1. The Case for Foreign Electoral Subversion
- Author:
- Cecile Fabre
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Institution:
- Carnegie Council
- Abstract:
- Most foreign policy is not implemented through war. Yet, with a few recent exceptions—like James Pattison’s 2018 monograph The Alternatives to War—political and moral philosophers have yet to explore all options between war and doing nothing.1 Here I consider one such option: subversive interference in a democracy’s nationwide elections. In that regard, the years 2016–2017 have proved rich in controversies. In France, Russian banks with close ties to the Kremlin provided cash loans to the National Front in the run-up to the 2017 presidential elections. In December 2017, the Australian premier announced a tightening of restrictions on foreign funding of political parties out of concern with alleged and undue Chinese influence on some Australian politicians. Last, but far from least, in the United States the Office of the Director of National Intelligence along with the CIA, FBI, and NSA all take the strong view, backed in part by social media data, that Russian authorities actively sought to undermine Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign and to bolster Donald Trump’s.2 Interestingly, however, some of President Putin’s critics are vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. To give but two examples, the United States has a long history of interfering in the institutions and elections of its Latin American neighbors and, indeed, at the height of the Cold War, of its European allies. More recently, many believe that, absent U.S.-driven assistance, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia would have lost the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election to Slobodan Milošević.3 Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war and, indeed, other forms of coercive diplomacy. Perhaps this is because, to many people, the rights of democratic participation have primacy over all other rights; or because most often electoral subversion takes place covertly. Either way, given how destructive those other modes of interference are, this is puzzling. I frame my inquiry as follows. I focus on the state-sponsored, nonviolent, nonkinetic subversion of nationwide elections (for short, subversion). Moreover, because I am interested in exploring whether there are any situations in which subversion may be justified, I consider cases in which subversion is used as a means to prevent or end large-scale human rights violations, though my argument also has implications for subversion as a tool of foreign policy in general. In addition, my aim is not to evaluate subversion as an alternative to war or, for that matter, to other measures, such as economic sanctions. Due to space constraints, I simply wish to show that, under certain conditions and subject to certain constraints, subversion is pro tanto justified. Whether it is justified all things considered—and, in particular, once one has taken into account other options—is another matter and one that I cannot settle here. Finally, although subversion affects election candidates, it above all undermines a citizen’s right to vote. Accordingly, in what follows I focus on the latter and not the former. Attempting to subvert the democratic elections of a putatively sovereign country is a time-honored way of bending the latter’s domestic and foreign policy to one’s will. However, it seems to elicit far more condemnation than war. Before I begin, let me outline the overall normative framework on which my arguments rely. I take it for granted that all individuals, wherever they reside in the world, have rights to the freedoms and the resources they need to lead a minimally flourishing life—in other words, human rights. Moreover, they hold those rights against all human beings and their respective governments. Put differently, on this cosmopolitan view, all of us, wherever we reside in the world, are under duties to all other individuals, wherever they reside, to respect their human rights. How precisely we discharge those duties partly depends on the institutional structures under which we live. Be that as it may, I am not under a stronger duty to respect my compatriots’ human rights—for example, not to be killed or to be given means of subsistence—than I am to respect those same rights of noncompatriots, and vice versa
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sovereignty, Elections, and Election Interference
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus