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1. Update: US and UK Strikes on Yemen Escalate Tensions

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 12 January, United States and United Kingdom air forces claimed to have carried out strikes on over 60 Houthi targets at 16 locations in Yemen. The operation was supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, members of the naval task force Operation Prosperity Guardian. The spokesperson of the Houthi military forces acknowledged the attack, mentioning that 73 raids targeted the capital Sanaa and the governorates of al-Hudayda, Taizz, Hajja, and Saada, resulting in five fighters dead and six injured. The multi-national operation sought to eliminate Houthi strategic infrastructure, thereby diminishing the Houthis’ offensive capabilities, and to retaliate following the group’s 9 January direct attack on US warships. However, it is unlikely that the strikes completely eradicated Houthi military capacity to target objectives in the Red Sea.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Strategic Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

2. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Sustained Resurgence in Yemen or Signs of Further Decline?

Author:
Emile Roy
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In the first two months of 2023, suspected United States drone strikes killed two senior leaders of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen’s Marib governorate. One of the group’s top explosives experts, a Yemeni citizen named Husayn Hadbul (also known as Hassan al-Hadrami), was killed on 30 January. The group’s media chief and leader of the group’s Shura Council, Saudi citizen Hamad al-Tamimi (also known as Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Adnani), was killed on 26 February. These strikes on high-profile AQAP leaders took place amid a resurgence of AQAP activity in Yemen, which started during the United Nations-mediated truce between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces that lasted from April to the beginning of October 2022, and that has informally held to this date.1 The lull in fighting between Houthi and anti-Houthi forces induced by the truce allowed for a broader political and military reconfiguration within the anti-Houthi camp. At the political level, former President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was replaced by an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to enhance coordination among anti-Houthi forces. Armed militias affiliated with the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) and other United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed forces exploited the new situation to gain control over territory in southern Yemen. As part of this territorial expansion, STC forces spearheaded several offensives against AQAP beginning in August 2022, leading to a sudden rise in AQAP activity in 2022.2 However, the nature of this overall increase is disputed, with some analysts arguing that it is a sign of AQAP’s weakness rather than its strength.3
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Conflict, Houthis, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

3. Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 25 March 2022, the Houthis launched a large-scale attack on Saudi Arabia using a combination of loitering munitions, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. This coordinated attack targeted oil refineries and energy infrastructure across Saudi territory, from Asir to the Eastern Province, and even threatened the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Jeddah. Yet, it turned out to be the last major gasp of the aerial war between Riyadh and the Sanaa-based government that had started in 2015. A few days later, on 2 April, a United Nations (UN)-mediated truce came into effect, which lasted until 2 October and, as of the time of writing, has effectively terminated Houthi cross-border attacks into Saudi and Emirati territories. In the current situation of relative stability, Saudi-Houthi talks are ongoing to renew and expand the truce.
Topic:
Deterrence, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia

4. ACLED Year in Review Global Disorder in 2022

Author:
Timothy Lay
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine escalated the war to a level that dwarfed all other conflicts in 2022, both in the sheer scale of violence and its deadliness. It also obscured a significant overall deterioration of the security situation in most other regions worldwide. Driven by heightened levels of conflict in both new and longstanding hotspots, political violence increased substantially over the course of the year. While 2022 saw some positive developments – including a significant reduction in total violent events in places like Afghanistan and Yemen after years of war – these gains only represent qualified improvements. Despite the aggregate decline in events in Afghanistan and Yemen, for example, they remain home to two of the most complex and severe conflict environments in the world. Globally, political violence targeting civilians became not only more common but also more deadly in 2022, underscoring the fact that it is civilian communities that are increasingly shouldering the burden of rising conflict levels around the world.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Civilians, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, Yemen, and Global Focus

5. Violence in Yemen During the UN-Mediated Truce: April-October 2022

Author:
Raed Khelifi, Emile Roy, and Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
On 2 October 2022, the UN-mediated truce in Yemen came to an end as the warring sides rejected a proposal presented by UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg to extend and expand the agreement (Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, 2 October 2022). The truce had first come into effect on 2 April 2022 and was renewed twice for two-month periods, in June and August. Among other things, it provided for a halt to offensive military operations by both the Houthi and Internationally Recognized Government (IRG)1 sides. Overall, the six months of truce brought several tangible benefits to the Yemeni population, including improved access to humanitarian aid (ReliefWeb, 31 May 2022), greater economic opportunities (ACAPS, 17 May 2022), and a significant reduction in violence and casualties countrywide. ACLED’s report on the first two months of truce found that April and May 2022 saw the lowest levels of reported fatalities from political violence in Yemen since January 2015. This trend continued for the whole truce period: reported fatalities from political violence between April and September 2022 were consistently lower than any other month since January 2015.
Topic:
United Nations, Violence, Houthis, Armed Conflict, and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

6. The UN-Mediated Truce in Yemen: Impacts of the First Two Months

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Key Trends: Both Saudi-led coalition airstrikes from fighter jets in Yemen and Houthi drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia stopped entirely. In the year leading up to the truce, ACLED records an average of more than 40 coalition airstrike events per week in Yemen,3 and an average of four Houthi drone and missile attacks per week in Saudi Arabia.4 Shelling across the main frontlines increased significantly, becoming the main form of political violence in Yemen. During the first two months of the truce, shelling, artillery, and missile attack events accounted for 55% of all political violence events, compared to 19% in the two months preceding the truce. While armed clashes between conflict parties remained at relatively high levels in April and May 2022, their lethality decreased considerably. The lethality of armed clashes was five times lower during the first two months of the truce than during the two months prior. April and May 2022 saw the lowest levels of reported fatalities since January 2015, but civilians suffered disproportionately from political violence. Although reported fatalities from civilian targeting decreased by more than 50% from March to April, their share of the total reported fatalities increased by more than 50%.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Gulf Nations

7. Religious Repression During Ashura Season: Cases from Bahrain, Iraq, and Yemen

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Religious celebrations can function as catalysts for religious repression, carrying a potential for state abuses and minority contestation (Hintz & Quatrini, 2020). A focus on Ashura celebrations demonstrates how regimes and believers can choose to respond to this Shiite festival depending on their respective religious affiliations, and how these responses can raise the risk for certain forms of religious repression. On Ashura, which recurs on the tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram, millions of Shiite believers across the globe mourn the death of Imam Husayn by reviving the events of Kerbala and staging mourning processions (Nikjoo et al., 22 March 2020).1 Commemorations continue for 40 days after Ashura, culminating with the Arbaeen walking pilgrimage, in which mourners walk to the Imam Husayn Shrine in Kerbala, Iraq. In 2021, ACLED-Religion records a 50% increase in religious repression in the week preceding Muharram (31 July-6 August) compared to the week prior, and a further 58% increase during the first week of Muharram (7-13 August). Notably, most Ashura-related2 repression events are concentrated in just three countries covered by the pilot project — Iraq, Yemen, and Bahrain (see figure below)3 — that have in common the presence of a large Shiite population. In these three countries, Ashura-related repression accounts for 46% of all religious repression events during ‘Ashura season’ (9 August-27 September).4 Across all seven countries covered by ACLED-Religion, Ashura-related repression accounts for around 20% of religious repression events during the Ashura season.
Topic:
Religion, Minorities, Repression, and Shia Islam
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, and Bahrain

8. The Hazm Brigades

Author:
Raed Khelifi
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

9. Mid-Year Update: 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2021

Author:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In ACLED’s special report on 10 conflicts to worry about at the start of 2021, we identified a range of flashpoints and emerging crises where violent political disorder was likely to evolve or worsen over the course of the year: Ethiopia, India & Pakistan, Myanmar, Haiti, Belarus, Colombia, Armenia & Azerbaijan, Yemen, Mozambique, and the Sahel.1 Our mid-year update revisits these 10 cases, tracking key developments in political violence and protest activity during the first half of 2021 and analyzing trends to watch in the coming months.
Topic:
Political Violence, Conflict, Protests, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Pakistan, India, Yemen, Colombia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Haiti, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Belarus, Sahel, and Global Focus

10. ‘Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong:’ The Imposition of Islamic Morality in Iran, Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq

Author:
Luca Nevola
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Religious repression is often targeted at individuals and groups that express religious behaviors or religious affiliation (Fox, 2016; Sarkissian, 26 May 2015). However, repressive acts can also be directed at imposing a coercer’s religious values regardless of the victim’s religious affiliation (or lack thereof). ACLED-Religion captures this type of religious repression under the ‘imposition’ religious context (ACLED-Religion Codebook, 2021). Critically, religious imposition does not delineate specific repression victims. Indeed, a perpetrator can impose their values on believers of a different religion, on “religiously unaffiliated” or non-practicing individuals (Pew Research Center, 18 December 2012), and on individuals practicing the perpetrator’s religion differently.
Topic:
Islam, Religion, Violence, and Repression
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, and Egypt