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Begin New Search Topic Economics Publishing Institution Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

81. Is Inflation Targeting Best-Practice Monetary Policy?

Author:
Jon Faust and Dale W. Henderson
Publication Date:
05-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We describe the inflation targeting framework (ITF) and compare it against hypothetical bestpractice based on optimization. The core requirements of the ITF are an explicit long-run inflation goal and a commitment to transparency in policymaking. Advocates and practitioners of the ITF have made many contributions to clear goal setting and communication by central banks. However, we contend that ITF communication policies both as advocated and practiced often have some elements that either obfuscate or, in some cases, explicitly contradict the dictates of optimization in a stabilization-policy paradigm. In this paradigm, the central bank has an objective function that places weight on both inflation and output-gap stabilization and faces a conventional (exploitable) Phillips-curve trade-off. We point out some problems that the ITF communication policy may generate in this setting. Our analysis leads us to make four suggestions for communication policy intended to help central banks avoid these problems.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Emerging Markets, and International Trade and Finance

82. Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-Quadratic Approach

Author:
Pierpaolo Benigno and Michael Woodford
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We propose an integrated treatment of the problems of optimal monetary and fiscal policy, for an economy in which prices are sticky (so that the supplyside effects of tax changes are more complex than in standard fiscal analyses) and the only available sources of government revenue are distorting taxes (so that the fiscal consequences of monetary policy must be considered alongside the usual stabilization objectives). Our linear-quadratic approach allows us to nest both conventional analyses of optimal monetary stabilization policy and analyses of optimal tax-smoothing as special cases of our more general framework. We show how a linear-quadratic policy problem can be derived which yields a correct linear approximation to the optimal policy rules from the point of view of the maximization of expected discounted utility in a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium model. Finally, in addition to characterizing the optimal dynamic responses to shocks under an optimal policy, we derive policy rules through which the monetary and fiscal authorities may implement the optimal equilibrium. These take the form of optimal targeting rules, specifying an appropriate target criterion for each authority.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Economics, and International Trade and Finance

83. Understanding the Effects of Government Spending on Consumption

Author:
Jordi Gali, J. David Lopez-Salido, and Javier Valles
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Recent evidence on the effect of government spending shocks on consumption cannot be easily reconciled with existing optimizing business cycle models. We extend the standard New Keynesian model to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb (non- Ricardian) consumers. We show how the interaction of the latter with sticky prices and deficit financing can account for the existing evidence on the effects of government spending.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance

84. The Decline of Activist Stabilization Policy: Natural Rate Misperceptions, Learning, and Expectations

Author:
Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We develop an estimated model of the U.S. economy in which agents form expectations by continually updating their beliefs regarding the behavior of the economy and monetary policy. We explore the effects of policymakers' misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment during the late 1960s and 1970s on the formation of expectations and macroeconomic outcomes. We find that the combination of monetary policy directed at tight stabilization of unemployment near its perceived natural rate and large real-time errors in estimates of the natural rate uprooted heretofore quiescent inflation expectations and destabilized the economy. Had monetary policy reacted less aggressively to perceived unemployment gaps, inflation expectations would have remained anchored and the stagflation of the 1970s would have been avoided. Indeed, we find that less activist policies would have been more effective at stabilizing both inflation and unemployment. We argue that policymakers, learning from the experience of the 1970s, eschewed activist policies in favor of policies that concentrated on the achievement of price stability, contributing to the subsequent improvements in macroeconomic performance of the U.S. economy.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States

85. Benefits and Spillovers of Greater Competition in Europe: A Macroeconomic Assessment

Author:
Tamim Bayoumi, Douglas Laxton, and Paolo Pesenti
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Using a general-equilibrium simulation model featuring nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition in product and labor markets, this paper estimates the macroeconomic benefits and international spillovers of an increase in competition. After calibrating the model to the euro area vs. the rest of the industrial world, the paper draws three conclusions. First, greater competition produces large effects on macroeconomic performance, as measured by standard indicators. In particular, we show that differences in competition can account for over half of the current gap in GDP per capita between the euro area and the US. Second, it may improve macroeconomic management by increasing the responsiveness of wages and prices to market conditions. Third, greater competition can generate positive spillovers to the rest of the world through its impact on the terms of trade.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe

86. Monetary Discretion, Pricing Complementarity and Dynamic Multiple Equilibria

Author:
Robert G. King and Alexander L. Wolman
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
In a plain-vanilla New Keynesian model with two-period staggered price-setting, discretionary monetary policy leads to multiple equilibria. Complementarity between the pricing decisions of forward-looking firms underlies the multiplicity, which is intrinsically dynamic in nature. At each point in time, the discretionary monetary authority optimally accommodates the level of predetermined prices when setting the money supply because it is concerned solely about real activity. Hence, if other firms set a high price in the current period, an individual firm will optimally choose a high price because it knows that the monetary authority next period will accommodate with a high money supply. Under commitment, the mechanism generating complementarity is absent: the monetary authority commits not to respond to future predetermined prices. Multiple equilibria also arise in other similar contexts where (i) a policymaker cannot commit, and (ii) forward-looking agents determine a state variable to which future policy responds.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance

87. The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy

Author:
Susan Athey, Andrew Atkeson, and Patrick J. Kehoe
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the model, well-designed rules trade off society's desire to give the monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against society's need to guard against the time inconsistency problem arising from the temptation to stimulate the economy with unexpected inflation. Although this dynamic mechanism design problem seems complex, society can implement the optimal policy simply by legislating an inflation cap that specifies the highest allowable inflation rate. The more severe the time inconsistency problem, the more tightly the cap constrains policy and the smaller is the degree of discretion. As this problem becomes sufficiently severe, the optimal degree of discretion is none.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe

88. Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence Between the Euro Area and the United States

Author:
Michael Ehrmann and Marcel Fratzscher
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
This paper investigates whether the degree and the nature of economic and monetary policy interdependence between the United States and the euro area have changed with the advent of EMU. Using real-time data, it addresses this issue from the perspective of financial markets by analysing the effects of monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the United States and the euro area. First, the paper finds that the interdependence of money markets has increased strongly around EMU. Although spillover effects from the United States to the euro area remain stronger than in the opposite direction, we present evidence that US markets have started reacting also to euro area developments since the onset of EMU. Second, beyond these general linkages, the paper finds that certain macroeconomic news about the US economy has a large and significant effect on euro area money markets, and that these effects have become stronger in recent years. Finally, we show that US macroeconomic news has become good leading indicators for economic developments in the euro area. This indicates that the higher money market interdependence between the United States and the euro area is at least partly explained by the increased real integration of the two economies in recent years.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States

89. The Great Inflation of the 1970s

Author:
Fabrice Collard and Harris Dellas
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
Was the high inflation of the 1970s mostly due to incomplete information about the structure of the economy (an unavoidable mistake as suggested by Orphanides, 2000)? Or, to weak reaction to expected inflation and/or excessive policy activism that led to indeterminacies (a policy mistake, a scenario suggested by Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000)? We study this question within the NNS model with policy commitment and imperfect information, requiring that the model have satisfactory overall empirical performance. We find that both explanations do a good job in accounting for the great inflation. Even with the commonly used specification of the interest policy rule, high and persistent inflation can occur following a significant productivity slowdown if policymakers significantly and persistently underestimate ”core” inflation.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States

90. Ramsey Monetary Policy and International Relative Prices

Author:
Ester Faia and Tommaso Monacelli
Publication Date:
04-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain consistent to a public finance approach by an explicit consideration of all the distortions that are relevant to the Ramsey planner. This strategy entails two main advantages. First, it allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that evolves around a steady-state which is not necessarily efficient. Second, it allows to describe a full range of alternative dynamic equilibria when price setters in both countries are completely forward looking and households' preferences are not restricted. In this context, we study optimal policy both in the long-run and along a dynamic path, and we compare optimal commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation. By deriving a second order accurate solution to the policy functions, we also characterize the welfare gains from international policy cooperation.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
United States