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11. What Turkey’s Political Changes Mean for U.S.-Turkish Relations

Author:
Max Hoffman, Alan Makovsky, and Michael Werz
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The July 9 swearing-in of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for his second term as Turkey’s president—and his subsequent decree1 thoroughly restructuring the Turkish government—have inaugurated a new phase in the country’s political history. Erdoğan will preside over a new system in which power is even more centralized in the office of the presidency than it was previously. Of course, this structure represents the institutionalization of what had been a de facto reality: Erdoğan was already the unassailable top decision-maker, and he will remain so. This continuity means that there may be little visible change in many areas of government. But the shift is emblematic of Turkey’s transformation over the last decade from an institutional, bureaucratic state into a highly personalized one. This personalization will affect Turkey’s foreign policy management, which may become even more unpredictable than it was before, with ramifications for U.S. and EU policy. As just one element of this change, Western diplomats may find that long-time Turkish diplomatic or military contacts have diminished authority and responsibility as foreign and security policy development is centralized in the presidential palace.2 Given his complete personal control, it is time to take seriously President Erdoğan’s apparent desire for Turkey to chart a more independent course, one that shows less deference to the ties that have long bound Turkey to the Western security architecture. During the swearing-in ceremony in Ankara, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro hailed his Turkish counterpart as the “leader of the new multi-polar world.”3 Erdoğan and his advisers certainly share this view: They believe that the United States is in decline, that the world is fundamentally multipolar, and that Turkey deserves to be a center of gravity in its own right.4 They further feel that the West is hypocritical in its espousal of democratic values and human rights. Therefore, they have concluded that Turkey’s traditional, Western-oriented foreign policy is obsolete.5 This worldview has led Erdoğan to adopt a transactional approach toward the United States and Europe and cultivate ties with Iran, China, and—especially—Russia.6 Alongside this understanding of a changing world, President Erdoğan has built his domestic political legitimacy on an aggressive nationalism that includes at its core deeply anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric.7 This was on full display in Erdoğan’s recent electoral campaign, which relied heavily on anti-Western resentment, conspiratorial thinking, and the cultivation of a sense of national threat—all staples of the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) politics in recent years. Meanwhile, the election empowered the extreme nationalists of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). This will only reinforce the negative trends in the government’s political orientation, given the MHP’s deep suspicion toward the United States and hostility toward any reopening of dialogue with Kurdish populations in eastern Turkey and northern Syria. This issue brief considers the ramifications of these changes for U.S. policy, providing recommendations for how the U.S. government should approach bilateral relations with Turkey in the months ahead. It is a policy designed to maintain the viability of U.S.-Turkish relations while seeking to restore Turkish respect for U.S. interests.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Authoritarianism, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

12. Partnership in Peril

Author:
Vikram Singh, Dalibor Rohac, and Danielle Pletka
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Populism, in and of itself, is not inherently bad. However, authoritarian populists who deny their political opponents’ legitimacy and divide society into a group of good, ordinary people and a corrupt, out-of-touch elite pose a threat to democracy and tend to degrade democratic institutions once in power. In Turkey and Hungary, for example, populist leaders have subverted independent institutions and weakened checks on executive power.1 Beyond frequently attacking domestic media, stacking their courts, and oppressing political opposition, authoritarian populists also often rail against multinational organizations and agreements.2 In earlier publications this year, a joint Center for American Progress and American Enterprise Institute team examined what is driving the success of populists in the United States3 and Europe.4 This report examines how populism on both sides of the Atlantic has weakened core transatlantic institutions such as the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and emboldened the West’s adversaries, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, European Union, Partnerships, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

13. A Snapshot of Turkish Public Opinion Toward the European Union

Author:
Max Hoffman
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
n the wake of Turkey’s June 24 presidential and parliamentary elections, Ankara has undertaken a coordinated campaign aimed at rejuvenating ties with the European Union in the face of a dramatic downturn in the Turkish economy. Turkish-European relations had grown strained in recent years over Turkey’s stalled accession process to join the bloc, as well as the country’s authoritarian drift, sweeping crackdown on dissent, management of the migration crisis, and the cases of EU citizens held in Turkish prison on what European governments considered trumped-up charges.1 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took repeated rhetorical shots at European leaders in 2016 and 2017,2 even suggesting German Chancellor Angela Merkel exhibited “Nazism” for saying that Turkey’s EU accession bid could be reconsidered in light of the deteriorating human rights situation.3 While President Erdoğan’s attacks may have reflected his real animus at perceived European abandonment of Turkey in the face of regional crises and a stalled EU accession process, they were also likely aimed at mobilizing and uniting domestic constituencies with deeply anti-Western views.4 But with the end of the election season and a rapid deterioration of the Turkish economy, the focus has now shifted to restoring ties with Europe. Europe is Turkey’s most important trade and investment partner, and the Turkish charm offensive is motivated by the country’s economic crisis and the crash in the value of the Turkish lira, as well as by faltering ties with the United States.5 The lira’s free fall has brought Turkey’s reliance on external financing into stark relief and even raised the possibility of an embarrassing turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for financial assistance. Turning to the IMF would be a bitter pill for Erdoğan, who seeks to project an image of Turkey as strong, economically self-sufficient, and independent from outside influence. The Trump administration’s tough line on Turkey for the ongoing detention of U.S. citizens—including largely symbolic sanctions on two Turkish cabinet ministers in line with the Global Magnitsky Act and new steel and aluminum tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act6—has cast another cloud over the Turkish economy and further underlined the necessity of patching up relations with the Europeans. In light of this situation, CAP thought it useful to offer insights stemming from its recent nationwide polling of Turks, shedding light on public attitudes toward the European Union and the political dynamics shaping the Turkish government’s approach.7 The nationwide survey was conducted by Metropoll from May 24 to June 4, 2018, and is based on 2,534 face-to-face interviews in 28 provinces. The overall results on each question have a margin of error of 1.95 percent. Like all public opinion surveys, the material presented here is only a snapshot. Moreover, it is a snapshot taken prior to the June 24 elections and further economic deterioration, both of which could somewhat alter the results were the questions asked today. Nevertheless, taken together with other data, these results underscore trends that persist to this day and are likely to continue for some time.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Public Opinion, European Union, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

