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231. Egypt’s Economy Amidst Regional Conflicts

Author:
Sahar Albazar
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Egypt, strategically positioned in the heart of the Middle East and North Africa, is grappling with significant economic pressures exacerbated by regional conflicts and geopolitical instability. The multifaceted crises stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian war, the Sudanese civil war, Libya’s political disarray, and the Russia-Ukraine war have collectively intensified the economic strains on Cairo. These challenges not only impact Egypt's economy but also threaten regional stability. Given the challenges facing Egypt and the region, Cairo is expecting from the United States to play a supportive role towards its strategic partner in the region. The international perception of regional instability is affecting Egypt’s domestic economy; tourism accounted for over 24% of GDP and employing over 2.5 million. However, the perception of insecurity in neighboring countries has deterred international visitors. Tourist arrivals declined by an estimated 25-30% between 2010-2022 compared to pre-conflicts levels. The resulting drop in tourism revenue has placed an additional strain on Egypt's foreign exchange reserves and employment relies heavily on this sector for foreign exchange earnings and employment.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Economy, Crisis Management, Economic Crisis, and Regional Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

232. How Autocracy Prevailed in Tunisia

Author:
Sarah Yerkes and Sabina Henneberg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Any future democratic renewal will require an entirely new movement that goes much further toward addressing the country’s deepest economic and social injustices. Not long ago, Tunisia was considered one of the biggest success stories in the Middle East and North Africa. Unlike neighboring Arab countries that experienced massive popular uprisings in 2011, Tunisia did not immediately revert to authoritarianism or descend into civil war. Instead, after its longtime dictator fled, an interim government held free and fair elections. The new, democratically elected regime adopted a liberal constitution and allowed civil society and independent media to flourish. By now, however, that success has decisively unraveled. Last month, for the first time in 14 years, Tunisia held a sham presidential election, marked by extensive manipulation and repression...
Topic:
Arab Spring, Protests, Autocracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Tunisia

233. Winds of Change: Ankara’s Subtle Shifts Towards Reconciliation with Kurdish Elements in Turkey

Author:
Wladimir van Wilgenburg
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Signs that Ankara is interested in a potential reconciliation with the PKK could lead an end to a decades-long conflict and have ripple effects across the region, although numerous obstacles remain. On November 11, Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), backed an October proposal by hardliner Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to address the Turkish government’s longstanding tensions with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) —a left-wing militant group founded in the 1980s that emerged in response to Turkey’s ban on Kurdish identity and language. Several weeks earlier, Bahçeli had proposed that the jailed leader of the outlawed PKK Abdullah Öcalan could be released from his life sentence in exchange for announcing an end to the group’s insurgency, and could likewise be allowed to speak in Turkey’s parliament. In his statement, Kurtulmuş underlined that the place “where all these negotiations should take place is the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the seat of the national will. I hope that we will enter a period where terrorism is no longer discussed, where terrorism has been eradicated.” Kurtulmus’s statement highlighted that there may be broader governmental support for the process initially outlined by MHP head Bahçeli. During his initial announcement, Bahçeli also shook hands with the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), this while in the past he has repeatedly called for the closure of the predecessor of the DEM and opposed a peace process between the PKK and the state. After Bahçeli’s speech, Öcalan’s family was allowed to visit him for the first time since March 2020, and Öcalan indicated he is ready to play a role to find a solution. However, shortly after, a new three-month visit ban was imposed on Öcalan. Nevertheless, Bahçeli’s proposal—especially notable coming from the MHP, which formed the People’s Alliance with the AKP in 2018 and in the past always had a hardline policy on the PKK, including calling for Öcalan’s execution in 2007—has resulted in many discussions in Turkey over the potential of a new peace process. Erdogan (and the PKK) had pursued such a process during his early years in office, but it collapsed in 2015 and resulted in new fighting between the Turkish state and the PKK. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani noted In October 2024 at the MERI conference in Erbil that this would mark the beginning of a new process, adding that the remarks of Turkish government officials are promising. “They indicate that a process is underway and that the issues at hand will be addressed.” President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed the proposal on October 30 but underlined that Bahçeli’s appeal was not directed toward the "terror barons" in Iraq and Syria (PKK) and called on Kurds to accept Bahçeli’s proposal.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Kurds, Reconciliation, and PKK
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

