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11. The Alliance of Civilizations and the Role of Spain

Author:
Ramon Blecua
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The crisis over Ukraine reinforces the view that, despite progress in many areas on the international agenda in recent years, the number of people affected by conflict and violence keeps growing. In the past 20 years, the number of forcibly displaced people has doubled, reaching over 80 million. According to United Nations data, over 60 percent of conflicts have relapsed in the last decade, a staggering figure that testifies of the difficulty of conflict resolution in this context. More than 80 percent of conflicts over the past 30 years involve militias and non‑state actors, while the more recent rise in transnational violent extremist groups has increased the challenges for conflict resolution. Civil wars are leading to more protracted conflicts with ethno‑cultural components, which complicate the traditional political approach. Existing multilateral mechanisms and diplomatic negotiations are increasingly ineffective, and a new toolbox for conflict resolution is more urgent than ever. The combination of great power competition, regional struggles for hegemony, and the proliferation of non‑state actors create interlocking and multi‑layered conflicts that impact international peace and stability. At the same time, these elements are challenging the traditional approaches whilst further putting the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals at risk, as recognized inter alia by the latest Strategic Plan of the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. The international multilateral order is being questioned from many different quarters, while the wave of global protests shows the exhaustion of existing economic and political models, as well as the need for a new social contract. The impact of the pandemic and the measures taken to control it are also having a profound impact on these new political and economic dynamics, laying bare the growing inequalities of the new digital economy as well as the weakening of solidarity and common action. The increasingly intricate fabric of peace and conflict and the multiplicity of actors involved have made conflict resolution more complex, as stated in the December 2020 Concept on EU Peace Mediation. Terrorism and radicalization have become a more imminent security threat and tensions related to environmental degradation, irregular migration and forced displacement, are affecting the social fabric in fragile states in unprecedented manners.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Alliance, Multilateralism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Spain

12. Georgia After the Second Karabakh War

Author:
Mamuka Tsereteli
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
The outcome of the Second Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly trans­formed the geopolitical reality in the South Caucasus, with im­plications for the wider Black Sea‑Caspian region. The unsettled political geography of the South Caucasus and the ethno‑political separatism fueled by external actors since the early 1990s left bleeding wounds on the bodies of the newly re‑emerged sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These conflicts have determined the trajectory of the geopolitical developments of the region for the last 30 years, including on the for­eign policy orientations of these new states. The conflicts in the South Caucasus were the primary challenge for transforming the strategic assets of this region into greater political and economic success. Three major conflict areas in the South Caucasus were former autonomous regions, created in the early Soviet period: Nagorno‑Karabakh, Abkhazia, and the Tskhinvali region, what was called South Ossetia. (Briefly: the latter term was introduced by the Soviets in the 1920s as a name for the newly created autonomous area in Georgia, popu­lated by Ossetians alongside ethnic Georgians. The historic homeland of Ossetians is located to the north of the Greater Caucasus mountains. Following the Soviet tradition of planting ethno‑political time bombs, Ossetia proper—located in the Russian Federation—was named North Ossetia, while the Tskhinvali region of Georgia—with the Ossetian population at the time concentrated in the border areas with Russia—was named South Ossetia.) As of today, all three of these areas are self‑proclaimed indepen­dent states, are formally ruled by de facto governments, and saw fierce military confrontation in the early 1990s. In 2008, the Tskhinvali region became the battleground between Russian and Georgian forces. In 2020, Azerbaijan regained through a combination of military action and diplomatic brinksmanship all seven regions outside of Nagorno‑ Karabakh that had been occupied by Armenia, as well as one‑third of the former Nagorno‑Karabakh region. In the case of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, as of mid‑2021, these ter­ritories remain, in reality, governed by Russian occupational forces. The Russian military influence was in­serted into Karabakh after the war that ended on November 10th, 2020, with Russian peacekeepers playing an increasing role in the governance of the region. In terms of geopolitical orienta­tion, Armenia willingly allowed Russian troops onto its territory, seeing them as a security guar­antee and deterrent against Azer­baijan. Georgia aligned itself with the Western powers, determined to join NATO and the EU. The conflicts on Georgian territory are seen as punishment from Russia for Georgia’s pro‑Western focus. As a result, there has been a heavy Russian military presence in the separatist areas of Georgia since the Russian invasion to Georgia in 2008.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