14. 10 Things to Watch for on Brexit

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On December 11, British Parliament will vote on Prime Minister Theresa May’s deal to leave the European Union (EU)—commonly known as Brexit. As of now, it seems clear that she is nowhere close to having the votes to pass it.1 The vote comes after a contentious referendum campaign in the United Kingdom and two years of difficult negotiations with the EU, which saw Prime Minister May and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, formally agree on a Brexit withdrawal agreement on November 25.2 The deal would establish a transition period at least through the end of 2020, during which the United Kingdom would be formally outside the EU but still abiding by its rules and regulations.3 During this transition period, U.K. and EU leadership will negotiate the final terms of the future economic and trading relationship that will see the United Kingdom leave the EU single market and formal customs union yet likely remain in close alignment with the EU on many customs rules.4 If the United Kingdom does remain close to EU customs rules, it would limit the scope of any free trade deals the nation wants with non-EU countries that diverge from EU customs requirements.5 Furthermore, it would allow the United Kingdom to place new limits on the previously free movement of EU nationals into the nation.6 May’s Conservative Party is in the unenviable position of not having enough members of Parliament (MPs) to form an overall majority and, in order to form a government, it relies on an agreement with 10 MPs from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to vote with them on important legislation.7 Yet the DUP opposes the withdrawal deal, as do many of May’s own Tory MPs.8 And then there is Britain’s main opposition, the Labour Party, which is against the deal, as is the third-largest party in Parliament, the Scottish National Party (SNP).9 The reality is that there still is no political consensus in the United Kingdom between the mutually exclusive positions of those who want a hard Brexit and a sharp break from the EU, a soft Brexit that maintains close alignment with the EU, and no Brexit at all.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Social Movement, European Union, Brexit, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

15. Why Americans Should Care About Russian Hacking

Author:
Michael Fuchs, Carolyn Kenney, Anna Perina, and Francesca Van Doorn
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election was an attack on the American people, threatening the integrity and legitimacy of the democratic process, as well as the outcome of the election. And yet, the Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian activity in the election found that this was but the most recent and aggressive expression to date of a longstanding Russian desire to sow chaos and instability in the United States. Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election should be a wake-up call to every American about the diverse ways in which Russian malicious cyberactivity could affect every aspect of their lives.1 The so-called information warfare campaign ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin during the election is part-and-parcel of a longstanding and multi-faceted Russian intelligence strategy that “blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyberactivity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’” in order to cripple its adversaries.2 The election is not the first time Russian cyberactors have been successful. Over the past decade, Russian hacking groups—many of which are backed by the government—have successfully deployed a technology-based strategy to infiltrate, tamper with, and steal sensitive information across government, military, banking, and communications systems in the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Social Media, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

16. Erdoğan’s Proposal for an Empowered Presidency

Author:
Alan Makovsky
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On April 16, the Turkish people will vote on a package of constitutional amendments passed by Turkey’s Parliament on January 21, 2017, that greatly expands the powers of the presidency. If the package passes the nationwide referendum, it will broaden and deepen the de jure powers of the presidency, giving it authority over all executive branch institutions, including the military. It would give the president the power to appoint key senior-level judges and other judicial officials without parliamentary—or any other—review. It would abolish the post of prime minister, with the president assuming the powers of that office. And it would allow, under certain circumstances, the president to serve three terms totaling just short of 15 years. In short, Turkey’s long-standing parliamentary political system would be transformed into something more appropriately called a presidential system, in which an “executive presidency”1 amasses unprecedented power in the hands of one man. The referendum will take place amid the ongoing erosion of Turkish democratic institutions, freedom of speech, and political rights. Moreover, the referendum campaign and the vote itself will be held under some of the least democratic circumstances imaginable—namely, emergency rule.
Topic:
NATO, International Cooperation, Governance, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

