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1. Congressional Perspectives on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons is one of the most significant and complex challenges facing the United States. Developing, implementing, and sustaining a verifiable diplomatic process that reduces risk and rolls back Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program requires a whole of government approach, including constructive contributions from members of the U.S. Congress. While crafting and implementing such an approach will be the prerogative of the Executive Branch, the role that Congress can play in supporting or hindering such a process should not be overlooked. Congress has used an array of tools to put in place conditions for negotiations, express its support or opposition to administration policy, and implement coercive measures toward North Korea designed to punish Pyongyang for its violations of international law and stymie its weapons development efforts. Using survey data and in-depth interviews from the late months of 2020, this report provides insight into how Congress views the North Korean nuclear threat and U.S. approaches to engaging with Pyongyang. More clarity into Congressional views and attitudes may lead to more effective policymaking.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

2. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond

Author:
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

3. The Nuclear Security Summits: An Overview of State Actions to Curb Nuclear Terrorism 2010–2016

Author:
Sara Z. Kutchesfahani, Kelsey Davenport, and Erin Connolly
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The 2016 Nuclear Security Summit brought to a close President Barack Obama’s high-level initiative to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and secure weapons-usable nuclear materials. The four biannual summits from 2010-2016 played a significant role in bringing high-level political attention to the threat posed by vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world and strengthening the global nuclear security regime. As part of the summit process, states were encouraged to make national commitments, known as house gifts, to take specific actions to strengthen nuclear security. Building on this concept, the 2012 summit began the tradition of offering multilateral joint statements, known as gift baskets, in which groups of states came together to address key gaps in the nuclear security architecture. The national commitments and joint statements resulted in some of the most tangible and innovative nuclear security improvements over the course of the summit process. This report offers a comprehensive assessment of the national commitments states undertook as part of the summit process. While these commitments represent significant advances, effective nuclear security requires continuous improvement to address gaps and new threats. States must continue to build on the accomplishments of the summit process to minimize the risk of nuclear terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

4. Resuming Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Elizabeth Philipp
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The window of opportunity to prevent North Korea from fielding nuclear-armed ballistic missiles is closing. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea has been scant in recent years. In response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, the United States and other countries, through actions of the United Nations Security Council and independent policies, have adopted an approach of increasing political and economic isolation. Yet, during this time, Pyongyang has improved its nuclear weapons capability quantitatively and qualitatively. The next presidential administration must prioritize reviewing and renewing Washington’s diplomatic approach to North Korea. With each successive nuclear and missile test, North Korea advances its knowledge and consolidates its capability. History has shown that it is far easier to convince North Korea to negotiate away a military capability it does not yet possess. Washington’s stated primary concern is a North Korean nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Pyongyang will achieve this capability if it is not reined in through a diplomatic agreement or understanding. Once Pyongyang achieves this status, the security balance in Asia will be disrupted and U.S. diplomats will be hard-pressed to convince North Korea to abandon the capability.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

5. Diplomatic Engagement: The Path to Avoiding War and Resolving the Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Greg Thielmann and Benjamin Seel
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
U.S.-Iranian relations are bad and getting worse. The New Year has opened with rising tensions between the United States and Iran and an increased prospect of war—either intentional or accidental. The Nov. 2011 report of the International Atomic Energy Agency details why the international community remains deeply concerned about Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. While sanctions and other measures have slowed down Iran’s movement toward acquiring a nuclear weapons option, Tehran continues to improve its nuclear capabilities and has so far refused to implement the confidence-building steps necessary to ensure it is not pursuing nuclear weapons. The latest round of U.S. unilateral sanctions has been met with Iranian threats of closing the Straits of Hormuz through which 35% of the world’s seaborne oil passes. Iran reinforced those threats with ten days of military exercises in nearby waters that included launches of anti-ship missiles. These and other developments highlight how relatively minor incidents could quickly escalate into a major military conflict. At the same time, Iran proposed on December 31 a new round of talks with the P5+1 group of nations, suggesting that that diplomatic options to resolve the nuclear concerns about its nuclear activities have not been exhausted. In the following Iran Nuclear Brief, ACA Senior Fellow Greg Thielmann argues that in order to avoid unintentional conflict with Iran, there is an urgent need to establish better lines of bilateral communication at all levels—between military forces in the region, between diplomats, and between senior officials. Thielmann also explains why pragmatic diplomatic engagement is essential to a successful strategy to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. Charting a Diplomatic Path On the Iran Nuclear Challenge

Author:
Peter Grail
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Even as tensions over Iran’s nuclear program rise, the principal parties engaged in the issue say that they seek a peaceful resolution through diplomacy. Earlier this month, Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili reportedly sent a letter to European Union High Representative Catherine Ashton—who represents the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—in response to the six-country offer for the renewal of serious talks on Iran’s nuclear program. With the P5+1 insisting that a diplomatic path to resolve the issue remains open and Tehran’s professed interest in dialogue, the question arises: what steps could the two sides take to resolve the impasse? In her letter to Jalili last October calling for renewed negotiations, Ashton said the process would need to begin with confidence-building measures to facilitate longer-term engagement. Given the current trust deficit and the inability of the fractured Iranian political leadership to agree on whether and how to engage on the nuclear issue, an approach that builds upon short-term arrangements makes sense. But it will also be necessary to have some idea of what the end-goal of such engagement might be. In this respect, Ashton said in her letter that the goal of the six countries is “a comprehensive negotiated, long-term solution which restores international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme,” reaffirming the group’s commitment to proposals it put forward 2006 and 2008. This brief provides an overview of these proposals and related confidence-building steps and discusses how they address the critical issue of Iran’s enrichment program.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Dialogue, and P5+1
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

7. Iran Nuclear Negotiations: What's Next After Moscow?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
On June 19, Iran concluded the third round of talks on its nuclear program in as many months, this time in Moscow, with senior officials of the six powers - the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China. Although there were strong incentives for the six to secure limits on Iran's most worrisome stockpiles of enriched uranium and for Iran to avoid an impending tightening of economic sanction, no breakthrough was achieved by the end of the latest round. But neither did diplomatic dialogue come to an end. The sides reached agreement to meet again at a technical level within two weeks in Istanbul, to be followed by renewed contact between the senior negotiators. With perseverance from the parties, the ongoing talks can mark the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end of chances for ultimate resolution.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Middle East

8. Is There Time to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The Obama administration has identified September as a time for reassessing its approach to negotiation with Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. It is imperative that this reassessment is based on a realistic appraisal of Iran's weaponization capabilities and limitations and not fall prey to politically motivated hyperbole. Iran's nuclear program is undeniably bringing that country closer to an ability to construct nuclear weapons-bad news for the region, the United States, and the world. Yet, a nuclear-armed Iran is years, not months, away, which is ample time for negotiating an outcome that prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear-weapon state while strengthening the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America