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Begin New Search Topic Fiscal Policy Publishing Institution Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

21. Monetary Regime Switches and Unstable Objectives

Author:
Davide Debortoli and Ricardo Nunes
Publication Date:
11-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Monetary policy objectives and targets are not necessarily stable over time. The regime switching literature has typically analyzed and interpreted changes in policymakers' behavior through simple interest rate rules. This paper analyzes policy regime switches explicitly modeling policymakers' behavior and objectives. We show how current monetary policy is affected and should optimally respond to alternative regimes. We also show that changes in the parameters of simple rules do not necessarily correspond to changes in policymakers' preferences. In fact, capturing and interpreting regime changes in preferences through interest rate rules can lead to misleading results.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Interest Rates, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Interest on Excess Reserves as a Monetary Policy Instrument: The Experience of Foreign Central Banks

Author:
David Bowman, Etienne Gagnon, and Mike Leahy
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper reviews the experience of eight major foreign central banks with policy interest rates comparable to the interest rate on excess reserves paid by the Federal Reserve. We pursue two main lines of inquiry: 1) To what extent have these policy interest rates been lower bounds for short-term market rates, and 2) to what extent has tightening that included increasing these policy rates been achieved without reliance on reductions in reserves or other deposits held at the central bank? The foreign experience suggests that policy rate floors can be effective lower bounds for market rates, although incomplete access to central bank accounts and interest on them weakens this result. In addition, the foreign experience suggests that tightening by increasing the interest rate paid on central bank balances can help reduce or eliminate the need to drain balances. These results are consistent with theoretical results that show that tightening without draining is possible, irrespective of whether excess reserves are large or small.
Topic:
Markets, Interest Rates, Central Bank, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Fiscal Policy in the European Monetary Union

Author:
Betty C. Daniel
Publication Date:
12-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
A country entering the EMU surrenders its monetary policy, and its debt becomes denominated in terms of a currency over which it has no direct control. A countryís promise to uphold the Öscal limits in the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact is implicitly a promise not to allow its Öscal stance to deteriorate to a position in which it places pressure on the central bank to forgo its price level target to Önance Öscal deÖcits. Violation of these limits has raised questions about potential Öscal encroachment on the monetary authorityís freedom to determine the price level. We specify a simple model of Öscal policy in which the Öscal authority faces an upper bound on the size of its primary surplus. Policy is determined by a Öscal rule, speciÖed as an error correction model, in which the primary surplus responds to debt and a target variable. We show that for the monetary authority to have the freedom to control price, the primary surplus must respond strongly enough to lagged debt. Using panel techniques that allow for unit roots and for heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence across countries, we estimate the coe¢ cients of the error correction model for the primary surplus in a panel of ten EMU countries over the period 1970-2006. The group mean estimate for the coe¢ cient on lagged debt is consistent with the hypothesis that the monetary authority can control the price level in the EMU, independent of Öscal ináuence.
Topic:
European Union, Fiscal Policy, and European Monetary Union
Political Geography:
Europe