17. Russia’s 5th Column

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Russia’s actions to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election and help then-presidential candidate Donald Trump win were similar to its activities to build a network of far-right political parties and movements in Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is using this network to advance his policy objectives at home and abroad. In this effort, Russia is motivated by both the desire to lead a conservative revival against Western liberal democracies and a flawed interpretation of recent waves of popular uprisings against autocratic rulers that sees an American conspiracy behind them. Putin has adopted a deliberate strategy to directly challenge the liberal international order led by the United States. That global system helped end the historical pattern of devastating wars among major powers and brought much of the world an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity since the end of World War II.
Topic:
Corruption, Social Movement, Leadership, Far Right, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. War by Other Means

Author:
Max Bergmann and Carolyn Kenney
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Liberal democracies across the globe are under attack. They are being attacked not by traditional weapons of war but by disinformation—intentionally false or misleading information designed to deceive targeted audiences. While these attacks may not pose a threat to the physical safety of democratic citizens, they do pose a threat to democracy. In modern democratic societies, credible information is critical to the economy, political system, and way of life that citizens have come to expect. When citizens of democracies do not trust information, the forums for discussing politics and debating policy are compromised. If the media in a democracy is viewed as biased or, worse, as aligned with special interests, the bedrock of the democratic system—its ability to resolve differences through debate, persuasion, and compromise—breaks down. A democratic society can withstand deep disagreements, but if its citizens cannot agree on some basic and fundamental facts, that democracy will struggle to function.
Topic:
War, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

19. An Alliance in Crisis: Europe Needs to Act Quickly to Defend Itself

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s European trip has thrown the trans-Atlantic alliance into crisis. The president’s unwillingness to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty—that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all—not only has revealed that America has become an unreliable ally but also has cast doubt on the integrity of NATO’s Article 5 and therefore the alliance itself. This is incredibly dangerous, as Europe is facing a clear and present security threat from the Russian Federation. Weakness invites aggression, and President Trump’s disdain for the alliance, as well as his apparent desire to appease Russia by removing sanctions,1 is practically inviting Russian President Vladimir Putin to test the strength of America’s Article 5 commitment. For the past 70 years, Europe has relied on America to guarantee its security, but should Putin instigate a security crisis, Europe will not be able to count on a Trump-led America to deter Russia or to come to Europe’s aid. Europe may now be on its own. Yet in this volatile and dangerous geopolitical moment, Europe is presently not ready or able to ensure its own defense. It needs to act fast.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

20. The European Union and Turkey in 2017: Move On or Apart?

Author:
Michael Werz
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Turkey’s efforts to negotiate for full membership in the European Union have now dragged on for more than a decade. Instead of bringing Turkey and the EU closer together, today the two are more estranged than ever before—and rapidly moving in opposite directions. While many of the relevant European countries have—albeit with difficulties—managed to stave off a wave of populist nationalism for the time being and are on a solid or at least stable growth path, the economic and political environment in Turkey continues to deteriorate. With mounting private debt, often denominated in foreign currencies, Turkey is desperately dependent on foreign direct investment—two-thirds of which comes from EU member states—and a renegotiation of the customs union.1 Even more concerning has been the profound political polarization, ethnic tensions, and sectarianism that have come to dominate public life in Turkey. The ruling party has overseen an enormous centralization of power, jailing opposition parliamentarians, reassigning thousands of judges and prosecutors, and bringing relentless political pressure to bear on Turkish civil society organizations. At last count, 15 of Turkey’s 191 universities have been closed by government decree, more than 130 journalists have been jailed, 178 media outlets have been shut down or put under government control, and 5,000 university professors from 112 universities have been dismissed.2 At the same time, a low-intensity civil war continues between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Turkish state in Eastern Anatolia, with dozens of casualties on both sides every week.3 Cumulatively, these developments have brought the relationship between the EU and Turkey to a decision point—it is time for the EU to revisit past strategies, readjust, and devise a path forward that encompasses both elements of a hard line approach when it comes to human rights and democracy within Turkey and an even stronger emphasis on continued engagement. At times, these strategies will exclude each other, but given the current state of affairs, there is no alternative. All elements of the complex relationship are at play and should be considered assets in a redefined EU strategy, one that will increasingly have to shift from political pressures to economic quid pro quo to generate the necessary leverage. A stronger approach is not only needed to save Turkey from further deterioration; these developments also have a direct impact on Europe, given Turkey’s close ties with the continent and with large emigrant communities, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. While there is consensus that the current turmoil within the European Union and in Turkey requires decisive action, EU policymakers still disagree about the best path forward. Traditional tools of policy engagement—the membership process, high-level consultations, and increased economic cooperation—more often have seemed to exacerbate problems in recent years than resolve them, and other options are lacking. Each one of these tools has become less effective the more Turkey has gravitated into a state of centralized authoritarianism. Given this current situation, a more systematic and strategic engagement with Turkish civil society is one of the few potentially productive avenues open to EU policymakers who seek to support Turkish democracy and maneuver it toward more enlightened EU-Turkish relations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey