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71. Revisiting the 12 Myths of Central Asia

Author:
Martha Brill Olcott
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
NEARLY TEN YEARS HAVE PASSED since the countries of Central Asia received their independence. This impending anniversary is a good opportunity to look at how these states are managing the state-building process, and in particular what symbolic or ideological defenses they are offering for their actions. States need little protection from their successes but are always seeking ways to explain away their various failures. This paper looks at the “myths” that the leaders of the five Central Asian states are using to explain away the very disappointing results in both economic and especially political reforms and shows how U.S. policy makers have bought into some of these myths as well.
Topic:
Security, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Central Asia, and Asia

72. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

73. Financing Nuclear Security

Author:
Todd Sechser
Publication Date:
12-1999
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States has spent over $3 billion addressing the nuclear proliferation threat from Russia since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Programs managed by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State have helped safeguard Russia's enormous stockpiles of nuclear material, dismantle nuclear-tipped missiles, and keep nuclear scientists employed in Russia and out of other nations' nuclear programs.
Topic:
Security and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

74. Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia

Author:
Martha Brill Olcott
Publication Date:
12-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To address drug proliferation and trafficking in the context of non-traditional security threats and to try to find ways out of the potentially explosive situation, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored a meeting of representatives of the five Central Asian states, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, the United States, the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Aga Khan Development Network, held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in May 1999. This paper analyzes the situation in the region based on the conference proceedings and aims to raise international awareness of the seriousness of the problem. It also advocates the need for a concerted effort within the region and without to help these countries fight this evil.
Topic:
Security and International Law
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Asia, and United Nations

75. No More Secrets? Policy Implications of Commercial Remote Sensing Satellites

Author:
Ann M. Florini, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Vipin Gupta, William Stoney, Robert Osterhout, Ray A. Williamson, John Pike, Allen Hammond, Anthony Janetos, John Baker, Adam Bernstein, Sarah A. Mullen, Kevin M. O'Connell, Daniel Dubno, Steven Livingston, Karen DeYoung, Barbara Cochran, John Barker, Daniel Schorr, and Jan M. Lodal
Publication Date:
05-1999
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
We at Carnegie believe that it is beyond question that we are living in a world of very fundamental change in the meaning and the relevance of national borders; in the relationship of governments, not so much to each other, but to other entities that are capable of governance, particularly internationally and especially private business and non–governmental organizations; and even to the meaning of national sovereignty. All that is the premise that underlies a major thrust of our work here in the Global Policy Program. It is also pretty clear to us that a principal, if not the principal, driving force of this change is the information and communication revolution and the accompanying mass of information, in its new form, that we are coming to call transparency as a political phenomenon. We also think that there are pretty good reasons to believe that the advent of high resolution commercial imagery is going to be another quantum leap in this revolution. And so it was natural for us to think that it would be useful to try to organize a meeting where we could examine the possibilities and the consequence of this emerging technology in some detail, both with respect to the implications for particular sectors? national security, environment, human rights, et cetera? but equally with respect to the effects on governance on political relationships, on difficulties or advantages that will be posed on the relationships between governments and media as well as other non–governmental actors. All of these issues, as you can see from the program, are on the agenda today.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Government, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
America

76. Tbilisi: The Tip of the Nuclear Iceberg

Author:
Toby F. Dalton
Publication Date:
04-1998
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In a front-page story on April 21, 1998, The New York Times broke the news of Auburn Endeavor, a secret U.S.-British operation to airlift fissile material from a nuclear research facility in Tbilisi, Georgia. This operation seems to be another success for the U.S. Departments of Defense and Energy in preventing the transfer of nuclear weapons, material or technology to nuclear weapons aspirants.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
New York

77. Strategic Arms Control -- Moment of Decision?

Author:
Rodney W. Jones, Michael Nacht, Sergei Rogov, Kenneth Sr. Meyers, Steve Pifer, Nikolai Sokov, and Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
06-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In his introductory remarks, Jones pointed out that key Russian interests in the terms of START II, which the United States shared and helped address in the early 1990s -- the denuclearization of Ukraine and the decoupling of Russian strategic forces from dependence on missile production plants in Ukraine -- faded into the background after START I entered into force and Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in December 1994. Russian criticism of START II thereafter focused on U.S. missile defense developments that could affect the ABM Treaty, on the heavy costs to Russia of implementing reductions, and on the unequal U.S. and Russian reconstitution potential under START II ceilings. By 1996, reactions to NATO expansion had become a further obstacle to START II ratification in Moscow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Ukraine

78. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Conference 1997 Agenda

Author:
Brad Roberts, Richard Speier, Leonard Spector, James Steinberg, Hank Chiles, Rüdiger Hartmann, Harald Müller, Leonard Weiss, Ben Sanders, Valery Tsepkalo, Shai Feldman, Phebe Marr, Riaz Kokhar, Virginia Foran, Dennis Gormley, Michael Moodie, Gennady Pshakin, Wendy Frieman, Shah. Prakash, Munir Akram, Michael Krepon, and Alexei Arbatov
Publication Date:
06-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
It is a great pleasure to welcome you to this conference on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Enhancing the Tools of the Trade." Each year, preparing the agenda for this meeting and preparing my opening remarks, provides me the opportunity to survey our field, to take stock of recent accomplishments and set backs, and to anticipate the challenges ahead. In many respects the news in our field has been good. Since we met last, in February 1996: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been opened for signature. The South-East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has entered into force for the regional parties, and the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone has been opened for signature. The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency has been upgraded and the way opened for further enhancements, under the second part of the 93+2 program. In the area of export controls, multilateral regimes, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, have added several new members and refined their rules... and China has strengthened its non-proliferation commitments by pledging not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear installations. In addition, there have been no new stories of significant leaks of nuclear materials from Russia or the other Soviet successor states, and U.S. cooperative programs to enhance security over such materials have gained considerable momentum. Reinforcing the norm of non-proliferation, the two nuclear superpowers continue to dismantle nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, and there are reasonable prospects for further reductions under the pending START II treaty and an anticipated START III accord. Looking at the threshold states... Pakistan is continuing its freeze on the production of fissile material, although Israel and India are apparently adding to their plutonium stockpiles. The North Korean nuclear weapons effort appears to remain frozen, as the result of the October 1994 Agreed Framework understanding with the United States. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons program, according to recent testimony by U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, has not progressed in the past two years, while Iraq's nuclear activities are being suppressed by UNSCOM, and Libya's nuclear program appears to be languishing.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, Russia, United States, and Iran

79. Proceedings: START II, Missile Non-Proliferation, and Missile Defense

Author:
Alexander Pikayev, Alexei Arbatov, Richard Speier, Rodney W. Jones, John Pike, Michael Nacht, Linton Brooks, Stephen Cambone, Seth Carus, Robert Einhorn, Ronald Lehman II, McCarthy Tim, Yuri Nazarkin, Keith Payne, Henry Sokolski, and Mikhail Streltsov
Publication Date:
02-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The first panel focused on the U.S. and Russian stakes in strategic arms control, the prospects for START II ratification in Russia, the status of START III issues, and the possibilities for cooperative approaches to the issues of strategic offense-defense interaction. The Russian panelists, Ambassadors Yuri Nazarkin and Mikhail Streltsov, and State Duma member Alexei Arbatov, explained Russia's START II reservations, steps in the ratification process, and expected implementation problems in eliminating Russia's multiple warhead (MIRVed) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). On balance, they agreed that START II serves Russia's basic interests, in lower levels of strategic arms, eventual economic savings, and political and military parity with the United States. They acknowledged that the ball is now in Russia's court, and ventured that parliament's approval probably would occur eventually.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia and United States