In response, others, most visibly the press and certain watchdog groups, have strongly resisted the claim that a more forceful response to unauthorized disclosures benefits the American public. This report evaluates the existing leaks-regulating regime and considers which of the current reform proposals are most likely to provide optimal deterrence. First, this report outlines the myriad and sometimes contradictory interests at stake implicated by unauthorized disclosure of classified information: protecting national security, safeguarding First Amendment rights, ensuring government accountability and transparency, promoting consistency in prosecution, and furthering efficient government functioning. Second, this report examines why it has proven difficult for the government to successfully prosecute leaks. It identifies four leading reasons. First, it can be difficult to identify a leaker, given the vast proliferation of the classification system and the expansion of national security bureaucracy. Second, the government faces significant legal burdens at trial— prosecutors often have to rely on circumstantial evidence; in the case of intangible information disclosure, the government may also have to deal with a heightened scienter requirements. Third, a trial may attract unwanted attention to an issue the government prefers to keep secret and defendants sometimes try to capitalize on this by using “graymail” defenses. Finally, the recipients of unauthorized disclosures—usually members of the press—enjoy robust constitutional protections that can restrict evidence gathering.
Topic:
Governance, Legal Theory, Deterrence, Classification, and Leaks
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. EU Privacy Regulation: Implications for U.S. and EI Law Enforcement

Author:
Carlton Forbes and Jacob Victor
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
In January 2012, the European Commission released drafts of two new pieces of legislation that would provide more stringent and more uniform regulation to the processing of electronic data relating to EU citizens. The proposed General Data Protection Regulation would govern the processing of data for general purposes, while the proposed Criminal Justice Directive would govern data processed in the specific context of criminal investigations. The Data Protection Regulation has proven controversial because of the significant number of requirements it imposes on private data processors, including requirements that the processor notify a consumer when her data is shared with a third party, and requirements that processors respect a number of new individual rights, such as the right of a consumer to request that her data be deleted (a.k.a. “the right to be forgotten”). Furthermore, the Regulation would mandate that many non-EU corporations would need to comply with its requirements when processing the data of EU citizens, or face harsh penalties. This memo summarizes the existing EU data protection regime, analyzes the changes proposed by the new Data Protection Regulation and Criminal Justice Directive, and explores the implications of this new legislation for U.S. criminal and national security investigations. We arrive at three main conclusions
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Law, European Union, Regulation, and Legal Theory
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. UNCLOS Dispute Settlement in Context: The United States’ Record in International Arbitration Proceedings

Author:
Julia Brower, Christina Koningisor, Ryan Liss, and Michael Shih
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a compulsory dispute settlement regime for resolving disagreements between member states. Critics of the Convention have argued that the mandatory dispute resolution provisions force member states to cede too much control over the dispute resolution process to an international body. They have also argued that the dispute resolution process is biased against the United States, and that the United States tends to fare poorly in international arbitration proceedings. This report addresses the first criticism by examining possible exceptions to mandatory dispute resolution provisions. At least one Annex VII tribunal has interpreted Article 281(1) of UNCLOS to permit states to contract around the mandatory dispute resolution provision through regional agreements. However, a subsequent tribunal applied a much more constrained interpretation of the Article 281 exception. Ultimately, the impact of this exception will depend upon which interpretation is applied. The report also examines the scope of the Article 298(1)(c) exception, which exempts from binding resolution “disputes in respect of which the Security Council . . . is exercising the functions assigned to it by the [U.N.] Charter.” This exception is not confined to specific subject matters, but it is limited by the procedural difficulties of adding or removing an item from the Security Council’s agenda, as well as by the political costs that such an effort entails. Finally, the report notes that UNCLOS’s compulsory dispute settlement regime is not accompanied by similarly robust enforcement provisions. The report addresses the second criticism by examining the United States’ record in arbitration proceedings under eighteen multilateral treaties containing mandatory dispute resolution provisions, as well as a series of bilateral aviation agreements that provide for mandatory dispute resolution. Fifteen of those agreements have yielded very few readily identifiable arbitration proceedings involving the United States.
Topic:
International Law, United Nations, Legal Theory, and Arbitration
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

19. Internationally Protected Persons: The Status of Consular Employees

Author:
Ryan Liss
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
This memorandum considers whether consular employees and their family members constitute “internationally protected persons” (IPPs) under 18 U.S.C. § 112. In addition, the memorandum briefly considers whether an assault against the child of a consular employee abroad meets the jurisdictional nexus requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 112, such that the assault could be prosecuted in U.S. courts. It concludes that existing U.S. and foreign law and state practice do not provide a definitive definition of IPPs that either clearly includes or excludes consular employees. Moreover, the status of a consular employee’s child is similarly unclear, as the status of consular employees’ family members depends on that of the employee. However, while a definitive answer is not provided, the travaux preparatoires of the relevant treaties and one U.S. decision at least suggest that consular employees are excluded from the definition of IPPs. Part I explains that the applicable U.S. statutory provisions do not provide an exhaustive definition of who constitutes an IPP. The statute relies instead on the definition of IPPs at international law. In addition, there are no U.S. cases directly on point, so the existing case law does not foreclose the possibility that a consular employee might qualify as an IPP. However, the court’s logic in one case, United States v. Marcano-Garcia,2 which relied on the assault victim’s status as honorary consul under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in determining his IPP status, suggests that a consular employee would not fall within the definition. The exclusion of consular employees from the definition of IPPs is also arguably supported by the international treaties that 18 U.S.C. § 112 was drafted to implement, as well as those treaties’ travaux préparatoires. Part II looks to foreign and international law. There are indications in statements made via United Nations reporting processes that some states regard themselves as obligated to protect consular employees. But these statements are vague and are not supported by a similar trend in foreign domestic legislation or foreign case law. Part III shows that even if a consular employee and his or her child qualify as IPPs, the jurisdictional nexus under 18 U.S.C. § 112 must be met. For American courts to exercise jurisdiction in this case, the provision requires that the accused either be a U.S. national or be present on U.S. territory. Having concluded that the law does not support a definitive conclusion regarding whether a consular employee qualifies as an IPP, Part IV concludes by discussing policy considerations both in favor of and against extending such protection to consular employees.
Topic:
Law, Legal Theory, Protected People, and Diplomatic Immunity
Political Geography:
United States of America and North America

20. TACIT AMENDMENTS

Author:
Oona A. Hathaway, Haley Nix, Saurrabh Sanghvi, and Sara Solow
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Legal Challenges, Yale Law School
Abstract:
As a general rule, the President is “‘without authority, except by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to modify a treaty provision.’”2 Thus, in amending a treaty, parties effectively sign and ratify a new treaty, to which the standard treaty processes apply. However, numerous treaties have established procedures for modifications to the regime that do not rise to the level of formal amendments to the treaty. This report focuses on such “unratified treaty amendments”—which include what are called “tacit amendments.” Unratified amendments are amendments to treaties that are made without formal Senate ratification.3 They have proven a useful tool in creating robust treaty regimes in a changing world. Just as the use of executive agreements in general has expanded rapidly in the past century,4 treaty regimes increasingly have adopted amendment processes that do not require a full ratification process. And just as executive agreements have raised questions about Senate prerogatives, so too have unratified amendments. There are two primary ways that the U.S. government modifies underlying treaties through an unratified amendment5 —first, through the use of executive agreements; and, second, through the use of tacit amendments. Part I describes how each process works. It argues that both pass constitutional muster so long as the Senate has provided its clear advice and consent to the use of such processes (although not necessarily to the substance of the modifications) in the first instance. Part II outlines and evaluates the various ways in which the Senate has responded to attempts to modify treaties by executive agreement or by tacit amendment in the past. It concludes that the Senate’s requirements of prior notice and its focus on technical provisions, while not always easy to achieve in practice, are sensible ways to maintain Senate prerogatives. Part III concludes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Domestic politics, and Federalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America