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2. U.S. Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and Alternatives
- Author:
- Kingston Reif and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- In a little-noticed comment before his controversial July 2018 summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his government’s multi-hundred billion dollar plans to replace the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal as “a very, very bad policy.” He seemed to express some hope that Russia and the United States, which together possess over 90 percent of the planet’s nuclear warheads, could chart a different path and avert renewed military and nuclear competition. The Helsinki meeting, however, did not produce any agreement on nuclear weapons and Trump has so far shown little interest in a different nuclear spending path. Quite the opposite, in fact.“We have far more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said last October. “We’ll build [the U.S. nuclear arsenal] up until” other nuclear-armed states such as Russia and China “come to their senses.” Citing a deteriorating international security environment, the Trump administration is pursuing a significant expansion of the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition to continuing full speed ahead with its predecessor’s plans to replace the nuclear triad and its associated warheads on largely a like-for-like basis, the administration is proposing to broaden the circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons, develop two new sea-based, lowyield nuclear options, and lay the groundwork to grow the size of the arsenal. At the same time, key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, which serve to regulate the nuclear balance and prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, are now in serious doubt. The Trump administration has announced the United States will leave the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 unless Russia returns to compliance with the pact, and expressed hostility towards extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to five years subject to the agreement of Washington and Moscow. In short, the Trump administration is preparing to compete in a new nuclear arms race while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of such a contest. The projected cost of the proposed nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, according to a January 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. This is an increase of nearly $100 billion, or about 23 percent, above the already enormous projected cost as of the end of the Obama administration. Over the next 30 years, the price tag is likely to top $1.5 trillion and could even approach $2 trillion. These big nuclear bills are coming due as the Defense Department is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces and internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of—and perhaps reduce—military spending. “We’re going to have enormous pressure on reducing the debt which means that defense spending—I’d like to tell you it’s going to keep going up—[but] I’m not terribly optimistic,” Alan Shaffer, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in February 2019. This report outlines the ways in which the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy is unnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe. It describes three realistic options to reduce spending on nuclear weapons while still maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. Scores of billions of dollars could be saved or redirected to higher priorities by eliminating, delaying, or scaling back the administration’s proposals for new delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Arms Race
- Political Geography:
- Russia and United States
3. Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry Into Force
- Author:
- Daryl G. Kimball
- Publication Date:
- 04-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing and a robust technical organization responsible for the operation and maintenance of a highly sensitive global nuclear test monitoring system, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. The CTBT is and will continue to be an essential pillar in the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise. Moving closer to the goal of the CTBT’s formal entry into force is the task of every CTBT state party, every nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) state-party, every state that supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and any other state that considers itself a “responsible” nuclear actor. But in order to realize the full potential of the treaty and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT will need to rejuvenate and update their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
4. The Complex and Increasingly Dangerous Nuclear Weapons Geometry of Asia
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann and David C. Logan
- Publication Date:
- 07-2016
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- While much of the world’s attention is focused on efforts to halt the nuclear and missile tests of North Korea, the nuclear arsenals and ambitions of India, Pakistan, and China also pose significant dangers and deserve more attention. The complicated nuclear weapons geometry of Asia extends from the subcontinent to the other side of the world. While Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is designed to counter India’s conventional and nuclear forces, New Delhi measures its own nuclear weapons program against that of China. Beijing, in turn, judges the adequacy of its nuclear arsenal against the threat it perceives from the United States’ strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. And in its efforts to mitigate the ballistic missile threat from North Korea, the United States and its allies in the region are expanding their strategic and theater missile defense capabilities. In order to fully understand how the pace and direction of nuclear proliferation can be influenced, the interconnections of these countries must be considered, along with the kinds of nuclear weapons they have at their disposal.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Asia
5. Resuming Negotiations with North Korea
- Author:
- Elizabeth Philipp
- Publication Date:
- 06-2016
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- The window of opportunity to prevent North Korea from fielding nuclear-armed ballistic missiles is closing. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea has been scant in recent years. In response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, the United States and other countries, through actions of the United Nations Security Council and independent policies, have adopted an approach of increasing political and economic isolation. Yet, during this time, Pyongyang has improved its nuclear weapons capability quantitatively and qualitatively. The next presidential administration must prioritize reviewing and renewing Washington’s diplomatic approach to North Korea. With each successive nuclear and missile test, North Korea advances its knowledge and consolidates its capability. History has shown that it is far easier to convince North Korea to negotiate away a military capability it does not yet possess. Washington’s stated primary concern is a North Korean nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Pyongyang will achieve this capability if it is not reined in through a diplomatic agreement or understanding. Once Pyongyang achieves this status, the security balance in Asia will be disrupted and U.S. diplomats will be hard-pressed to convince North Korea to abandon the capability.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- United States and North Korea
6. North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: How to Halt Its Slow but Steady Advance
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann
- Publication Date:
- 02-2016
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- In the first five weeks of 2016, North Korea twice defied UN Security Council resolutions designed to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons. On January 6, it conducted its fourth underground nuclear test; on February 7, it launched a satellite into space for the second time. These two events provided a vivid reminder that North Korea continues to make progress mastering the technology needed for developing long-range ballistic missiles and arming them with nuclear warheads. U.S. leaders have long sought to formulate and implement policies that would secure a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but these efforts have not been successful. U.S. political commentary on North Korea vacillates between taking at face value the regime’s exaggerated claims of technological prowess and reducing its leadership to cartoonish stereotypes. A clearer understanding of North Korea’s motives and the current status of its nuclear and missile programs can lead to a more realistic strategy for enhancing U.S. security. That strategy would involve using enhanced sanctions as leverage for achieving a halt in North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing and production of fissile material, but this can only happen through negotiations.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, International Security, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- United States and North Korea
7. Understanding the North Korean Nuclear Threat
- Publication Date:
- 05-2015
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference continues in New York, the international community's failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea looms large. Unlike the four of the world's nine nuclear-weapon states that have shown some progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals, North Korea is working hard to expand its arsenal and make it more credible. Unlike six of the nine, which have either ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or maintained a testing moratorium since the treaty was concluded, North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests, the only state to do so during the last 17 years. Unlike the three nuclear-weapon states that never became parties to the NPT, North Korea signed the treaty, declared it was withdrawing, later pledged to denuclearize, and then reneged on its commitment. The North's nuclear program today is out of control and accelerating, damaging both the NPT and international stability. Addressing this grim reality begins with an objective assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capabilities and an acknowledgment that the Obama administration's "strategic patience" approach is not working. Washington and Beijing must step up their efforts to revive the six-party process with the near-term goal of freezing Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, taking care to manage potential spoilers, Russia and the U.S. Congress.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Political stability, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, and North Korea
8. Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs as P5+1 Talks Resume
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann and Kelsey Davenport
- Publication Date:
- 09-2013
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- As negotiations are poised to resume between Iran and the six powers seeking to rein in Iran's nuclear program, it is difficult to avoid a sense of déjà vu. For years now, the UN Security Council has demanded Iran suspend uranium enrichment. Tehran continues to expand its nuclear program and insists it will never compromise its right to enrich, the United States continues to tighten sanctions on Iranian trade and finances, and alarms are raised about Iran being able to sprint to a nuclear bomb with little warning. Yet, with a new Iranian president and negotiating team, there are grounds for cautious optimism that talks this time can be different. Although Iran continues to enrich uranium and add to its nuclear complex, time remains to negotiate an agreement that adequately guards against Iran building nuclear weapons.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nonproliferation, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
9. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card
- Author:
- Kelsey Davenport and Marcus Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 04-2013
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Arms Control Association
- Abstract:
- The study, Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2010-2013 Report Card gives grades to China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, India, Israel, Pakistan—each of which possess nuclear weapons—and North Korea—which maintains a nuclear weapons capability—as well as Iran and Syria, which are under investigation for possible nuclear weapons-related activity.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, Iran, India, Israel, North Korea, France, Syria, and United States of America