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1. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond

Author:
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

2. U.S. Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and Alternatives

Author:
Kingston Reif and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In a little-noticed comment before his controversial July 2018 summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his government’s multi-hundred billion dollar plans to replace the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal as “a very, very bad policy.” He seemed to express some hope that Russia and the United States, which together possess over 90 percent of the planet’s nuclear warheads, could chart a different path and avert renewed military and nuclear competition. The Helsinki meeting, however, did not produce any agreement on nuclear weapons and Trump has so far shown little interest in a different nuclear spending path. Quite the opposite, in fact.“We have far more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said last October. “We’ll build [the U.S. nuclear arsenal] up until” other nuclear-armed states such as Russia and China “come to their senses.” Citing a deteriorating international security environment, the Trump administration is pursuing a significant expansion of the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition to continuing full speed ahead with its predecessor’s plans to replace the nuclear triad and its associated warheads on largely a like-for-like basis, the administration is proposing to broaden the circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons, develop two new sea-based, lowyield nuclear options, and lay the groundwork to grow the size of the arsenal. At the same time, key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, which serve to regulate the nuclear balance and prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, are now in serious doubt. The Trump administration has announced the United States will leave the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 unless Russia returns to compliance with the pact, and expressed hostility towards extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to five years subject to the agreement of Washington and Moscow. In short, the Trump administration is preparing to compete in a new nuclear arms race while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of such a contest. The projected cost of the proposed nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, according to a January 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. This is an increase of nearly $100 billion, or about 23 percent, above the already enormous projected cost as of the end of the Obama administration. Over the next 30 years, the price tag is likely to top $1.5 trillion and could even approach $2 trillion. These big nuclear bills are coming due as the Defense Department is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces and internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of—and perhaps reduce—military spending. “We’re going to have enormous pressure on reducing the debt which means that defense spending—I’d like to tell you it’s going to keep going up—[but] I’m not terribly optimistic,” Alan Shaffer, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in February 2019. This report outlines the ways in which the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy is unnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe. It describes three realistic options to reduce spending on nuclear weapons while still maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. Scores of billions of dollars could be saved or redirected to higher priorities by eliminating, delaying, or scaling back the administration’s proposals for new delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

3. Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry Into Force

Author:
Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing and a robust technical organization responsible for the operation and maintenance of a highly sensitive global nuclear test monitoring system, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. The CTBT is and will continue to be an essential pillar in the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise. Moving closer to the goal of the CTBT’s formal entry into force is the task of every CTBT state party, every nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) state-party, every state that supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and any other state that considers itself a “responsible” nuclear actor. But in order to realize the full potential of the treaty and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT will need to rejuvenate and update their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

5. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

6. Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The international community has been acutely concerned for many years about Iran's increasing capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. With sufficient fissile material and a warhead design, Iran could use its existing ballistic missiles to pose a credible nuclear threat throughout the region. Consequently, after repeatedly directing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, the UN Security Council decided in 2010 that Iran also had to halt all activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now that serious negotiations are under way to curtail Iran's ability to dash for a bomb, seeking ballistic missile limits as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would be unwise. Getting adequate and verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program remains the highest priority. The best way to address Iran's potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent. To also demand severe limits on conventional weapons that Iran regards as vital to its self-defense would jeopardize the negotiations' key objective.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs as P5+1 Talks Resume

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiations are poised to resume between Iran and the six powers seeking to rein in Iran's nuclear program, it is difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. For years now, the UN Security Council has demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran continues to expand its nuclear program and insists it will never compromise its right to enrich, the United States continues to tighten sanctions on Iranian trade and finances, and alarms are raised about Iran being able to sprint to a nuclear bomb with little warning. Yet, with a new Iranian president and negotiating team, there are grounds for cautious optimism that talks this time can be different. Although Iran continues to enrich uranium and add to its nuclear complex, time remains to negotiate an agreement that adequately guards against Iran building nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. The Naval Nuclear Reactor Threat to the NPT

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has long been a critical bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. Although preventing the production and accumulation of fissile material is an important part of this effort, the NPT does not explicitly regulate the production, use, and disposition of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for naval nuclear reactors. This exclusion poses a growing risk to achieving the nonproliferation goals of the treaty. While seeking to advance prospects for a fissile material cutoff treaty, the United States is continuing to design naval reactors for the world’s largest nuclear submarine fleet that are powered with weapons-grade uranium. While proclaiming its renunciation of any nuclear weapons ambitions, Brazil plans to build six nuclear submarines powered by uranium fuel that may be close to weapons grade. Neither the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nor important NPT member states have fully confronted the proliferation implications of excluding naval reactor fuel from safeguards. The IAEA and NPT members should take steps to minimize the use of HEU for any reason—a goal they declared just this month at a nuclear security conference in Vienna.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Brazil, Global Focus, and United States of America

9. Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
A long submerged flaw in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) surfaced conspicuously in June when Iran announced it intended to build a nuclear-powered submarine. The treaty does not ban a non-nuclear weapons state's production of weapons-grade uranium if it is to be used to power a naval reactor. What many now consider a proliferation loophole in the NPT was first seen as theoretical because only nuclear weapons states had nuclear-powered submarines when the treaty was negotiated. Now, as more and more countries initiate or announce intentions to initiate nuclear-powered submarine programs, this excuse for enriching uranium to levels beyond the needs of civilian power reactors intensifies the challenge of achieving U.S. nonproliferation goals. The United States should adjust its policy by: 1) choosing a reactor for the Ohio-class SSBN follow-on that does not require weapons-grade fuel and 2) pushing for multilateral action to close or at least narrow the NPT loophole that allows for non-nuclear weapons states to produce highly enriched uranium for naval reactors.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Submarines, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects

Author:
Arms Control Association
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has already helped to bring an end to nuclear testing, reduced nuclear arms competition, and improved global capabilities to detect and deter nuclear testing in the future. But until the CTBT enters into force, the door to renewed testing is still open. Entry into force requires ratification by a handful of key states. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), ACA organized a high-level conference on the CTBT in Vienna, Austria involving senior government representatives and leading technical experts. The participants reviewed the progress of the CTBTO and the International Monitoring System, examined the role of the CTBT in advancing disarmament and curbing proliferation, and evaluated the obstacles and pathways to the Treaty’s entry into force. This conference report includes formal conference presentations and summarizes the discussions.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Political Geography:
Global Focus