13. From Struggle to Permanent Failure Why the Karabakh Attempt at Secession Failed

Author:
Azer Babayev
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
After 44 days of fighting, the Second Karabakh War came to an end on 10 November 2020 as a result of a Russian‑brokered ceasefire agree­ment. The most important questions here appear to be: what led to this dangerous military escalation, and what does it mean for the conflict, given that it seems to have now entered into a (new) political phase, again? In the declining Soviet Union, what was originally a status dispute over the autonomous Nagorno‑Karabakh region escalated into an international violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Following the end of a bloody war in 1994 (the First Karabakh War, 1992‑ 1994), a fragile situation around the conflict region took root: the “frozen conflict,” as it came to be known, lasted for nearly three decades and led to conditions of neither war nor peace. And during this period, it was feared that the longer the sides had to wait for a peace agreement to be reached, the more likely the conflict would re‑escalate and even­tually erupt again into a hot war. As it turned out, this is exactly what happened: an all‑out six‑week war erupted again unexpectedly between the conflict parties in late September 2020, and, as a result, the Armenian side more or less capitulated. But first things first: in the First Karabakh War, Azerbaijan suffered a major defeat, ceding to Armenian forces not only the secessionist region itself but also seven surrounding territo­ries. These other lands were, as a whole, twice the size of Nagorno‑ Karabakh itself and contained five times the old oblast’s population, the entirety of which was expelled by the time an armistice was signed in 1994. And that is why during this war the UN Security Council re­sponded by passing four resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Arme­nian forces from the occupied areas of Azerbaijan. However, the UN res­olutions failed to have any effect. Since that time, no international protagonists felt a strong, compelling need to try to resolve the Nagorno‑ Karabakh conflict. In addition, all in­ternational actors dismissed the idea of “power mediation.” Moreover, although Russia as a key international actor is directly involved in all the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, its involvement in the Nagorno‑Karabakh dispute has been rather indirect: in the Karabakh case, Moscow has been both a critical and a questionable actor. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a central position in me­diating a peaceful settlement to the conflict while, on the other hand, it has been delivering weapons to both sides. This last represents perhaps the most striking situation regarding the international dimension of the con­flict. Russia is militarily allied with Armenia and has a military presence in the country. It has provided secu­rity guarantees to Yerevan, primarily through their shared membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which neu­tralized to a certain extent the poten­tial effects of Russian arms being sold to financially strong Azerbaijan on a purely commercial basis.
Topic:
Security, War, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan

14. Beijing’s Long Way to the Gulf Region Oil, Security, Geopolitics

Author:
Fuad Shahbazov
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
Energy cooperation has been a key aspect of growing bilateral cooper­ation between China and the Arab states of the Gulf region for the past several years. Since 1996, China has become a net importer of crude oil and, as the second‑largest en­ergy consumer in the world after the United States, is now the third‑largest importer of oil after the United States and Japan. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that China is eying a deep and strategic partnership with the states of a re­gion that sits on top of the world’s largest proven crude oil and natural gas reserves. The deepening political and economic cooperation between China and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has received increasing atten­tion from the region’s more estab­lished strategic players: foremost the United States, but also the UK as well as the EU and some of its member states. Indeed, the region’s apparent geopolitical challenges— such as the American withdrawal from the Middle East, the escalation of sectarian wars in the region, the outbreak and development of the Syrian conflict followed by the spread of Islamic radicalism and similar threats—have encouraged the Arab states in the Gulf (as well as Iran) to look more to the East for new reliable partners. This has pro­vided China with an opportunity to obtain a foothold in the region, which sits adjacent to the Silk Road region and is therefore of signifi­cant and lasting interest to readers of Baku Dialogues. With the rapid growth of its economy and consequent height­ened energy demands, China is viewed as a potential investor by the oil rich GCC states, each of which needs to diversify its economy. On­going Western sanctions directed against Iran also make China an attractive proposition for Tehran. Although the Chinese interest in, and policy towards, the region is increasingly complex, this new axis between the Gulf region (especially the Arab half) and China has not received much attention from the think tank and academic communities—at least in the West.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Oil, Natural Resources, Hegemony, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Gulf Nations

15. Ukraine’s Strategic Relations with the South Caucasus With References to Turkey and Russia

Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
kraine’s relations with the three Southern Caucasian states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia have been varied during the three decades since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has paid greater attention to pro‑Western Georgia and multivectoral Azerbaijan, and the least attention to pro‑Russian Armenia. In Soviet times, the Ukrainian and Georgian dissident and nation­alist movements maintained close ties, and this influenced the devel­opment of friendly relations be­tween Ukraine and Georgia in the post‑Soviet era. From the late 1990s onwards, Ukraine and Georgia made joining both NATO and the EU priority goals, which also played a role in bringing Kyiv and Tbilisi together. Azerbaijan pur­sued a multi‑vector foreign policy of integration without membership in these two institutions, managing to be cautiously pro‑Western but at the same time not anti‑Russian. Armenia, on the other hand, has been a member of all Russian‑led regional integration projects since the early 1990s, and therefore Kyiv has had few common interests with Yerevan. Relations with Armenia have de­teriorated since 2014 because of Armenia’s support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the presence of Armenian merce­naries fighting against Ukraine in the ranks of Russia’s proxies in the Donbas. During the Second Karabakh War, the Ukrainian media, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and all political parties (except one pro‑Russian one) en­thusiastically supported Azerbaijan.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine