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21. Towards a Commonwealth law enforcement innovation framework

Author:
Genevieve Feely and John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
In March 2019, ASPI, with the sponsorship of Oracle, coordinated the ASPI–Oracle Innovation Framework Workshop. The workshop brought together subject-matter experts from federal law enforcement agencies, academia and the private sector to explore the feasibility of a Commonwealth law enforcement innovation framework (CLEIF). This followed a 2018 research project that explored the current state of innovation in law enforcement.1 That research was based on a case study of innovation in Australia’s federal anti-money-laundering (AML) provisions. The research project was underpinned by three key questions: How can technology enhance the identification of money-laundering offences? How can law enforcement bring together technology and policy to ensure more agile AML decision-making? How can law enforcement agencies gain faster access to new AML technologies and capabilities? The research resulted in the publication of a Special Report, titled ‘I can see clearly now!’, which provided specific analysis of the key factors that support and restrict technological innovation in federal law enforcement AML efforts.2 The report’s central argument was that the current ecosystem for technological innovation in AML needs to be enhanced to engage with the dual challenge of disruptive technology and the integration of pockets of AML excellence into a holistic whole-of-government program. While the research was focused on technology and AML, it has broader application to law enforcement technological innovation. The research found little evidence that the organisational frameworks for enterprise or portfolio technological innovation in federal law enforcement are fully developed.3 The March 2019 workshop explored innovation themes in government and the corporate sector that had relevance to law enforcement. The results provide further input to policymakers as they formulate future directions for the agencies and their capabilities.
Topic:
Governance, Law Enforcement, Police, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

22. Strong and free? The future security of Australia's north

Author:
John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This report argues that ‘there is a need to reconceptualize Northern Australia, as a single scalable Defence and National Security ecosystem’. This ecosystem should be developed to ‘deliver integrated support to current and future ADF and National Security operations’. The strategic importance of Australia’s north to Australia’s defence has long been recognized by government and policy makers. Despite strategic policy commitments to Northern Australia, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that the gap is widening between strategic policy and Defence’s actual activities and presence in the north. This could well be symptomatic of a gap in Australia’s northern development policies. It is likely that with the significantly reduced warning times of future conflict the North of Australia will increasingly become either Australia’s Forward Operating (FOB) base, or its lily pad to another forward location within the pacific or the first or second island chain. The northern Australian industry base needs to be enhanced to be able to provide a permanent and scalable civilianized replenishment and depot repair capacity for Defence capabilities deployed across the various physical nodes of FOB North. If the Northern Australian industry base is not scalable then the ADF may not be able to optimally configure to undertake Defence of Australia tasks, nor short notification joint expeditionary operations within our regional neighbourhood. To succeed, the FOB North concept must be fully integrated with Australia’s broader national security strategy. ADF and National security activities ought to be integrally linked and mutually supporting. The FOB North concept will provide policy makers the foundation for thinking of the North as a facilitator of engagement with the region. FOB North will also make the North of Australia a vehicle for defence with the region, rather than defence from the region. The development of FOB North needs to be part of, and supported by, Australia sovereign nation building efforts. FOB North as both a sovereign defence and national security concept is an integral part of building national resilience in Northern Australia and as such should not be simply planned and delivered through a defence white paper (DWP). This kind of ambitious national approach will involve Defence working with a diverse array of stakeholders and partners. It will also allow Defence to make a significant and lasting contribution to its most basic strategic interest; a secure, resilient Australia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

23. The Australian Defence Force and contested space

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Abstract:
This new Strategy report looks at war on the high frontier of outer space, and what the implications such a development might have for the ADF. It highlights that space is not a sanctuary from geopolitical rivalries. The report notes that Australia is heavily dependent on the space environment, both for its national prosperity and societal well-being, and for its defence and national security, and the report examines Australia’s current approach to use of space for Defence. The report then examines emerging counterspace threats. China and Russia are moving towards deploying a suite of ‘counterspace capabilities’ to deny access to essential space systems used by the US and its allies, including Australia, prior to, or at the outset of a military conflict. These include direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that physically destroy satellites in orbit after being launched from Earth’s surface; they are testing technologies that could be applied towards a co-orbital ASAT system designed to attack satellites from space; and have a range of ‘soft-kill’ ground-based technologies to disrupt, damage, and disable – but not destroy - satellites. Author Malcolm Davis notes that, 'China is developing the ability to rapidly attack US and allied (including Australian) critical space infrastructure prior to or at the outset of a future military conflict, in what amounts to the risk of a ‘space Pearl Harbor’ that would be designed to leave the US and its allies ‘deaf, dumb and blind.’ Such an outcome would severely erode the ADF’s ability to undertake information-led joint, integrated and coalition operations.' The report highlights the risks posed by ‘soft-kill’ systems described above. These don’t generate space debris, and thus have greater operational utility and anonymity, and they raise the threat of ‘grey zones in orbit. The report also examines efforts towards legal and arms control measures to constrain space weaponization and explores how these can contribute to reduce the prospect of warfare in space. The report finally makes a number of recommendations on how Defence should respond to this challenge to maintain freedom of action in space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Space, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific