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Begin New Search Topic Economic Policy Publishing Institution Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)

1. Tax Audits as Scarecrows: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment

Author:
Ricardo Perez Truglia, Matias Giaccobasso, Guillermo Cruces, Rodrigo Ceni, and Marcelo Bergolo
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
The canonical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) predicts that firms evade taxes by optimally trading off between the costs and benefits of evasion. However, there is no direct evidence that firms react to audits in this way. We conducted a large-scale field experiment in collaboration with Uruguay’s tax authority to address this question. We sent letters to 20,440 small- and medium-sized firms that collectively paid more than 200 million dollars in taxes per year. Our letters provided exogenous yet nondeceptive signals about key inputs for their evasion decisions, such as audit probabilities and penalty rates. We measured the effect of these signals on their subsequent perceptions about the auditing process, based on survey data, as well as on the actual taxes paid, based on administrative data. We find that providing information about audits had a significant effect on tax compliance but in a manner that was inconsistent with Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Our findings are consistent with an alternative model, risk-as-feelings, in which messages about audits generate fear and induce probability neglect. According to this model, audits may deter tax evasion in the same way that scarecrows frighten off birds.
Topic:
Economics, Global Political Economy, Tax Systems, Economic Policy, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
United States, Argentina, and Global Focus

2. Construction of an Extended Environmental and Economic Social Accounting Matrix from a Practitioner’s Perspective

Author:
Onil Banerjee, Martin Cicowiez, Renato Vargas, and Mark Horridge
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
In 2014, the United Nations published the first International Standard for environmental economic statistics, known as the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA).. As more countries adopt and implement the SEEA, the availability of consistent environmental and economic information increases the need for analytical tools that can use this data to respond to policy relevant questions. In this paper, we present a workflow to develop an environmentally extended social accounting matrix, which can serve as the basic database for the development of environmentally-extended computable general equilibrium models. To illustrate, and given its comprehensive implementation of the SEEA, we apply this workflow to the Guatemalan case and the Integrated Economic-Environmental Modeling (IEEM) Platform.
Topic:
Economics, United Nations, Basic Data, Accountability, Economic Policy, and Statistics
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, Central America, Guatemala, and Global Focus

3. Multiple Violations of Labor Market Regulations: Patterns in the Peruvian Labor Market and the Impact of Enforcement

Author:
Mariana Viollaz
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
This paper quantifies labor law violations and how the enforcement efforts impact on the compliance level by considering the possibility of different labor regulations being violated simultaneously. The findings for the Peruvian labor markets over the period 2004-2013 indicate that: (i) multiple violations of labor regulations are an important feature of Peruvian labor markets; (ii) young workers, workers with low level of education, indigenous workers, workers in micro firms and workers employed in the agricultural sector have higher chances of being deprived of several labor benefits simultaneously; (iii) the enforcement of labor regulations, captured through the number of labor inspections at the region level, is effective in detecting and penalizing extreme situations of multiple violations of the labor law, but the evidence also suggests that firms adjust only partially as an attempt to reduce the amount of a potential fine if discovered, and that laid off workers during the adjustment process moved to the informal sector where firms are not inspected. These findings are useful from a policy perspective indicating that there is space to improve firms’ incentives when facing an increase in the enforcement effort.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Law Enforcement, Law, Regulation, Labor Policies, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Latin America and Peru