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1. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

2. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:
Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

3. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and China

4. Why China Won't Abandon Its Nuclear Strategy of Assured Retaliation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in U.S.-China strategic stability. In recent years, the United States has been developing strategic capabilities such as missile defenses and conventional long-range strike capabilities that could reduce the effectiveness of China's deterrent. Writings by Chinese strategists and analysts, however, indicate that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and East Asia

5. Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions

Author:
Gene Gerzhoy
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Security
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
When does a nuclear-armed state's provision of security guarantees to a militarily threatened ally inhibit the ally's nuclear weapons ambitions? Although the established security model of nuclear proliferation posits that clients will prefer to depend on a patron's extended nuclear deterrent, this proposition overlooks how military threats and doubts about the patron's intentions encourage clients to seek nuclear weapons of their own. To resolve this indeterminacy in the security model's explanation of nuclear restraint, it is necessary to account for the patron's use of alliance coercion, a strategy consisting of conditional threats of military abandonment to obtain compliance with the patron's demands. This strategy succeeds when the client is militarily dependent on the patron and when the patron provides assurances that threats of abandonment are conditional on the client's nuclear choices. Historical evidence from West Germany's nuclear decisionmaking provides a test of this logic. Contrary to the common belief among nonproliferation scholars, German leaders persistently doubted the credibility and durability of U.S. security guarantees and sought to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent. Rather than preferring to renounce nuclear armament, Germany was compelled to do so by U.S. threats of military abandonment, contradicting the established logic of the security model and affirming the logic of alliance coercion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Germany, and West Germany

6. Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals

Author:
Matthew Bunn, Martin B. Malin, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism has not disappeared, though the world has made important progress in reducing these risks. Urgent new steps are needed to build effective and lasting nuclear security worldwide. The nuclear security effort must now shift from short-term improvements toward a focus on a continued search for excellence, lasting as long as terrorist groups bent on mass destruction and the nuclear and radiological materials they might use both continue to exist.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Border Control

7. Securing China's Nuclear Future

Author:
Hui Zhang and Tuosheng Zhang
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the threat of nuclear terrorism has become one of the most significant challenges to international security. China has worked to meet this challenge, but a continuing effort is needed. The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits raised the issues of nuclear security to a higher political level and enhanced international consensus on the danger of nuclear terrorism. China actively participated in the first two summits, and President Xi Jinping will participate in the Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in March 2014. China's commitment to nuclear security is now well established. Former president Hu Jintao emphasized in 2012 that, "the threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be overlooked." Meeting that threat, as President Hu recognized, "is a long and arduous task."
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Border Control
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. Shadow Wars of Weapons Acquisition: Arms Denial and its Strategic Implications

Author:
Sarit Markovich and Oren Setter
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
In trying to prevent adversaries from acquiring new military capabilities, countries often employ strategies of arms denial; e.g., "unilateral diplomacy," supply chain interdiction, covert sabotage and targeted military strikes. We posit that the prevalence of this approach gives rise to strategic effects that affect all players' behavior. We explore this phenomenon using a game-theoretic model of weapons acquisition and denial. Our model shows that denial could indeed be the equilibrium result of such strategic interactions, and provides the conditions under which the threat of denial is sufficient to cause adversaries to refrain from acquisition altogether. We further identify strategic levers that actors can use to improve their position in this interaction. The results of the model are illustrated using real-world examples and are then used to assess the implications of arms denial on arms races and regional stability.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy

9. Possible Frameworks for Verification of a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East - The Nuclear Dimension

Author:
Olli Heinonen
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The Resolution on the Middle East adopted without vote at the 1995 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference calling for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs), was reaffirmed by the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. The 2010 Conference mandated the Secretary- General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the states of the region, to convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. The mandate was the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon states. The anticipated 2012 Conference was mandated to take the 1995 Resolution as its terms of reference.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Security
Political Geography:
Middle East

10. The Korean Dispute over the Northern Limit Line: Economics, International Law, and Security

Author:
Terence Roehrig
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Security on the Korean Peninsula often focuses on North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles along with deterrence along the demilitarized zone. Yet an equally likely candidate for starting a conflict is a disputed maritime boundary called the Northern Limit Line (NLL) drawn in the Yellow Sea (West Sea). Indeed, since 1999, there have been numerous clashes along the NLL, most notably in 2010 with the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong island, that have come close to sparking a broader conflagration. This seminar examined the roots of the dispute, the economic, international law, and security dimensions of the issue and explores possible solutions to the problem.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Communism, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Korea