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Begin New Search Topic Counterinsurgency Publishing Institution Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University

1. Giving the Surge Partial Credit for Iraq's 2007 Reduction in Violence

Author:
Stephen Biddle, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Jeffrey A. Friedman
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Why did violence decline in Iraq in 2007? Many credit the "surge," or the program of U.S. reinforcements and doctrinal changes that began in January 2007. Others cite the voluntary insurgent stand-downs of the Sunni Awakening or say that the violence had simply run its course after a wave of sectarian cleansing. Evidence drawn from recently declassified data on violence at local levels and a series of seventy structured interviews with coalition participants finds little support for the cleansing or Awakening theses. This analysis constitutes the first attempt to gather systematic evidence across space and time to help resolve this debate, and it shows that a synergistic interaction between the surge and the Awakening was required for violence to drop as quickly and widely as it did.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

2. South Korea's Counterpiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden

Author:
Terence Roehrig
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In March 2009, the South Korean National Assembly approved the first foreign deployment of South Korea's naval forces to join the U.S.-led Combined Task Force (CTF-151). The purpose of CTF-151 is to conduct antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia's east coast by the Horn of Africa. South Korea joined the navies of twentyfour other countries that participate in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) through one of three combined task forces, CTF-150, CTF-151, and CTF-152, to help ensure maritime security in this region. The CMF is an international effort to conduct maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.
Topic:
Security, Maritime Commerce, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Africa, Israel, and South Korea

3. Leadership Decapitation and the End of Terrorist Groups

Author:
Bryan C. Price
Publication Date:
05-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Leadership decapitation has largely failed to produce desired policy results against organizations other than terrorist groups, such as state regimes and drug cartels. For example, killing or capturing kingpins has had little effect on the flow of drugs into the United States, and worse, it has often led to more drugs, more cartels, and more violence. Terrorist groups are different. Because they are violent, clandestine, and values-based organizations, terrorist groups are especially susceptible to leadership decapitation.
Topic:
Political Violence, Crime, Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Narcotics Trafficking, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States

4. The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Combating Insurgencies

Author:
Patrick B. Johnston
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Targeting militant leaders is central to many states' national security strategies, but does it work? What should policymakers expect when government armed forces kill or capture militant leaders? Is leadership decapitation more likely to succeed or fail under certain conditions? These questions have never been more pressing than since the May 2011 killing of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Political Violence, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency

5. Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps: How Education Can Help Defeat AQAP

Author:
Francisco Martin-Rayo
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper seeks to analyze some of the causes of radicalization and recruitment in refugee/IDP camps, and makes the argument that receiving a well- rounded education, even if it produces mediocre academic results, is the most effective method of counter-radicalization in crisis situations and reduces the space for extremist organizations to recruit and operate. Radicalization is especially relevant in crisis situations (and the camps that are created to house those displaced) because it can create space for terrorist networks to operate and stage attacks against governments or civilians. In addition, a highly radicalized refugee population can provide a cadre of ideal volunteers for a terrorist organization, as they are more vulnerable than traditional populations, typically come from a violent environment, and have fewer opportunities for personal advancement, thus making a terrorist organization more attractive. the existing literature on radicalization in crisis situations typically identifies three drivers of radicalization: the existence or pervasiveness of an Islamic education; the ability to find gainful employment; and the ability to have freedom of movement (encampment vs. open camp policies). this paper indicates that all three of these characteristics are secondary reasons for radicalization, and that access to a well-rounded education is a powerful enough factor on its own to overcome these obstacles and significantly reduce radicalization and terrorist recruitment in crisis situations. access to a well-rounded education, even if of mediocre quality and even if the student is only able to attend for a few years, is the most important factor in reducing radicalization and terrorist recruitment from a population in a crisis situation, once their basic needs have been satisfied.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Refugee Issues, and Counterinsurgency

6. The Exaggerated Threat of American Muslim "Homegrown" Terrorism

Author:
Risa Brooks
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In recent years, public officials in the United States and terrorism analysts here and abroad have warned of an increasing threat of Muslim homegrown terrorist attacks. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 perpetrated by European homegrown terrorists have contributed to these concerns, as has the surge in terrorist-related arrests in the United States in 2009 and 2010. Among these are the high-profile arrests of Maj. Nidal Hasan, who engaged Securityin a deadly shooting spree at Fort Hood, Texas, in November 2009, and Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to bomb Times Square in May 2010. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that the threat of American Muslims engaging in lethal attacks in the United States has been frequently overstated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Islam, Counterinsurgency, and Sectarianism
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and London

7. Al Qaeda's Religious Justification of Nuclear Terrorism

Author:
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When legendary jihadist Abdullah Azzam was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in November 1989, suspects in his murder included Osama bin Laden and Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan, Azzam sought to shift jihad to his homeland, Palestine. Zawahiri sought to focus the jihad on Egypt and the other secular Muslim states, in hopes of restoring the caliphate, the rule of Islamic clerics, which had ended after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. After Islamic rule had been re-established in the Islamic world, Zawahiri wrote, “then history would make a new turn, God willing, in the opposite direction against the empire of the United States and the world's Jewish government.”
Topic:
Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Palestine, Egypt, and Assam

8. Who Lost Vietnam? Soldiers, Civilians, and U.S. Military Strategy

Author:
James McAllister
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Scholars have long argued about why the United States pursued a conventional military strategy during the Vietnam War rather than one based on counterinsurgency principles. A recent article in this journal by Jonathan Caverley presents a bold challenge to the historiography of the Vietnam War. Rejecting the standard historical focus on the organizational culture and strategic perspective of Gen. William Westmoreland and the U.S. Army, Caverley argues that the roots of the United States' strategy in Vietnam can be traced to the direct influence of civilian leaders and the strong constraint of public opinion. Caverley's main arguments are a welcome challenge to the established wisdom, but they are not supported by the historical evidence.
Topic:
Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States

9. Enhancing Full-Spectrum Flexibility: Striking the Balance to Maximize Force Effectiveness in Conventional and Counterinsurgency Operations

Author:
William D. Anderson, Jr.
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
With the United States currently engaged in difficult and taxing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, renewed emphasis has been focused upon the country's cap abilities and priorities vis - à - vis this type of warfare. Within the military, the Air Force has been especially and increasingly criticized for being too enamored with a Cold - War era conventionally minded force structure and for not shifting aggressively to meet the threats of COIN - style conflicts that many predict will be pervasive throughout the Global War on Terror.
Topic:
Political Violence, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Iraq