234. Supporting the SDF in Post-Assad Syria

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To preserve its only reliable and capable partner in the fight against the Islamic State, the United States must help the SDF deter HTS and fend off Turkey-backed militias. Bashar al-Assad’s fall has quickly changed the map of Syria. While the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its allies swept out of their base in Idlib to seize major regime strongholds en route to the capital, other opposition groups moved to take territory in the southeastern provinces of Deraa and Quneitra. In the central and southern Badia desert region, the U.S.-backed opposition faction Maghawir al-Thawra has expanded its control around the American garrison at al-Tanf. Remnants of the Islamic State (IS) prowl the desert too, liable to strike at any moment. And in the northeast, the U.S.-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) moved deeper into Raqqa but lost ground in Tal Rifaat and Manbij due to advances by the Syrian National Army (SNA), the local coalition of Turkey-backed militias. At this fragile moment, U.S. officials must reassess the SDF’s needs to ensure it has the support required to continue the mission that brought the two partners together in the first place—the shared fight against IS, which now includes defending the many northeastern detention facilities that hold thousands of IS members and supporters. This task also entails keeping SNA militias at bay and ensuring that the SDF is prepared to face a renewed HTS offensive if the jihadists decide to push into the northeast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

235. Washington Returns to Damascus with High Stakes for Syria’s Transition

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The delegation’s findings on key political and security issues will have a major impact on future U.S. engagement with Syria’s new leaders, including the decision on whether or not to remove sanctions. For the first time since October 2011, when Ambassador Robert Ford was pulled from Syria amid U.S. concerns about the Assad regime’s crackdown on protesters, Washington is back in Damascus—this time to engage with the new transitional government led by rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Earlier today, U.S. officials met with HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (aka Ahmed al-Sharaa) to uncover information on missing Americans Austin Tice, Majd Kamalmaz, and others; they were also scheduled to meet with civil society figures, activists, and representatives of various minority communities. The delegation includes Barbara Leaf, the State Department’s assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs; Roger Carstens, the special presidential envoy for hostage affairs; and Daniel Rubinstein, a long-time Arabist and retired ambassador recently recalled to duty. Their visit comes on the heels of a Pentagon announcement that the U.S. military presence in Syria has jumped from 900 to 2,000 soldiers, illustrating concerns about how the Islamic State (IS) might take advantage of the new situation. The delegation arrives at a momentous time in Syria’s transition process, which is officially scheduled to last until March 1. Local sources suggest that the second phase of the transition will begin in the coming days, during which HTS is supposed to open the process to more representatives from all of Syrian society, rather than just the HTS loyalists who have overseen the first phase. Therefore, much is at stake for the current U.S. delegation and Washington’s broader efforts to redevelop a Syria policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transitional Government
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

236. Public Opinion and Development Policy: Alignment Needed

Author:
Irene Paviotti
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The crises of the past few years have significantly affected the volumes of official development assistance (ODA) – also known as aid – provided by traditional donors. 2023 marked the fifth consecutive year for increased ODA allocations globally: total volumes reached 223.7 billion US dollars, a significant increase from the 160 billion US dollars provided in 2019. The succession of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and, most recently, the flare-up of the Israel-Palestine conflict contributed to such increase. Absolute volumes however position members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), that is, traditional donors, still far away from the United Nations target of allocating 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) to ODA – in 2023, the OECD average hovered around 0.37 per cent.[1] Although this percentage is the highest in 55 years,[2] the need for concessional finance for developing countries has arguably never been more urgent. The challenges brought about by an ever-worsening climate crisis, coupled with long-standing issues such as poverty and poor health are enough to justify increased ODA, according to practitioners.[3] These figures are usually (and rightly) discussed from such outward impact perspective – how will a less generous donor affect the beneficiaries whose livelihoods its ODA supports? The input dimension, that is, whether these policies align with a country’s public sentiment on ODA, is however relatively less explored. ODA is public funding, so it might be legitimate to ask: where does public opinion stand on aid, and what could this possibly mean for development policy and practice?
Topic:
Development, Public Opinion, and Economic Aid
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Italy, and United States of America

237. China-Taiwan Relations and the EU: How European Soft Power Could Help Reduce Cross-Strait Tensions

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has brought back to the spotlight the question of China’s (officially the People’s Republic of China, PRC) potential attack on Taiwan (officially the Republic of China, ROC). Beijing claims that the island is one of its provinces, whereas the current Taiwanese government maintains that it is already an independent country. A conflict over Taiwan – or even a Chinese blockade of the island – would have immediate economic and political implications for Europe which will likely impose sanctions on the PRC, the EU’s second-largest trading partner.[1] The EU is not a security actor in East Asia, but has some formidable – and unique – soft power assets that could be leveraged to promote dialogue and understanding between China and Taiwan, with the objective of reducing tensions in the area and maintaining the status quo.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, International Relations, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

238. Technological Innovation and Cybersecurity: The Role of the G7

Author:
Ettore Greco and Federica Marconi
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In an era of unprecedented technological advancement, digital transformation is revealing its enormous potential, but also presenting new challenges. At its core, it represents a catalyst for innovation, igniting advancements that enhance productivity and propel economic growth. Thus, harnessing its transformative power holds the promise of unlocking new opportunities, solving complex challenges and ultimately shaping a more inclusive and sustainable future for humanity. However, rapid technological progress has ushered in a new era of interconnectedness and interdependence, where nations are increasingly reliant on digital systems and networks to power their economies and safeguard their national security. In this regard, the intersection of technological advancement and the amplification of geopolitical tensions has brought into sharp focus the myriad threats that countries face in the contemporary landscape. Among others, cyberattacks, in particular, have grown more sophisticated, transcending national borders and necessitating collaboration and partnerships among nations to protect against such threats. These challenges have prompted all major actors – both public and private – to intensify their efforts to protect their data and digital assets. They are devising and implementing a variety of risk management strategies. The empirical evidence shows that the most effective and resilient cybersecurity policies and approaches are those tailored to specific risks and security requirements. Individual organisations need to adopt the cybersecurity measures most appropriate for the challenges they face, based on a careful risk assessment. This requires the adoption of internationally recognised cybersecurity frameworks and standards that are based upon the principles of risk management and that are relevant across sectors to strengthen consistency and continuity among interconnected sectors and throughout global supply chains. Cybersecurity threats are transnational by definition and as such they can be countered effectively only through global mechanisms aimed at risk reduction and trust building. A primary objective of multilateral cooperation should be the adoption of interoperable policy frameworks that promote international harmonisation and consistent cybersecurity mechanisms. The G7 can provide a fundamental impulse for this cooperation at the global level by encouraging the development and implementation of risk-based, consensus-driven frameworks, standards and risk management best practices. A commitment to these internationally recognised cyber risk management approaches and frameworks can advance economic security and enhance cyber resilience across the ecosystem.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, G7, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

239. Gaza’s Day After Starts in Ramallah

Author:
Francesca Borri
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The toing and froing of proposals and counterproposals for a ceasefire in Gaza has been going on for months now. The talks between the Israeli government and Hamas, however, have never really been about numbers: how many hostages to release, which ones, in return for how many and which prisoners, and how many days of truce. The sticking point is another: Hamas calls for the end of the war, and the Israeli government for the end of Hamas. This means that, in reality, the stand-off is all about the “day after”. How can a government be established in Gaza that ensures freedom and development on one side, and security on the other one? And yet, that’s what no one has been working on. While most mediators admit by now that Hamas will not be destroyed, in the ceasefire talks the issue of the “day after” continues not to be factored in.
Topic:
Hamas, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

240. Italy’s National Energy and Climate Plan and Road Transport: An Appraisal

Author:
Pier Paolo Raimondi and Michel Noussan
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The Italian government has recently submitted the final version of its National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP),[1] which outlines Italian measures to achieve its national climate targets by 2030 in line with the objectives set by the European Union. To do so, Italy has put forward targets, strategies and measures also for the decarbonisation of transport, which remains among the hardest to decarbonise. While Italy’s greenhouse gas emissions due to energy consumption have decreased by 21 per cent from 1990 to 2022, those related to transport have increased by 8 per cent in the same period. Moreover, the transport sector accounted for 27 per cent of national emissions in 2022, with road transport alone accounting for 92 per cent of those emissions.[2] Against this backdrop, it is important to assess the main targets and political implications of Italy’s NECP related to both private cars and heavy-duty road transport (buses and trucks) in order to identify potential gaps and opportunities to reach Italy’s climate targets.
Topic:
Climate Change, Transportation, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy